Opinion
B321525
02-28-2023
In re Z.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. K.A., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 18CCJP06150 Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BENDIX, J.
K.A. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son Z.A. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in not applying the parental-benefit exception to adoption.
Mother's visits with Z.A. throughout the dependency proceedings were characterized by mother's express antagonism towards Z.A.'s caregivers and her unwillingness to comply with court orders and DCFS instructions. The evidence showed mother's conduct was driven by unresolved mental health issues. The juvenile court reasonably could conclude that mother was a destabilizing force in Z.A.'s life, and it was not in his best interest to maintain a relationship with her through legal guardianship as opposed to a stable placement with his maternal grandparents, who wished to adopt him.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The appellate record in this case is lengthy. We limit our summary to the information relevant to the issue on appeal, the applicability of the parental-benefit exception. We do not, inter alia, discuss at length the facts and proceedings concerning Z.A.'s father R.E. (father), who is not a party to this appeal. Also, because mother does not challenge the jurisdictional allegations sustained against her, we do not summarize all the evidence in support of those allegations.
At the time of the proceedings at issue in this case, father lived in Georgia and had not seen Z.A. or mother for many years. The juvenile court sustained jurisdictional allegations that father in 2008 had engaged in domestic violence against mother, and had a subsequent history of violence towards other female companions. On appeal, this court reversed the jurisdictional findings as to father for insufficient evidence of risk to Z.A. (In re Z.A. (Mar. 26, 2020, B298943) [nonpub. opn.].) It does not appear from the record that father sought custody of Z.A. as a nonoffending parent.
1. Detention
On September 25, 2018, respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 seeking to detain Z.A., then 10 years old, from mother. The petition alleged that earlier that month, mother physically abused Z.A. by striking him on the face, causing a bruise. The petition further alleged that mother had "mental and emotional problems including PTSD and anxiety" and failed to take her prescribed medication, thus rendering mother incapable of caring for Z.A. and placing him at risk of harm. Finally, the petition alleged mother had a history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of marijuana, all of which placed the child at risk.
Unspecified statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
According to the detention report, a social worker observed a red mark on Z.A.'s temple. Z.A. stated his mother slapped him when he pushed her arm away while she was trying to administer medicine to him. Z.A. said mother had never done that before. He said he was not afraid of her and wanted to return home to her.
Mother acknowledged she had swung her hand at Z.A. when he pushed her away while she was giving him medicine. She said Z.A. had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. She stated she herself suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following a medical malpractice incident, and was also learning disabled. She took Xanax as needed for anxiety.
Following the social worker's interview with mother, over the course of four days, mother sent the social worker more than 300 e-mails and text messages, most of which were difficult to understand and not relevant to the investigation. Some of the text messages were "incomprehensible," and "included videos of mother talking into the camera, screaming, and exhibiting bizarre behaviors." The social worker learned that "mother ha[d] a pattern of sending inappropriate email bursts like these," including to Z.A.'s school and to mother's apartment manager. The social worker also discovered that mother had told another social worker in 2009 that she had been diagnosed as bipolar. Maternal grandfather reported mother had "mental issues" and when she did not take her medication "you cannot have a conversation with her." Mother once told maternal grandfather she was schizophrenic.
Following a detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered Z.A. detained, with monitored visitation for mother. Z.A. was placed with his adult half sister, A.M.
2. Adjudication
In the jurisdiction and disposition report, mother denied any diagnosis of schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. Mother stated she had been misdiagnosed with bipolar disorder at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center "to justify keeping her there." Mother said the psychiatrist who saw her in the hospital was in fact a medical student, and the student threatened to rape mother if she did not cooperate.
Maternal grandparents stated they were willing to take Z.A. into their home for as long as necessary, but they wanted mother to reunify with Z.A. They said mother was a loving and caring parent and would not intentionally harm Z.A., although they worried about mother's ability to care for Z.A. in her current mental and emotional state.
Z.A. stated he liked living with his sister and was not afraid of mother. His sister and caregiver A.M. stated she did not believe Z.A. was at risk in mother's custody, and that returning Z.A. to mother would help mother's emotional well-being.
The report summarized interviews conducted by a social worker in 2012 of mother and her mental health providers. Mother's psychiatrist at the time reported that mother had been diagnosed as bipolar and was prescribed lithium. Mother herself confirmed she was taking lithium and felt that it helped her. Mother's psychologist reported she was treating mother for mood disorder and early trauma.
A last minute information filed November 26, 2018, summarized a series of voicemails and e-mails from mother to the dependency investigator and others on a variety of topics. Some of the voicemails were "laden with profanity and insults" because mother "appears to be upset over the content of the [DCFS] reports, assessment and recommendations." Copies of the e-mails were attached to the last minute information; one e-mail chain, sent to DCFS counsel and others, stated, inter alia, "You all are sick people," "You gross disgusting persons," and "You are all crazy."
A last minute information filed January 16, 2019, similarly reported that "mother continues to send hundreds of incoherent and tangential emails with a variety of themes ....The emails are sent at all hours of the day and night including the early morning hours."
At a trial setting conference on January 16, 2019, the juvenile court ordered mother to stop referencing Z.A. in her social media posts about the dependency proceeding. The court further ordered mother not to communicate with counsel for the other parties.
On April 29, 2019, DCFS filed an amended section 300 petition. The petition now alleged mother had "inappropriately physically disciplined the child [Z.A.], leaving a mark on his face." It further alleged mother "has mental and emotional problems including PTSD and anxiety which periodically limits her ability to provide appropriate care for the child," and "[o]n at least one occasion, the mother did not take her prescribed psychotropic medication." DCFS omitted the previous allegations of substance abuse and physical abuse of Z.A.
The amended petition also added allegations concerning father. (See fn. 1, ante.)
A last minute information filed April 30, 2019, stated that mother visited Z.A. twice a week, and according to his caregiver "any visit that has been missed has been due to mother's unwillingness to participate." Mother's calls to DCFS had "decreased significantly," but she continued to leave "rambling voice mail messages about [Z.A.] having been removed from her custody illegally [and] the reasons why the case should not be open ...."
The last minute information included a letter indicating mother had completed a 12-session parenting program, and the program director stated mother "is doing everything possible to learn how to be a better co-parent and to parent her son effectively."
The juvenile court held the adjudication hearing on June 27, 2019. The court asked mother's position regarding the amended allegations against her, and mother's counsel stated mother, "in a cooperative spirit, [is] satisfied with the wording of the amended petition." The court sustained the amended allegations against mother.
Over DCFS's objection, but with Z.A.'s counsel's agreement, the juvenile court ordered Z.A. released to home of mother. The court ordered, inter alia, conjoint counseling with Z.A., on-demand drug testing, and individual mental health counseling.
3. Second detention
On October 22, 2019, Z.A.'s counsel filed a walk-on request stating mother throughout August 2019 had prevented DCFS and Z.A.'s counsel's social worker from entering her home to visit with Z.A. Z.A.'s counsel requested the juvenile court order mother to allow counsel to visit with Z.A. and to cooperate with court orders.
DCFS then filed a last minute information stating that since Z.A. had been released to mother, mother had refused to drug test or enroll herself or Z.A. in counseling. Mother was not making herself or Z.A. available to the family preservation services provider, leading to the provider terminating services. DCFS was unable to visit Z.A. in the home in August 2019 because mother did not respond to DCFS communications, and she and Z.A. were not home during two unannounced visits. Apart from August, the DCFS social worker was able to visit several times, during which mother often lost her temper and yelled at the social worker about the injustice of her child having previously been detained from her. Her speech was "often loud ranting, disconnected/disjointed and sometimes incoherent." During one visit, when the social worker disapproved of mother disenrolling Z.A. from school for two weeks, mother said she was placing the social worker under citizen's arrest and called the police. Mother continued to send e-mails and texts to DCFS, which the social worker characterized as "disorganized rambling that jumps from topic to topic."
Following a hearing on November 15, 2019, the juvenile court ordered family preservation services reinitiated, and ordered mother to, inter alia, allow all DCFS service providers and Z.A.'s counsel into her home, and to enroll Z.A. in school.
A status review report filed December 11, 2019, provided additional detail on mother's antagonism towards the social worker previously described in the last minute information, including that mother had called the police twice on the social worker.
Since the November 15, 2019, hearing, mother told the social worker she would not submit to drug testing or participate in family preservation, nor would she enroll Z.A. in school, "because she knew what is best for her child."
During another visit, mother "yelled and berated" the social worker, and after the social worker left, he heard mother continue to scream for 10 to 15 minutes. Immediately following that visit, mother sent nine e-mails to the social worker that were quoted in full in the report, stating, inter alia, that mother would not submit to drug testing, accusing the social worker of lying, and calling the social worker a "[p]sychopath."
The report stated the juvenile court had granted DCFS a warrant removal order, and detention of Z.A. was pending. A subsequent last minute information filed December 19, 2019, stated mother had refused to release Z.A. voluntarily back to his half sister A.M., and when the social worker and police came to remove Z.A., he and mother were gone, whereabouts unknown. The last minute information attached more angry texts and e-mails from mother to the social worker.
Z.A. and mother appeared at a hearing on December 19, 2019, and DCFS took Z.A. into custody.
On December 26, 2019, DCFS filed a subsequent juvenile dependency petition under section 342 alleging mother had failed to comply with the juvenile court's orders concerning drug rehabilitation, drug testing, mental health and conjoint counseling, family preservation services, and a psychiatric evaluation. DCFS also filed a supplemental petition under section 387 for a more restrictive placement, asking that Z.A. be removed from mother's care and placed again with A.M.
The juvenile court held a hearing on the new petitions on December 27, 2019, and ordered Z.A. detained, with monitored visits for mother. The court further ordered DCFS to initiate the procedures under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for placement of Z.A. with his maternal grandparents in Ohio.
4. Second adjudication
DCFS filed a jurisdiction and disposition report on February 21, 2020. The report stated that mother had missed four drug tests. Z.A. stated he wished to return to mother, but if he could not, he would like to live with maternal grandparents. DCFS was having trouble arranging visitation-caregiver A.M. refused to monitor visits after an incident in which mother screamed and yelled at her after witnessing Z.A. whisper something to A.M. When DCFS tried to make other arrangements, mother declined because she did not want monitored visits. Mother continued to send many e-mails to the social worker each day.
An addendum report filed April 21, 2020, stated mother's new psychiatrist had started mother on lithium and other medications. DCFS had expressed to the psychiatrist the concerns that mother continued to "barrage" the social worker and A.M. with e-mails and that mother continued to take Valium despite the doctor discontinuing the prescription, but the psychiatrist had yet to respond.
The report further stated that mother had spent most of a 45-minute teleconference with the social worker "ranting about her case," although mother seemed calmer now that she was taking lithium. According to the social worker, "Mother did not accept that she has a problem and even suggested that she was in [the] past cooperative with DCFS and Family Preservation when she was not." When the social worker later visited mother at home, she became angry, calling her neighbors and the social worker vulgarities. Mother continued to send the social worker "countless emails per day" that "often do not make sense, are threatening[,] and are inappropriate." The report included some examples. Mother continued to miss drug tests, although she tested clean once in early March.
DCFS filed another addendum report on June 16, 2020. The report stated that mother continued to miss her drug tests, and had withdrawn her consent for DCFS to speak with her psychiatrist. Because of COVID-19, A.M. would not allow mother to visit Z.A. at home so visitation had been limited to telephone and FaceTime contact. Mother "continues to barrage the [social worker] and the caregiver with threatening, demeaning and inappropriate texts and emails." DCFS recommended Z.A. be granted an extended visit with maternal grandparents in Ohio pending completion of the ICPC requirements.
A letter from mother's psychologist dated June 22, 2020, stated her diagnosis was PTSD. She generally attended sessions with him twice a week, and overall had attended 43 sessions.
The juvenile court adjudicated the section 342 subsequent petition and the section 387 supplemental petition on June 24, 2020. Z.A.'s counsel stated that Z.A. "does wish to return home to mother. He did state that he feels safe with mother." Counsel nonetheless stated she would not ask that Z.A. be returned to mother at that time.
The juvenile court sustained the section 387 petition based on mother's behavior as described in the reports, her inconsistent participation in testing and services, and her lack of cooperation with a requested mental health evaluation. The court dismissed the section 342 petition as duplicative. At Z.A.'s counsel's request, the court authorized an extended 29-day visit for Z.A. with maternal grandparents in Ohio. The juvenile court subsequently extended the visit numerous times.
5. Review period
A last minute information filed August 14, 2020, stated that Z.A. was doing well with his maternal grandparents. There was concern because mother was leaving threatening messages for the grandparents, and would tell Z.A. during phone calls that she was going to sue the grandparents or the child welfare agency and have Z.A. removed from the grandparents' home. At the next hearing, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to appoint a monitor for mother's calls with Z.A.
A last minute information filed September 11, 2020, stated that since appointment of a DCFS monitor, mother's calls with Z.A. were going much better.
On November 5, 2020, the juvenile court found the ICPC for maternal grandparents was approved. The juvenile court found Z.A. was suitably placed with maternal grandparents, and vacated the previous order placing him with A.M.
DCFS filed a status review report on December 15, 2020. Since his placement with maternal grandparents, Z.A. "appeared well adjusted without any emotional or behavioral problems," and was doing well in school, earning As and Bs and joining the school basketball team. Mother continued to visit with Z.A. telephonically, and the visits had been appropriate since appointment of a DCFS monitor.
The report stated that mother continued to send inappropriate and occasionally "bizarre" e-mails to the DCFS social worker, sometimes 5-10 times in a day. Some e-mails were angry, but others were "just mother's daily thoughts or discussions of others," or mother talking about her depression, medication, drinking, and use of marijuana.
The report stated that mother's psychologist ended services because" 'mother was too focused on DCFS.'" Mother was linked to a new therapist. Mother was drug testing, albeit inconsistently, and had tested positive on four occasions, which might have been attributable to her prescription medications.
The report stated that during a teleconference with the social worker and mother's mental health careworker, mother expressed her dislike of the social worker, "then started talking/rambling for 25 minutes straight without stop or hesitation." Mother started to get louder and louder, then started to scream, ultimately hanging up the phone. At a subsequent meeting, mother appeared lethargic, and told the social worker she had taken Valium so the social worker would not trigger a panic attack.
According to the report, Z.A. had consistently stated that he would like to return to mother, but he also stated to his ICPC social worker in Ohio that he was content to be with his grandparents.
The report attached a letter from mother's new therapist, who stated that mother had consistently participated in therapy with satisfactory attendance, "and expresses motivation to continue utilizing mental health services." Mother's current diagnosis was PTSD.
On December 31, 2020, DCFS provided the court with a 10-page mental health evaluation report of mother. The report concluded that "mother's mental health is extremely unstable," and "[s]he meets DSM-5 criteria for Bipolar Disorder with psychotic features." The report recommended no further visits between mother and Z.A. until mother's mental health stabilized, because "[h]er impaired mental status can be detrimental to [Z.A.'s] mental well-being and adjustment."
A last minute information filed February 23, 2021, stated that DCFS had learned mother had a pending criminal case stemming from an October 2020 alleged assault and battery of a waitress while under the influence.
In February, mother's psychiatrist reported she was taking only one prescribed medication for anxiety. Mother also had enrolled in and attended the first session of a parenting class. Subsequent letters from early April 2021 stated that mother continued to participate in therapy with satisfactory attendance, had now completed 10 parenting sessions, and was participating in a substance abuse program.
A last minute information filed April 30, 2021, stated that on April 20, 2021, the DCFS monitor had to terminate mother's phone call with Z.A. "because mother was not able to control her emotions during [the] phone call and was not abiding by [the] monitor's redirections. The monitor also complained that mother then sent her insulting and offensive message for days after the phone call was terminated." Further, DCFS had reported to the police mother's threatening e-mails to DCFS employees, and the police had admonished and advised mother to refrain from inappropriate and threatening communication.
At a hearing on May 5, 2021, the parties discussed the feasibility of an in-person visit between mother and Z.A. DCFS opposed maternal grandparents bringing Z.A. to California to visit mother, given maternal grandparents' previous difficulty monitoring contact between Z.A. and mother. DCFS recommended instead that mother travel to Ohio for visits with Z.A. under the supervision of the ICPC social worker. Z.A.'s counsel disagreed with DCFS out of concern that if mother were required to go to Ohio, the visit might not happen. Z.A.'s counsel stated, "[Z.A.] is very closely bonded to his mother. He does wish to have a visit with her in person." Z.A.'s counsel believed arrangements could be made to ensure Z.A.'s safety. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to facilitate an in-person visit with Z.A. traveling to California, and to provide a monitor for those visits other than maternal grandparents.
In a last minute information filed July 6, 2021, DCFS stated that when discussing in-person visit arrangements with mother, mother spoke of maternal grandfather in a "very derogatory and accusatory manner." The DCFS monitor also was having difficulty managing mother's emotional outbursts during calls with Z.A., so DCFS believed the assigned social worker or another social worker would have to monitor any in-person visit. DCFS noted, however, mother's antipathy towards the DCFS social worker.
DCFS filed another status review report on September 10, 2021. Z.A. continued to do well in placement and school, with no emotional or behavioral concerns. Mother had missed three drug tests but tested negative on eight others. She continued to see her therapist consistently.
The report stated that because of COVID-19 and concerns about Z.A.'s safety with mother, DCFS had been unable to arrange an in-person visit between Z.A. and mother. Mother had regular phone contact with Z.A. The report stated that mother had two DCFS-assigned monitors for her phone calls with Z.A., and both reported "mother needing redirection" because mother would become upset, say inappropriate things about Z.A.'s grandparents, and tell Z.A. he would be returned to her at the next hearing. Mother also sent insulting and inappropriate texts to the monitors after hours. When the social worker asked mother why she lashed out at the monitors, she responded that it was a harmless coping mechanism for her.
The report stated that mother's criminal case had resolved with a conviction for assault and battery, and mother had been sentenced to 12 months of probation with participation in alcohol and substance abuse programs.
The report attached a letter indicating mother had completed her parenting course, with favorable comments from the instructor about mother's engagement, positivity, and desire to learn.
The report also attached a concurrent planning assessment indicating maternal grandparents favored legal guardianship over adoption out of hope that Z.A. could reunify with his parents in the future. Z.A. stated," 'I don't want to be adopted, I want legal guardianship because it gives my mom a chance to get me back.'" If he could not go back home, however, he preferred to stay with his grandparents, because" 'at least I'm with family and not strangers.' "
DCFS recommended termination of reunification services and setting a hearing for a permanent plan.
The juvenile court held a review hearing on September 23, 2021. Z.A.'s counsel stated Z.A. "wants to have a relationship with his mother. He wants to live with her. He has been and will continue to wait for her." Z.A.'s counsel nonetheless agreed with DCFS's recommendation "given the safety concerns."
The juvenile court found it would not be safe to return Z.A. to mother given her ongoing mental health issues. The court found mother and father had not made sufficient progress in their case plans, and terminated reunification services for both. The court set a permanency planning hearing, and further ordered DCFS to make best efforts to facilitate an in-person visit between Z.A. and mother.
6. Permanency planning period
DCFS filed a permanency planning report on January 13, 2022. Z.A. was now in eighth grade and had earned As and Bs and one C. He was suspended for two days for repeating a derogatory comment that one of his friends said. Apart from this, there continued to be no reports of any significant emotional or behavioral problems.
The report stated that DCFS had discontinued mother's phone visitation with Z.A. because of mother talking about case issues and making derogatory comments about the monitor, caregivers, and DCFS to Z.A. The DCFS social worker met with mother about resuming phone visitation and maternal grandparents called in to the meeting. Maternal grandparents stated they would monitor the calls if mother respected them. "Mother was dismissive and cut them off." The social worker reiterated the rules for appropriate contact. As of December 15, 2021, maternal grandfather reported the phone calls were going well.
A later report indicated phone visitation had ceased after mother sent a racist text message to the DCFS monitor on October 29, 2021.
The report stated that father visited Z.A. in Ohio in August 2021. Maternal grandparents reported the visit did not go well, with father exhibiting" 'bizarre'" behavior that upset Z.A. Father threatened to fight some of Z.A's uncles. Father also accused his girlfriend, who came with him on the visit, of cheating on him with someone in the neighborhood, even though she had never been in that neighborhood before.
According to the report, maternal grandparents now wished to adopt Z.A. Father's visit had worried them, and they wanted to be sure that neither parent could go to court and obtain custody of Z.A. in the future. The report stated, Z.A. "is adjusting to residing with the prospective adoptive applicants [i.e. maternal grandparents]. He is doing well and wants to remain in their home." (Boldface omitted.) DCFS recommended termination of parental rights and adoption.
A new concurrent planning assessment reflected maternal grandparents' desire to adopt. The assessment reported that on September 15, 2021, Z.A. stated," 'I don't mind if they (maternal grandparents) adopt me,[' "] but also "added he would still like to have a relationship with his parents."
On January 20, 2022, mother filed a request to change court order. She indicated circumstances had changed because she had begun to take her prescribed psychotropic medication and had been acting more appropriately during meetings and visits. She requested restoration of family reunification services and either liberalized visitation or Z.A.'s return to her custody. Mother attached a November 2021 letter from her psychiatrist listing her current medications and indicating that mother had been more focused on dealing with trauma in therapy and was not being triggered as often as she had been in the past. She had also curtailed her use of alcohol.
It is unclear from the psychiatrist's letter if the psychiatrist himself had observed these changes in mother or if mother was reporting these changes herself.
At a hearing on January 21, 2022, the juvenile court continued the permanency planning hearing and set mother's change-of-order request to be heard at the same time as the permanency planning hearing. Z.A.'s counsel stated that Z.A. "does not consent to adoption at this time."
DCFS filed a status review report on March 2, 2022. In regard to the phone visitation, there had been no further incidents of "verbal abuse or inappropriate communication." Mother, however, continued to tell Z.A. that he would be returning home to her soon, and maternal grandfather had terminated several calls because of that. Z.A. reportedly "was not overly upset about [the] calls [with mother] but he feels bad for his mom. He states that he [is] content staying with grandparents but does not want to tell [mother] because it would upset her."
According to the report, mother, with DCFS and ICPC social worker approval, went to Ohio to visit Z.A. in late February 2022. Maternal grandfather reported the visit went well, and that Z.A. and mother spent a lot of time together, accompanied either by maternal grandparents or other relatives. Maternal grandfather said mother" 'treated everyone respectfully and well[,] at least when [maternal grandparents] were present.'" (Italics omitted.)
DCFS filed an interim review report on March 4, 2022, recommending the juvenile court deny mother's change-of-order request. The report reiterated past reports' evidence of mother's mental illness and inappropriate communications, and quoted from recent e-mails sent by mother to the DCFS social worker in January 2022, which were rambling and sometimes incoherent.
A last minute information filed March 23, 2022, indicated that Z.A. "would 'like to move forward with [a]doption' and he wants his grandparents to adopt him. [Z.A.] stated that he [is] happy with his grandparents and is stable in their home."
The juvenile court held a permanency planning review hearing on March 23, 2022. Z.A.'s counsel said he had spoken with Z.A. and "it is his desire to be adopted." The court ordered adoption as the permanent plan.
Following a hearing on April 7, 2022, the juvenile court denied mother's change-of-order request. The court found mother had participated in services but was not showing sufficient benefit from those services. The court noted that mother "continues to be easily triggered," and referenced her "derogatory racist statements" to the DCFS monitor, her "rambling, nonsensical emails to the social worker," and her "rambling" during court appearances.
7. Permanency planning hearing
The juvenile court held the permanency planning hearing on June 23, 2022. There was no witness testimony. Mother submitted as an exhibit a Mother's Day card from Z.A. stating, in relevant part, "I miss you so much and I hope you know that. I hope I get to go back home and see you again. I hope we have more visits like we did that one time you came out here. I love you so much, and I miss you so much."
Mother's counsel requested the court apply the parental-benefit exception to adoption and not terminate mother's parental rights. Counsel argued mother had maintained regular visitation with Z.A. and that Z.A. and mother were "very bonded." Z.A. "sends Mother's Day cards to . . . mother." Counsel noted Z.A. initially had reservations about being adopted and DCFS's original recommendation was legal guardianship. Counsel argued there had been no negative effects on Z.A. from his continued relationship with mother, and maintaining the relationship would benefit him because he "enjoy[s] speaking to his mother and will keep the sibling bond [with his adult half sister]." Acknowledging mother's visits with Z.A. had "started off rocky," counsel argued the more recent visits had been without issue, and mother had increased her medication to deal with her mental health difficulties.
Father's counsel objected to termination of parental rights but did not present argument.
Z.A.'s counsel argued in favor of adoption and termination of parental rights. Counsel argued the fact that mother's recent visits had gone well was insufficient to establish a substantial positive emotional attachment, and father's visits had not been liberalized following the in-person visit in which father had threatened Z.A.'s uncles. Counsel further argued termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to Z.A., who was doing well in school and with his maternal grandparents.
DCFS's counsel argued there was an insufficient positive emotional attachment between parents and Z.A. to apply the parental-benefit exception, and the need for security and permanency outweighed the benefit of maintaining Z.A.'s relationship with his parents. Counsel characterized the visits as "up and down," referencing mother's inappropriate conduct during visits. Although counsel acknowledged that for purposes of the parental-benefit exception, the court should not consider whether mother was capable of taking custody of Z.A., counsel argued mother's ongoing struggles with mental illness were relevant to whether Z.A. would benefit from maintaining his relationship with her. Counsel further noted that Z.A., now age 14, had stated he wished to be adopted.
The juvenile court found the parental-benefit exception did not apply. It stated, "The court finds that the parents' visits have not been regular. I'm also considering the quality of the visits as well, and they have not established a parental bond exists between them and the child. [¶] The court finds that any benefit accruing to the child from his relationship with the mother and father is outweighed by the physical and emotional benefit the child will receive through permanency and stability of the adoption with his maternal grandparents and that adoption is in the best interests of the child at this time."
The juvenile court terminated mother's and father's parental rights and designated maternal grandparents as the prospective adoptive parents. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, mother argues the juvenile court erred in not applying the parental-benefit exception.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When a juvenile court has determined a child cannot be returned to a parent's care and a permanent placement is appropriate, section 366.26 provides a list of options for the permanent plan. (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 992.) "[T]he preferred choice is adoption, coupled with an order terminating parental rights." (Id., citing § 366.26, subd. (b); In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.) [under § 366.26, adoption is" 'the norm' "].)" 'Adoption is the Legislature's first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.' [Citation.]" (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Thus, "the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances [in section 366.26] provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child." (Celine R., at p. 53.)
The parental-benefit exception is one of the circumstances specified in section 366.26 by which a parent may prevent adoption of the child and termination of parental rights. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) "[T]he exception applies in situations where a child cannot be in a parent's custody but where severing the child's relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child." (Caden C., at p. 630.) If the juvenile court finds the exception applies, the child is not returned to the parent-rather, the court "decline[s] to terminate parental rights and select[s] another permanent plan" (id. at p. 631), such as legal guardianship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).)
To establish the parental-benefit exception, a parent must show, "by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . that the parent has regularly visited with the child, that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and that terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629, citing § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)In assessing these elements, "the focus is on the best interests of the child." (Caden C., at p. 632.)
The statutory language requires a showing that "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court's determinations regarding regular visitation and whether the child would benefit from continuing the relationship with the parent. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We review for abuse of discretion the juvenile court's ultimate determination whether terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child, again reviewing any factual findings supporting that determination for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 640.)
"In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should 'not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.' [Citation.] The determinations should 'be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.' [Citations.]" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Where, as here, the appellants had the burden to prove the parental-benefit exception, "the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law." (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989.)
"Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only when '" 'the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.'"' [Citation.] But '"' [w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. '"' [Citations.]" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.)
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declining To Apply the Parental-Benefit Exception
Mother contends that she satisfied all three elements of the parental-benefit exception. Although the juvenile court did not so find, we will assume arguendo mother established the first two elements-regular visitation and beneficial relationship- because the third element-whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to Z.A.-is determinative here.
In evaluating the third element, the juvenile court "weigh[s] the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) The question "is how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship-in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child's life." (Id. at p. 633.) For example, "the effects [of severing the parental relationship] might include emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression." (Ibid.) On the other hand, "a new, stable home may alleviate the emotional instability and preoccupation leading to such problems, providing a new source of stability that could make the loss of a parent not, at least on balance, detrimental." (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, on balance, whatever benefit Z.A. obtained from his relationship with his mother was outweighed by the benefits of a stable, adoptive home with maternal grandparents. There are two themes evident in the record on appeal: (1) mother's antipathy towards anyone who would care for Z.A. other than herself, and (2) mother's unwillingness to cooperate with court orders and social worker instructions regarding her contacts with Z.A. and his caregivers. Given these recurring themes, the juvenile court would have little confidence that mother would abide by the strictures of a legal guardianship, in which she necessarily must accept that others would care for her child. Z.A. would have little chance of a stable life if mother in her communications with him continued to disparage his caregivers and remind him of her desire to resume custody of him.
It is true that towards the end of the dependency proceedings, mother's conduct during visits with Z.A. appears to have improved. Given mother's earlier inappropriate conduct, however, and more recent evidence-such as her incoherent communications with the DCFS social worker-that she was still struggling with the mental health issues that drove that conduct, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding mother's improvement was insufficient reassurance that she would not be a destabilizing presence in Z.A.'s life.
Also supporting the juvenile court's ruling was an absence of evidence that severing parental ties would be detrimental to Z.A. Z.A. himself stated he was in favor of adoption. He appeared to be thriving despite living thousands of miles away from mother. Mother did not testify, nor did she offer evidence from Z.A.'s therapist, teachers, or others suggesting Z.A. would suffer harm if he lost his relationship with her.
Mother contends Z.A.'s shifting position on adoption throughout the proceedings, as well as the Mother's Day card offered in evidence, "foreshadow the degree of detriment he will incur" upon termination of parental rights. Certainly Z.A.'s changing preferences and his love of mother were proper considerations for the juvenile court, but those considerations do not establish as a matter of law that Z.A. would, on balance, suffer detriment if deprived of a relationship with mother.
Mother argues, based on the brevity of the juvenile court's stated findings, that the juvenile court failed to conduct a proper analysis under Caden C. There is "no requirement . . . that the juvenile court, in finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception." (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) The juvenile court specifically referenced the "quality of the visits" as a factor in its decision, which we reasonably may assume refers to mother's inappropriate conduct during those visits, including mother's verbal attacks on the caregivers and her improperly suggesting to Z.A. that he would return to her soon. As we have explained, mother's inappropriate conduct during visits was a proper basis for the juvenile court to conclude a continued relationship between Z.A. and mother was not in Z.A.'s best interests.
Mother criticizes DCFS for "present[ing] a paucity of evidence analyzing the nature and importance of mother's relationship with [Z.A.]." This criticism is not well taken when mother, who had the burden to establish the parental-benefit exception, offered little of her own evidence. She did not testify, nor does the record reflect that she sought to have Z.A. testify or present a statement to the juvenile court. Mother does not show in the record that she ever requested that DCFS obtain more information from Z.A., Z.A.'s therapist, or others. Mother therefore has little basis to blame DCFS for the lack of evidence to support the parental-benefit exception. Regardless, even assuming a strong, beneficial bond between mother and Z.A., mother's history of antagonism towards Z.A.'s caregivers and inability to follow court orders and other legal strictures justified severing that bond for the reasons set forth earlier in our Discussion.
Mother contends DCFS and the juvenile court "considered 'improper factors'" by "placing undue emphasis upon mother's inability to complete the court-ordered case plan, overcome her mental health issues, assume a 'parental role', and resume custody of her son." Mother does not identify what language in the record indicates the juvenile court relied on improper factors. At the permanency planning hearing, DCFS argued, consistent with our holding here, that mother's visits with Z.A. were concerning, and her ongoing struggles with mental illness militated against the conclusion that Z.A. would benefit from maintaining a relationship with her. As our Supreme Court stated in Caden C., although "[a] parent's continued struggles with the issues leading to dependency are not a categorical bar to applying the [parental-benefit] exception," "[a] parent's struggles may mean that interaction between parent and child at least sometimes has a' "negative" effect' on the child." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637.) Here, mother's struggles with mental illness, and her concomitant difficulties with behaving properly when interacting with Z.A., were properly considered by the juvenile court in concluding the benefits of termination of parental rights outweighed the benefits of maintaining the parental bond.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J., WEINGART, J.