Opinion
B332860
12-16-2024
In re Michael A. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. KAYLA G., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 23CCJP02204A-C Kristen Byrdsong, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Mother Kayla G. has three children, N.G., Michael A., and C.M. After finding dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court issued disposition orders removing the children from her custody, awarding custody to their respective fathers, ordering monitored visitation for Kayla, and terminating jurisdiction. On appeal, Kayla does not challenge the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings or its removal or visitation orders. Her appeal is limited to two issues: (1) she contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating its jurisdiction over Michael, who now lives in New York with his previously noncustodial father, because it deprives her of a "realistic forum" to seek modification of the exit orders that relate to Michael, and (2) she asserts the juvenile court improperly conditioned potential modification of the exit orders on her completion of programming and counseling. We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 3, 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). The petition alleged: Kayla physically abused 11-year-old N.G. and six-year-old Michael; the children's respective fathers failed to protect them; and the abuse endangered all three children and placed them at risk of serious physical harm, including eight-month-old C.M.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
As to N.G., the petition specifically alleged the following incidents: "On or around May 2023, the mother struck the child on the child's stomach. On a prior occasion, the mother struck the child's nose, resulting in the child's nose to bleed. On a prior occasion, the mother struck the child on the child's face, and the child sustained bruising to the child's face. On prior occasions, the mother instructed the child to complete wall-sits, for an extended period of time. On numerous prior occasions, the mother struck the child on the hand, buttocks, and body."
As to Michael, the petition similarly alleged: "On a prior occasion, the mother kicked the child. On prior occasions, the mother struck the child on the child's buttocks, with a belt or sandal. On numerous prior occasions, the mother struck the child on the hand, buttocks, and body. On prior occasions, the mother instructed the child complete wall-sits, for an extended period of time."
The children were removed from Kayla's home and placed with their fathers. Kayla was granted monitored visitation. C.M.'s and N.G.'s fathers lived in California. Michael's father lived in New York and arranged for him to stay temporarily with his paternal grandmother in Southern California. On September 19, 2023, the Department transported Michael to live with his father in New York.
At the August 23, 2023 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations against Kayla and dismissed the failure to protect allegations as to each of the three fathers.
Because Kayla does not challenge the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings, we do not describe in detail the Department's investigation of the family and the evidence supporting the court's findings.
At the September 25, 2023 disposition hearing, Kayla's counsel requested the court retain jurisdiction and give her the opportunity to reunify with all of her children. Counsel argued Kayla had made significant progress in her attitudes about punishment, called the children every day, and visited regularly.Counsel directed the court's attention to the Department's last minute information documenting Kayla's completion of a 12-week parenting course, attendance at six sessions of a 12-week domestic violence course, participation in five sessions of an anger management course, and participation in individual counseling.
Michael had moved from Southern California to New York the week before the disposition hearing.
Minors' counsel agreed with Kayla's counsel. She asked the court to retain jurisdiction to allow Kayla the opportunity to reunify with all three children. Counsel reported that N.G. and Michael told her "repeatedly" that they missed Kayla and wanted her back in their lives. If the court was not inclined to retain jurisdiction, counsel asked the court to keep only Michael's case open to ensure he was enrolled in school, was receiving counseling, and was adjusting well to living in New York. If the court was not inclined to retain jurisdiction over any of the children, minors' counsel asked the court to order unmonitored visits for Kayla.
The Department recommended the juvenile court terminate its jurisdiction over the children with orders granting sole physical custody and joint legal custody to the fathers of N.G. and C.M. with monitored visits for Kayla. As to Michael, the Department asserted it had coordinated with the authorities in New York to assess Michael's father's home and investigate his criminal and child welfare history before placement. The Department reported Michael's father took the day off from work when Michael arrived to enroll him in school and secure childcare. The Department also informed the court that paternal family members in the area were available to help care for Michael. Additionally, Michael expressed his desire to live with his father in New York. Given these circumstances, the Department recommended the court terminate its jurisdiction over Michael and award sole physical and legal custody to his father. The fathers, who were each separately represented, urged the court to follow the Department's recommendations.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence there was substantial danger to the children's physical health, safety, and emotional wellbeing if they remained in Kayla's custody. The court accepted the Department's recommendations, ordered the children removed from Kayla, awarded physical and legal custody to the fathers as recommended, ordered monitored visits for Kayla, and terminated its jurisdiction over the children. It also stated the custody orders were "to include a rider outlining all services mother must complete in their entirety before custody can be modified. Those services are to include a parenting class, individual counseling and anger management." Fathers' attorneys each submitted Judicial Council form custody, visitation, and parentage orders, which the court signed and entered on September 25, 2023, the day of the hearing. None of the form orders included the "rider" specified by the juvenile court in its oral disposition.
Kayla timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Terminating Its Jurisdiction over Michael
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
"Section 361.2, subdivision (a) requires a court ordering removal of a child first to determine whether there is a noncustodial parent who wants to assume custody. The court shall place the child with that parent, unless that placement would be detrimental to the child's safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being." (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 42; accord, In re K.B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 972, 979.) "'If the court places the child with the noncustodial parent, the court initially has three alternatives. The court may order the noncustodial parent to assume custody of the child, terminate juvenile court jurisdiction and enter a custody order. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).) It may continue juvenile court jurisdiction and require a home visit within three months, after which the court may make orders as provided in subdivision (b)(1), (2) or (3). (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(2).) Or the court may order reunification services to be provided to either or both parents and determine at a later review hearing under section 366.3 which parent, if either, shall have custody of the child. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).)'" (In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1243; accord, In re Adrianna P. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 44, 55.)
"When deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction, the court must determine whether there is a need for continued supervision, not whether the conditions that justified taking jurisdiction in the first place still exist." (In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451; accord, In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 97; In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1135 [the juvenile court may not terminate jurisdiction until it has analyzed whether ongoing supervision of the child in the noncustodial parent's home is necessary].) The court should not keep a case open and refuse to issue an exit order merely to give the parent from whose custody the child was taken a chance to receive services. (See In re Erika W. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 470, 476.)
An order terminating jurisdiction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See In re C.S. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 635, 637; In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 863 ["We review a juvenile court's decision to terminate jurisdiction and to issue an accompanying exit custody order for abuse of discretion, and may not disturb such rulings unless the court made an '"'"arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination."'"'"].)
2. Analysis
As stated, Kayla does not challenge the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings or disposition order as to any child. Instead, Kayla argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating its jurisdiction over Michael because it deprived her of a "realistic forum in which to modify visitation or custody of Michael." According to Kayla, she would be required to institute family law proceedings in two jurisdictions-New York for Michael and California for N.G. and C.M.-if she wanted to modify the current custody or visitation orders. If instead, the juvenile court had retained jurisdiction over Michael, she could seek modification in California.
Kayla cites no legal support for her argument that a juvenile court abuses its discretion by declining to retain jurisdiction and keeping a case open in order to provide a forum for parents to petition for modification in the future. The law does not support Kayla's argument. Once the juvenile court designates the noncustodial parent to be the legal and physical custodian of the child, the court "shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the child." (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1); see In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1082 [once child was placed with the noncustodial, nonoffending parent and "was found not to be 'at risk' in that setting for any of the enumerated harms, the core predicate for juvenile court jurisdiction disappeared"]; see also In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 535.) Here, Kayla does not challenge Michael's removal from her custody or assert the juvenile court erred by granting sole legal and physical custody to Michael's father. Nor does she contend continued supervision under section 361.2, subdivisions (b)(2) or (b)(3), was necessary. Under the express terms of the statute, the court was required to terminate jurisdiction once it granted custody to Michael's father. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by following the statutory scheme.
We also find no legal basis for Kayla's argument that she would be forced to seek modification in New York courts because Michael now lives there. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (Fam. Code, §§ 3400 et seq.) "is the exclusive method for determining subject matter jurisdiction for child custody proceedings in California." (In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 668; accord, In re Kayla W. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 99, 105.) "'Child custody proceeding' means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation of the parties, neglect, abuse, dependency, . . . termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear." (Fam. Code, § 3402, subd. (d); see A.H. v. Superior Ct. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504, 516-517.) New York and California both have enacted the UCCJEA. (See In re Kayla W., at p. 105; Stocker v. Sheehan, 13 A.D.3d 1, 4-5 [N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2004]; see N.Y. CLS Dom. Rel. Law Article 5-A.)
"[T]he UCCJEA makes clear that a change in the child's home state after a court has initially assumed [subject matter] jurisdiction does not result in the shifting of [subject matter] jurisdiction to the new home state. The principles of the UCCJEA require a state at least to deferentially assess the status of any preexisting order before acting. For [New York] to assume modification jurisdiction, either California would have had to voluntarily cede [subject matter] jurisdiction (which it did not), or else the [New York] court would have had to find that 'the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside' in California. ([Family Code,] § 3423, subds. (a) &(b).)" (In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 504; accord, In re E.W. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1170; Grahm v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200.) Under the present circumstances, Kayla would not be required to seek modification of the exit orders in New York state courts. Kayla does not address the UCCJEA and presents no legal authority supporting her contention that New York would have subject matter jurisdiction over Michael's case.
Kayla further argues her substantial efforts at completing a proposed case plan "favored [her] endeavor to pursue return of Michael to her care." To the extent Kayla argues the juvenile court was required to maintain jurisdiction over Michael to allow her to reunify with him in the future, Kayla fails to provide any legal authority in support. A juvenile court does not maintain jurisdiction to give the parent from whose custody the child was taken an opportunity to receive services and reunify with the child. (See In re Erika W., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 476; see also In re Janee W., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455.) In re Erika W. explained that reunification services for a previously custodial parent are not required when a child is placed with a noncustodial parent because the goal of returning a dependent minor to parental custody has already been met. (See In re Erika W., at p. 478.)
The statutory scheme authorizes a juvenile court "to terminate dependency jurisdiction when the child is in parental custody and no protective issue remains." (In re D.B., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 624.) Here, it is undisputed Michael is in parental custody and no protective issue remains. Kayla has not demonstrated the court abused its discretion by terminating jurisdiction under these circumstances.
B. The Juvenile Court's Written Exit Orders Did Not Condition Modification of Custody on Kayla's Completion of Programming
Kayla next argues the juvenile court exceeded its authority by including a "rider" in its orally announced disposition order that detailed the programming Kayla must complete before custody may be modified by the family court. Generally, a juvenile court may not limit a family court's authority to modify exit orders. (See In re Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1456 [juvenile court lacked authority to condition modification of exit orders on father's completion of programming and counseling].) Here, the written orders the court signed and filed do not contain the challenged rider. The written orders thus conflict with the oral order. We conclude the written orders control.
In re Jerred H. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 793 determined that a juvenile court's written order terminating parental rights controlled over its contrary oral pronouncements from the bench. In re Jerred H. distinguished criminal cases holding the reverse- that the oral pronouncement of judgment controlled over the written. As that case explained, "This is a dependency proceeding, not a criminal action in which the judge is required to orally pronounce judgment against the defendant. Entry of the judge's written order is not a ministerial act similar to the entry of a sentence in the clerk's minutes." (Id. at p. 798, fn. 3.)
In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752 likewise decided that to the extent the juvenile "court's oral pronouncement differed from its written order, the written order controls." (Id. at p. 756, fn. 1.) In re Jennifer G. reasoned, "The court's order is that which is written, signed and filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003.)" (Ibid.; cf. In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1259, fn. 9 ["Because the court's written orders are internally inconsistent . . . we conclude that the court's oral pronouncement prevails"]; In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1241, fn. 5 [oral pronouncement prevails over an ambiguous written order].)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1003 provides: "Every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order."
Here, the written orders are not ambiguous or internally inconsistent. The juvenile court signed and filed them on the day of the disposition hearing. It thus had the opportunity to modify its orders, and the court ultimately did not include the challenged rider. Under these circumstances, the written orders prevail and any error arising from the court's oral disposition order is harmless. (See People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 729.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders are affirmed.
We concur: SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.