Opinion
B327961
12-19-2023
In re I.D., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. L.C. et al., Defendants and Appellants LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.C. David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.D. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 21CCJP01963A Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.C.
David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.D.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent
BAKER, J.
We are asked to decide two questions: (1) whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when concluding terminating the parental rights of L.C. (Mother) and C.D. (Father) would not be detrimental to their daughter, I.D. (Minor); and (2) whether the court was justified in denying father's change of circumstance petition without ordering an evidentiary hearing on the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Investigation and Assumption of Dependency Jurisdiction
Minor was born in January 2021. In April 2021, when Minor was just under three months old, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) received an anonymous report concerning cuts and bruises on Minor.
A Department social worker observed bruising and a small cut on Minor's face, but she otherwise appeared to be healthy and well-nourished. Mother and Father separately told the social worker that Minor was injured in her bassinet while a maternal aunt was babysitting. The aunt said Minor was sleeping in her bassinet and she slept in her own room much of the time that Mother and Father were away. She heard no suspicious noises that would have suggested Minor had been injured while sleeping.
Mother and Father did not seek medical attention for Minor's bruising because she was behaving normally. They had, however, sought medical attention for Minor a couple weeks earlier because she had diarrhea. Minor was diagnosed with a urinary tract infection and completed a prescribed course of medication.
Mother and Father both disclosed they use marijuana on weekends when Minor's paternal grandmother babysits. Father denied any mental health issues. Mother denied any current mental health issues but revealed she attempted suicide a few years earlier.
Minor was referred for a forensic medical examination, which revealed multiple fractures in her arms and legs. Several doctors told the Department that Minor's injuries were not consistent with Mother and Father's statements. One explained Minor's injuries were likely not accidental because they were "'too large'" and required "[h]igh impact trauma.'" Another wrote that "[b]ruising in this small of an infant is incredibly suspicious alone for physical child abuse as this child does not show evidence of a bleeding disorder, there is no history of injury[,] and this child is not able to ambulate. In addition, this child has at least one healing fracture and multiple other areas to her legs and right arm that likely show signs of healing/previous injury. Therefore, this child has likely had multiple incidents of trauma." In a follow-up letter, the same doctor wrote that the "[t]iming of fractures can best be done in broad strokes....It is likely these fractures occurred around the same time frame although the bruising to the face was likely a separate incident due to the differing mechanism of this injury ...."
Mother and Father expressed shock when advised of Minor's discovered injuries and denied abusing her. They said they had mentioned Minor was not moving her legs during their doctor visit weeks earlier, but the doctor "said she was fine and did not take x rays." When they were interviewed again several weeks later, Mother and Father said Father had fallen on stairs while holding Minor at one point, but they did not believe Minor was injured at the time. Mother also recalled an incident in which Father had struggled to extricate Minor's legs from a walker. Mother said Minor's legs were the primary reason for the visit to the doctor in early April and she "wish[ed]" she had "advocated more . . . and focused more on [Minor's] leg which is what [she] was mostly worried about."
Minor's medical records indicate Mother brought her to a clinic in early April 2021. Minor exhibited gastrointestinal issues, "ha[d] her legs curled up[,] and [was] constantly crying." She was referred to the emergency room to "'rule out intussusception'" and she was treated for a urinary tract infection.
Minor was placed with non-relative foster parent, Rosalind G. (Rosalind), when she was released from the hospital where she underwent the forensic examination. Rosalind is a retired social worker, and Minor is the 85th foster child that has been in her care. Rosalind told the Department that Mother and Father "c[a]me prepared" for visits and "completely focused on [Minor] the entire time." They held, changed, and fed Minor, inquired about her eating and sleeping, and appeared to "griev[e] the missed milestones ...." The visits were "the sweetest thing [Rosalind] ha[d] ever seen."
In July 2021, Mother and Father pled no contest to a juvenile dependency petition alleging a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Minor based on their failure to protect her from injuries consistent with non-accidental trauma. The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over Minor, ordered her removed from Mother and Father's custody, and ordered family reunification services. Both parents were ordered to undergo drug testing, to provide results showing decreased marijuana use (and otherwise to complete a full rehabilitation program), to attend parenting classes, and to participate in individual counseling. Mother's case plan also required her to comply with the terms of probation (including completion of a domestic violence program) from an incident that occurred in a prior relationship. Both parents were granted monitored visits with Minor.
B. Reunification Period
Prior to a six month status review hearing in January 2022, Minor remained placed with the foster parent Rosalind. She monitored visits and reported that Mother and Father "never missed a visit and check[ed] in on a daily basis." Visits increased from two-hour visits twice per week to three-hour visits four times per week during this period.
The Department reported Mother and Father completed parenting courses and were participating in individual counseling. Mother had also completed a domestic violence program. However, both Mother and Father were "in the process of enrolling in a full substance abuse program due to . . . recent missed and positive drug test results." The juvenile court found Mother and Father to be in substantial compliance with their case plans but determined it was necessary to keep Minor in foster care.
Prior to the next status review hearing in June 2022, the Department reported Mother had progressed to unmonitored and overnight visits. Father's visitation remained monitored due to "recent missed and positive drug test results."
In a last minute information report before the status review hearing, the Department reported Mother had been arrested following a domestic violence incident with Father. Father told a social worker that Mother became upset when she overheard him talking about their relationship. She struck him with a shower curtain rod, punched him in the face, tried to bite him, and threw things at him. Father said "this was not the first time" and Mother "has always been physically and verbally aggressive to him." Mother told the police officers who arrested her that she punched Father, but she added that Father grabbed her by the neck earlier in the day, kissed her, and told her, "You[r'e] mine."
At the status review hearing, and notwithstanding Mother's recent arrest, the juvenile court again found Mother and Father to be in substantial compliance with their case plans. The court granted both Mother and Father unmonitored visitation that was conditioned on their not visiting together, on participating in domestic violence classes, and on continuing to make progress with court-ordered programs and services.
The Department continued to investigate domestic violence between Mother and Father and filed a subsequent juvenile dependency petition later in June 2022. The petition alleged a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Minor based on the incident leading to Mother's arrest as well as four other unreported domestic violence episodes between Mother and Father. In one of those four, Mother suffered scratches and bruises. In another, she attempted to jump from a moving car on the freeway. The Department's subsequent petition further alleged Minor was at risk due to Mother's history of mental and emotional problems-problems for which she was involuntarily hospitalized in 2017.
Around the same time that the Department filed the subsequent petition, the agency reported Minor had been moved from the care of Rosalind to the care of her paternal aunt and uncle, J.D. and Y.I. J.D. and Y.I. indicated they had been "involved in [Minor's] life since birth. J.D. and Minor's paternal grandmother had weekly visits with Minor since at least December 2021. J.D. and Y.I. also share a home with Minor's paternal grandmother.
Prior to the August 2022 hearing on the subsequent petition, the Department filed a changed circumstances petition asking the court to limit Father to monitored visitation because he failed to provide proof that he was attending a domestic violence program and because he visited Minor with Mother in violation of the juvenile court's order. The juvenile court granted the changed circumstances petition. Subsequently, Mother and Father visited Minor separately twice per week.
In a last-minute information report filed around the same time, the Department related J.D.'s statement that Mother and Father continued to live together and that Mother hit Father and tried to jump from a moving car (again). The Department was unable to verify where Father lived because he "ha[d] not been very cooperative in providing . . . his full and correct address."
After a hearing on the subsequent petition, the juvenile court sustained it except with respect to a count concerning a substantial risk Minor would suffer serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally.
Prior to the next status review hearing, the Department reported both parents had been having monitored weekly visits with Minor and behaved appropriately during the visits. The Department noted that although Mother and Father "enrolled in programs and appear[ed] to be working toward stabilizing themselves and creating a safe home environment," it was unknown whether they continued to reside together and Father's inconsistent testing and Mother's recent behavior made their "sobriety questionable."
The Department recommended terminating family reunification services, and the juvenile court did so in October 2022.
C. Termination of Parental Rights
Before the permanency planning hearing in March 2023, the Department reported Minor's paternal aunt and uncle, J.D. and Y.I., were committed to adopting Minor. Minor had been placed with J.D. and Y.I. since June 2022 and the Department reported she had "a strong attachment" to them.
Mother and Father continued to visit Minor approximately once per week. Mother was "engaged and affectionate" with Minor, who called her "momma" and "showed excitement when seeing [her]," but there were concerns that she brought food and toys that were not developmentally appropriate and demonstrated "immaturity" at times in her interaction with Minor. Notwithstanding an incident described in a last minute information report in which Minor became "upset" when Father dropped off clothing and started to leave, the Department reported Minor did not appear to experience any "separation anxiety" when visits with either parent ended.
The last minute information report also related threatening comments Father allegedly made to J.D. when she would not permit him to extend a visit, as well as concerns that Mother and Father continued to live together.
On the day of the permanency planning hearing, both parents filed Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions to reinstate reunification services based on changed circumstances. Mother contended, among other things, that she had continued services, ended her relationship with Father, and developed a substantial, positive emotional attachment with Minor as a result of consistent visitation. Father contended, among other things, that there had been no domestic violence incidents since June 2022, he no longer had contact with Mother, and he had completed a 12-week "Domestic Violence Education and Awareness course." He argued reinstating reunification services would benefit Minor because he was visiting consistently and Minor was strongly bonded to him, as "evidenced by her getting upset when he comes by only for short visits to drop off items."
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The juvenile court stated that it was denying the changed circumstances petitions without ordering a hearing for the purpose of deciding them. The court summarized on the record the reasons for its ruling, which were memorialized in orders filed later the same day. (In the filed orders, the juvenile court checked boxes to indicate both that Mother and Father's petitions did "not state sufficient new information or a change of circumstances" and that reinstating reunification services would not be in Minor's best interest. The juvenile court included a notation that Mother should "[r]esubmit with written reports from service providers including [her] therapist and [a] 26 week DV [program] for perpetrators as well as [a] mental health assessment or psychological assessment." The juvenile court additionally noted Father's domestic violence certificate was "only for [a] 12-week DV education class" and stated Father could "[r]esubmit with written reports from [his] individual therapist and [a] [Department] approved [program addressing] DV for victims.") After summarizing its reasons, the court inquired, "Any counsel not ready to proceed with the [permanency planning] hearing at this time?" There was no objection or other response.
Both parents testified at the permanency planning hearing and covered several topics, including visitation with Minor and their perceptions of their bond with her. Mother confirmed she visited Minor for about two hours once per week since June 2022, though she had unmonitored and overnight visits for a few months prior to June 2022. The visits generally took place at J.D.'s home, with either J.D. or Minor's paternal grandmother serving as monitor. Mother testified she was "allow[ed] . . . to wake [Minor] up from her nap" at the beginning of her visits and Minor called her "mommy" and "jump[ed] with joy." Mother was "still trying to kind of feel comfortable" with the visits, "trying to find a balance to be able to do activities with [Minor] that are . . . safe ...." Mother made food for Minor, and they did "a lot of pretend play." When visits were held in public places with other children present, Mother learned a lot "about sharing and stuff, so [she] definitely practiced that with [Minor]."
Mother testified she communicated with Minor via video on occasion. She did not specify how frequently these video communications took place except to say it was less than once per week due to scheduling conflicts.
Mother testified Minor "would cry a lot" at the end of her visits "[i]n the beginning," but Minor's paternal grandmother had been "really helpful in trying to deescalate the situation" by "try[ing] to make it fun." Mother felt Minor tended "sometimes to go with her grandma a lot or [J.D.] when she's . . . scared or when she's sad" because Mother "[did not] really see her." Mother felt, however, that Minor was "starting to . . . trust [her] more."
Father testified he visited Minor for about two hours once per week since June 2022, though he visited more frequently prior to that. Additionally, "[h]ere and there," Father would drop off diapers and other necessities for Minor. Father testified he "didn't know . . . [he] could possibly be with [Minor] longer than two hours ...." He asserted he "would want to stay . . . longer, but . . . [he] would always usually kind of get kicked out once that two-hour mark . . . hit."
Father's visits were primarily held at his parents' home or a nearby park, with either his sister or Minor's paternal grandmother serving as monitor. During home visits, Father would wake Minor, bring her breakfast, bathe and change her, play, and "try to stimulate her thinking" through educational games and lessons. At the park, Father and Minor would build sand castles, pretend to cook, kick balls, and play on playground equipment. Minor called Father "dada," was excited to see him, and appeared upset when he had to leave or stopped by only briefly to drop things off.
Following the presentation of testimony, Mother and Father argued the juvenile court should apply the parental benefit exception to forgo terminating their parental rights. The Department and Minor's counsel argued the exception was inapplicable and recommended termination of parental rights to permit Minor to be adopted.
The juvenile court found two of the three elements of a parental benefit exception showing were satisfied because "[i]t [was] clear that the parents . . . maintained regular and consistent visitation and contact" and "[Minor] has very positive interactions with the parents ...." The court emphasized Father "especially display[ed] real insight into the types of activities and things that he is doing with the child, including trying to deal with educational aspects."
"[G]etting to the third prong," i.e., "whether it would be detrimental to sever that relationship," the juvenile court found there was "no showing that there would be any emotional impact to [Minor] by severing the relationship." The court acknowledged Minor was "at times . . . sad when the parents' visits end," but the court emphasized Minor had been out of their care since she was three months old and visits were held only once per week and "ha[d] been for quite some time." The court observed "[t]his is a very young child, who when you look at the overall aspects of the child's daily life and the child's life for the two years, almost two years the child has been in the system, it is a very minimal part of the child's life, the interaction with the parents." The court determined that "[w]hen you look at what this child's life would be like without the parents, in the current home, the child is thriving, is experiencing nurturing bonds." Therefore, the court "[could not] find by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be detrimental to the child to sever this parent/child relationship, nor that the parent/child relationship continuing outweighs the benefits of adoption."
Mother and Father each appeal the order terminating their parental rights. Father additionally appeals the juvenile court's denial of his changed circumstances petition without a hearing.
II. DISCUSSION
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's changed circumstances petition without first ordering an evidentiary hearing to specifically decide that matter. Even assuming Father made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, he did not show reinstating reunification services was in Minor's best interest based on either his bond with Minor or his progress toward remedying the issues that led to the assumption of dependency jurisdiction.
The juvenile court also acted within its discretion in deciding the parental benefit exception does not apply. When balanced against the demonstrated benefits of the prospective adoptive home, the juvenile court did not exceed the bounds of reason when it determined that severing the parents' relationship with Minor-which really arose only as a result of regular but infrequent visits with a toddler who had been out their care since she was just three months old-would not be detrimental.
A. Denying Father's Changed Circumstances Petition Was Not Error
1. Legal framework
"Section 388 accords a parent the right to petition the juvenile court for modification of any of its orders based upon changed circumstances or new evidence. [Citations.] To obtain the requested modification, the parent must demonstrate both a change of circumstance or new evidence, and that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child. [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] To obtain an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, a parent must make a prima facie showing that circumstances have changed since the prior court order, and that the proposed change will be in the best interests of the child. [Citations.]" (In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478, fn. omitted.) Where, as here, reunification services have been terminated, "the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount" and a court considering the child's best interest in the context of a section 388 petition "must recognize this shift of focus ...." (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; accord Alayah J., supra, at 478; In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.)
In deciding whether a prima facie showing has been made, a juvenile court "may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case." (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 711.) We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1, 7; In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.)
2. Analysis
Father's primary contention with respect to the changed circumstances petition is that the juvenile court should have permitted him to re-file his petition with the additional documentation that the court said, in its written denial order, could be provided with a resubmitted petition. We will assume for the sake of argument that Father did not forfeit this argument by failing to raise it when the juvenile court summarized the reasons for its ruling and asked whether the parties were ready proceed with the permanency planning hearing. We will also assume for argument's sake that Father could have produced additional documentation from his therapist or a domestic violence program for victims that would show a change in circumstances. Even with these assumptions, however, there is no basis to disturb the juvenile court's finding that Father did not make the requisite prima facie showing that ordering additional reunification services would then be in Minor's best interest.
In determining whether a proposed change would be in the best interest of a child, courts have considered "the seriousness of the problem leading to the dependency and the reason for its continuation; the strength of the parent-child and child-caretaker bonds and the time the child has been in the system; and the nature of the change of circumstance, the ease by which it could be achieved, and the reason it did not occur sooner. [Citation.]" (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.) Other courts, though, have criticized this approach for not focusing on the child's need for permanency and stability after reunification services have terminated. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 [holding that "a parent's petition for either an order returning custody or reopening reunification efforts must establish how such a change will advance the child's need for permanency and stability"].) Even under the more parent-advantageous approach espoused in cases like Amber M., the juvenile court acted within its discretion.
Minor was removed from Father's care when she was only three months old and some two years before the juvenile court's ruling on Father's petition. Although Father visited regularly, he was visiting for only a couple hours per week in the nine or so months before parental rights were terminated. Father was permitted unmonitored visitation for a relatively short time, but the juvenile court then ordered monitoring to resume when concerns about domestic violence between Mother and Father- occurring while dependency proceedings were underway- resurfaced. During all this time, Minor developed a "strong attachment" to her caregivers, and in that context, occasions when Minor became upset when Father left after short visits is not a fact that weighs significantly in favor of the view that continued visits-and the possibility of reunification-would be in Minor's best interest.
In addition, the facts here reveal quite serious problems that led to dependency jurisdiction combined with slow, inconclusive efforts at remediation. The juvenile court originally assumed jurisdiction over Minor based on severe injuries inflicted in the first months of her life and sustained a subsequent petition based on a history of domestic violence between Mother and Father that came to light because of further violence that occurred after the court assumed dependency jurisdiction. Although Father completed court-ordered classes, the significance of that evidence is diminished by the evidence that he continued to have contact with Mother and visited Minor with Mother in violation of a juvenile court order. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 463 ["simple completion" of a course does not, by itself, show prima facie that a changed order would be in a child's best interest].) Considering this and the overall evidentiary picture, we are not persuaded by the contention that the juvenile court erred in finding Father had not made the requisite prima facie showing it was in Minor's best interest to revisit the court's prior order terminating reunification services.
Father's assertion in his petition that, "after speaking with his counsel, [he] ha[d] ceased being around [M]other in order to comply with [the juvenile] court's stay away order" conspicuously does not specify when Father ceased being around Mother. Father's changed circumstances petition itself indicates they continued to share an address and the Department reported Father was reluctant to provide a home address after he claimed to have separated from Mother.
Apart from the merits of the juvenile court's section 388 ruling, Father also presents a procedural challenge: the contention that juvenile court's summary denial of his petition was an improper order that conditioned the grant of an evidentiary hearing upon the outcome of the permanency planning hearing. Although the Alayah J. court held that sort of approach is improper (Alayah J., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at 480), that is not what the juvenile court did here. In Alayah J., the Court of Appeal explained the juvenile court's order indicated "that it had found that the best interests of the children may be promoted by [the] mother's request," at which point it "was then compelled to order a hearing" on the petition, "but it did so on the condition that [the] mother's parental rights were not terminated at the section 366.26 hearing the court conducted before considering [the] petition." (Ibid.) Here, by contrast, the juvenile court made it clear it was denying Father's petition before proceeding to questions of permanency planning.
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Terminating Mother and Father's Parental Rights
1. Legal framework
When a parent is unable to remedy the issues giving rise to dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court holds a hearing under section 366.26 to determine "whether to terminate parental rights, making way for adoption, or to maintain parental rights and select another permanent plan." (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 625.) "To ease the court's difficult task in making this important decision, the statute provides a carefully calibrated process. Even if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted, the parent may avoid termination of parental rights by establishing at least one of a series of enumerated exceptions." (Ibid.)
One of these exceptions, set forth at section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), is the parental benefit exception. The exception is "limited in scope" and applies where "'[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) From th[is] statute, [our Supreme Court] readily discern[ed] three elements the parent must prove to establish the exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 631.) Only the third element is at issue in this appeal.
Analyzing whether terminating a parental relationship would be detrimental to a child requires the juvenile court to determine "whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs 'the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.' [Citation.] 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,' even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would 'harm[ ]' the child, the court should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.]" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 633, citing In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Relevant factual determinations include "the specific features of the child's relationship with the parent and the harm that would come from losing those specific features," "how harmful in total that loss would be," and "for the particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those harms." (Caden C., supra, at 640.)
A reviewing court uses the substantial evidence standard of review to evaluate a juvenile court's determination of the existence vel non of a beneficial relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 639.) The same substantial evidence standard applies in assessing the factual determinations underpinning a detriment finding, "ranging from specific benefits related to the child's specific characteristics up to a higher-level conclusion about the benefit of adoption all told." (Id. at 640.) But "the ultimate decision-whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child's relationship with his parent-is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion." (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
Both Mother and Father argue their regular, positive visitation with Minor necessarily implies that terminating their relationships with Minor will be detrimental to her. The problem with that argument, however, is it mistakes a three-prong test for one with only two.
The juvenile court acknowledged Mother and Father's "regular and consistent visitation and contact" and "very positive interactions" with Minor, but correctly emphasized countervailing considerations. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 634 ["understanding the harm associated with severing the relationship is a subtle enterprise-sometimes depending on more than just how beneficial the relationship is"].) There were several such considerations. Minor had been in foster care since she was three months old. Mother and Father were consistent in their visits, but this amounted to only a couple hours per week each by the date of the permanency planning hearing. Although Minor was upset when visits ended, she ate and slept well afterward and did not appear to suffer separation anxiety.
The juvenile court also properly emphasized the benefits of a new adoptive home. Although Minor spent her nearly two years in foster care with two different families, she was strongly attached to her prospective adoptive parents and doing well in their care. J.D. and Y.I. had been involved in Minor's life since birth. Indeed, J.D. had weekly visits with Minor several months before Minor was placed with them. Mother testified Minor sought out J.D. or her paternal grandmother when she was scared or sad. With scant evidence that severing Minor's bonds with Mother and Father would be detrimental and strong evidence that J.D. and Y.I. were providing the safety and security Minor needed, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that terminating Mother and Father's parental rights would not be detrimental to Minor.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, P. J., MOOR, J.