Opinion
B323526
06-05-2023
In re V.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff, v. J.H., Defendant and Appellant.
Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent Minors.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00553B&C Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.
Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent Minors.
LUI, P. J.
Appellant J.H. (Mother) challenges a juvenile court order denying her request for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388.) Mother asked to start reunification services, which were previously denied because she or her partner inflicted life-threatening injuries on her three-year-old daughter. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Mother's young sons oppose her appeal because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) sided with Mother, for no apparent reason.
Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The court did not abuse its discretion. Mother did not show changed circumstances or that modification is in the children's best interest. Mother took no responsibility for her child's painful, near-death experience, never progressed beyond monitored visits, and did not show that she can provide a safe, permanent home. Her sons, both under age three at detention, deserve stability after years in the dependency system. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother has three children: M.H. (born in 2017), and respondents V.M., Jr. (2019) and M.M. (2020). V.M., Sr. (Father) is the presumed parent of respondents, who are the focus of Mother's appeal. P.A. is the father of M.H. Father, P.A., and M.H. are not parties to this appeal.
History of Violence
In 2019, DCFS investigated a report that the family lived in a filthy, vermin-infested house with no utilities; Mother used drugs; V.M., Jr. had drugs in his system at birth but did not receive care for withdrawal symptoms; and Father was stabbed at home. DCFS closed the case without finding evidence to support the report. In 2020, DCFS learned that police in Nevada intervened after Mother drove the children to Las Vegas late at night to confront Father; Mother "punched" and tried to strangle M.M.; she slapped the children; and DCFS did nothing to protect them. DCFS deemed the report "inconclusive."
Father was beaten and stabbed by Mother's relatives after he and Mother argued over fireworks they had purchased.
Severe Child Abuse Leading to Detention
In August 2020, M.H. was evaluated at two Palmdale hospitals, where Mother told staff that the child fell and hit her head. M.H. had a hematoma on her forehead, complained of stomach pain, was vomiting brown fluid, and urinated on herself. She was airlifted to Children's Hospital in Los Angeles (CHLA), which diagnosed a perforated bowel, "the result of a severe blow to the stomach or some other type of blunt force trauma." M.H. underwent three abdominal surgeries.
Mother said M.H. fell in the bathroom; however, CHLA advised DCFS that the fall Mother described would not cause a perforated bowel, which "is the result of a 'high impact' to the abdomen" and "could not have been caused accidentally." Mother said a doctor "informed her that this type of injury is only found in individuals involved in car accidents," yet "she does not know where this injury could have occurred" because M.H. "is with her '24/7.'" She denied that Father harmed M.H. and has "no concern" about his interactions with the child.
A CHLA physician said M.H.'s injury" 'is almost always child abuse . . . someone kicking in or punching you in the abdominal area. This is non-accidental trauma'" that could not occur with just a fall because M.H." 'does not weigh enough to have caused this type of force.'" Her pain was" 'unbearable'" because" 'acid and feces were being dumped into her abdomen.'" CHLA planned to remove part of her bowel and reconstruct her intestine," 'a huge surgery'" that would have to wait until a septic infection abated.
P.A. was concerned about Mother's abuse of his daughter, M.H. Photos taken of M.H. in February 2020 show a swollen lip, facial bruises, burst blood vessels in both eyes, a burn covering the back of her hand, and a missing thumbnail. P.A. travelled to Palmdale to report M.H.'s injuries but the sheriff's department refused to look at M.H. or take a report. Mother told P.A. that M.H. fell against a dresser for the facial injuries, was playing with a box cutter for the nail injury, and was burned by hot water. P.A. believes that Mother harms M.H. Mother saw the photos and repeated that M.H. had facial injuries from a fall and a burn from hot water but denied that M.H. lost a fingernail.
Inconsistently, Mother told the maternal aunt (MA) that M.H. burned the back of her hand by touching a water heater, which caused her fingernail to fall off.
Father denied hitting M.H. He told CHLA that M.H. fell in the bathroom. The family sometimes lives with the paternal grandfather, who said that Mother ignores the children, did not bathe them, and let baby M.M. fall multiple times from a sofa onto a tile floor.
Deputies detained the children because the parents gave conflicting narratives about M.H.'s injuries. Mother showed photos of a bruised M.H. and accused Father of" 'causing harm to her daughter.'" The parents gave conflicting information about where they were staying. Father told deputies that he and Mother were in the motel room when they heard M.H. fall; Mother said she was outside the room. Deputies said Mother was "nonchalant" and "contradicted herself on several occasions." The owner of the motel told deputies that the parents brought bloody bed sheets to wash.
DCFS determined that either Mother or Father perpetrated an injury that could have caused M.H.'s death. It secured a court order to remove the children.
The Dependency Petition
A petition alleged that M.H. sustained life-threatening blunt-force traumatic injury that the parents inconsistently explained; while in parental care, she previously had bruised and swollen eyes, "popped blood vessels in both eyes," a torn-off thumbnail, and burns. The serious physical harm and severe physical abuse of M.H. places the minors at risk of harm. (§ 300, subds. (a), (b), (e), (j).) DCFS asserted that M.H.'s injuries are prima facie evidence that section 300 applies. (§ 355.1, subd. (a).)
At the detention hearing on September 4, 2020, the court placed the children in shelter care. A substantial danger to their physical and emotional health required removal from the home. Mother was given monitored visits and directed to participate in counseling, parenting classes and anger management counseling.
Further Investigation
Mother denied a history of domestic violence, mental health issues, history of substance abuse, neglect as a child, sexual abuse, or criminal history. Mother was, however, formerly a dependent of the court. Father denied altercations with Mother but CHLA reported that they argued at M.H.'s bedside. The maternal grandmother (MGM) said Mother was evicted by a relative who "couldn't take [her] abusing the kids anymore." Mother took a swing at MGM but missed; while MGM was bent over, Father "ran up and kicked me in the face," causing MGM to lose two front teeth. MGM accused Father of beating up M.H.
M.H. remained hospitalized. CHLA reported that she was "sad, quiet, difficult to engage" after Mother's visits, "crying very hard and had trouble catching her breath." By contrast, M.H. laughed and smiled with nurses. After DCFS told the court that Mother's visits are "causing emotional and physical detriment to the child," the court limited Mother to virtual visits.
CHLA reported that M.H. had significant adverse emotions triggered by anyone touching her head, face and neck, "a complex trauma response, which improved over the course of her hospitalization." Her injury "require[d] substantial blunt force trauma to the abdomen, such as could occur from forcefully punching or kicking" her. M.H. "could have died."
A DCFS social worker (CSW) interviewed three-year-old M.H. at CHLA, while she was attached to medical devices and bandaged. She gave nonverbal responses, nodding agreement that she promised to tell the truth. She did not respond when asked if she likes Father. M.H. looked at CSW and nodded when asked if a family member hurt her stomach, indicating "yes" when asked if it was Father.
P.A. told DCFS that Mother is manipulative, dishonest, and tries to keep him from seeing M.H. In February 2020, he asked M.H. if Mother hit her, causing a split lip, and she said "yes." It made no sense to P.A. that Mother allowed a child to play with a box cutter and cut off a fingernail. Father told P.A. that Mother harms the children. After M.H. was released from CHLA, she went to live with P.A. and his relatives; CSW saw that she is happy, smiling, and energetic.
Father's seven-year-old daughter I.M. (who is unrelated to Mother) told CSW that Father hits her with a closed fist. She is afraid of him. She reported that Mother hits M.H. I.M. said Father "is 'mean to me. He just hits my stomach, it hurts.'" She "demonstrated a balled up fist and punched [it] into her stomach."
MA said Mother gave conflicting accounts of M.H.'s injuries, saying M.H. fell on stairs, and asked people to lie for her in court. MA saw Mother "smack" M.H. and V.M., Jr. in the face and said Father is violent. MA saw M.H.'s burned hand and missing fingernail.
M.H.'s paternal grandmother (PGM) saw the child in February 2020 with black eyes, missing fingernail, and a flat affect. Mother said it was not her fault if Father "kicked [M.H.] in the stomach." PGM believes Mother and Father abused M.H. M.H. lives with P.A. in PGM's home. M.H. is affectionate, comfortable, and bonded with her father.
During an examination for child abuse, a physician wrote that V.M., Jr.'s irregular femur shows a possible healed fracture. M.H. was hospitalized 45 days for her perforated bowel and has a long scar on her abdomen. DCFS recommended that neither Mother nor Father receive reunification services.
In December 2020, DCFS wrote that Mother did not start counseling or anger management classes. Against instructions, she allowed others to participate in virtual visits with her children, made disparaging comments, and discussed the DCFS case with M.H. During a monitored visit in March 2021, Mother yelled and threatened CSW, using profanity, "with no regard to her children being present." CSW instructed the caregivers to disconnect the children from the call.
Mother and Father live together in a familial relationship. Mother did not enroll in approved programs, saying she is "not willing to participate." At monitored visits, she initially interacts with the children; for the final two hours, she hands V.M., Jr. a phone to watch and puts M.M. in a stroller to fall asleep. DCFS did not plan to liberalize visits because she has not learned how to mitigate safety concerns.
During a visit in September 2021, M.M. allowed Mother to hold him, which is usually not the case; after one hour, she sat V.M., Jr. in her lap while he watched her phone. Mother closed her eyes and no longer spoke to the children. At CSW's request, Mother roused herself and interacted with the children, cleaning up their toys and waiting for their caregiver to arrive 30 minutes before the visit was scheduled to end. Virtual visits were unfruitful as there was little interaction between her and the children. Mother refused to authorize an assessment of V.M., Jr., who was nearly nonverbal at age two-and-a-half and had difficulty chewing and swallowing food without coaching.
DCFS recommended that the court sustain the petition, deny reunification services to Mother and Father, and terminate jurisdiction as to M.H. with sole legal and physical custody to P.A., the nonoffending parent.
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings
A trial was conducted. On October 4, 2021, the court sustained the allegations in the petition and found that the children fall within section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (e), and (j). Soon after, Mother moved to Las Vegas.
At the contested disposition hearing on November 1, 2021, the court declared the children to be dependents and found a substantial danger to them if they return to parental care. The court denied reunification services and directed DCFS to provide permanent placement services. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6).) Mother was given monitored visits.
Mother gave notice of her intent to file a writ petition, contesting the denial of services. After counsel filed a no merit letter, Mother filed an insufficient petition that we dismissed on April 29, 2022. (J.H. v. Superior Court, B316087.)
Permanent Planning Phase
In February 2022, DCFS reported that the boys, ages one and two, are living with prospective adoptive parents who have cared for them since they were detained in 2020. The caregivers are seeking a medical evaluation because both boys have trouble chewing and swallowing food. Mother is inconsistent with weekly virtual visits. It is difficult to keep the boys attentive during visits; afterward, they resume playing and do not seem to miss their parents. The caregivers have adopted other children and their home is approved. DCFS recommended that parental rights be terminated and the children be adopted.
Mother was never restricted to virtual visits with the boys, only with M.H. Mother resides out of state and had not seen them for months; she stopped visiting of her own accord. In October 2021, she completed one of eight scheduled in-person visits. She sometimes did not act appropriately and CSW had to intervene on multiple occasions. As for virtual visits in 2022, Mother had one in January; four in February; and three in March. She had no proof of participation in classes or programs that would show she has grown in her ability to parent. During virtual visits, she does not give the children her full attention.
On April 5, 2022, the court ordered that Mother's visits "be virtual only." DCFS had discretion to allow in-person visits at a secure location. Mother must inform DCFS in writing if she desires an in-person visit. A counselor wrote that Mother began therapy in January 2022 to address "thinking patterns and cognitive distortions," learn "mindfulness, relaxation and empathy," and process "past and present hardships."
The boys continued to thrive with the prospective adoptive parents, who are helping V.M., Jr. with his language skills. M.M. is closely bonded with the caregivers, who tend to all emotional, physical, and developmental needs. Mother communicates with DCFS only to confirm visits.
Mother has in-person visits once a month at the DCFS office and one-hour virtual visits every Friday. She is trying to bond with the children and brings snacks and activities but has difficulty engaging and controlling them or reading their cues. During virtual visits, there are sometimes long silences. DCFS continued to recommend termination of parental rights.
During a bonding study in July 2022, Mother tried to remain engaged and attentive to the children "but did not know how to redirect them or talk on their level." M.M. wandered around without engaging with Mother. The children ran to the DCFS lobby and the facilitator had to retrieve them. M.M. went limp and began to fuss when Mother picked him up but did not object to being held by CSW. Long before the visit was supposed to end, V.M., Jr. said "he wanted to go home" and refused to kiss Mother good-bye.
The bonding assessment report noted that M.M. was removed from Mother before developing an attachment to her; he does not show affection, joy, or excitement to see her or distress when she leaves the room. V.M., Jr. has an anxious attachment to Mother and wants her full attention. He was excited to see her but told her, "Mommy, I want to go back home," after two hours. Both boys left with CSW without hesitation after saying good-bye to Mother. The psychologist believes their attachment to Mother can be repaired.
Mother's Request for Modification
In August 2022, Mother requested modification of the court's November 2021 order denying reunification services. She asked the court to return the children to her or begin services. The changed circumstance is that she began parenting classes and counseling in January 2022. She asserted that the children will benefit because she loves them, visits regularly, they share a bond, and they should be raised by her.
Mother's counselor said they discuss coping strategies, stressors, and relaxation techniques; they discussed the child abuse case generally and recently reviewed specifics. Mother has difficulty regulating her emotions, including sadness and anger. She took parenting classes from January to July 2022.
Minors' counsel and DCFS objected that M.H.'s severe injuries could have been fatal; Mother never took responsibility for what happened; she started therapy and parenting in 2022 and only recently began addressing case issues; and her visits were inconsistent. The court set a hearing on the section 388 request. DCFS later recommended that the court grant Mother's request and order reunification services.
The Hearing
A hearing was conducted on September 6, 2022. Mother's counsel acknowledged that "this was a very serious case," Mother did not enroll in programs or cooperate with DCFS, and services were bypassed; however, she "turned the corner" in 2022, began therapy, and visits in person once a month and virtually three times monthly. Father supported Mother's request to begin services. DCFS agreed, saying Mother has "appeared to make a change" after being "very uncooperative" with DCFS. She visits more often and is "trying to engage" in services.
Minors' counsel asked the court to deny the request. There is no change of circumstances. Mother did not show she resolved any issues that led to the dependency proceeding; her recent participation in services is a "changing" circumstance. She has not addressed the severe abuse M.H. endured. She has made minimum progress without showing that she has any insight or takes responsibility, only that she is working on her emotions and coping strategies. There is no evidence that starting services is in the best interests of the children. The bonding study psychologist observed one visit; by contrast, CSW monitored many visits and saw Mother struggle to engage and redirect the children. Mother attended only one of eight visits in October 2021, and eight of 13 visits from January to March 2022.
Mother testified that she sees the children once a month for three hours at the DCFS office, and three times virtually. V.M., Jr. calls her "mommy" and sometimes says he wants to stay with her; other times says he wants to return to his foster home. M.M. calls her "mama" or "mom." Mother loves her children and feels they should live with her. Minors' counsel asked the court to terminate parental rights because the children have been in foster care for over two years; there are no barriers to adoption; and there is no showing that the children would be harmed if the parental bond is severed.
The Court's Rulings
After reviewing all documentary evidence and hearing argument, the court denied the section 388 request. There is insufficient evidence of changed circumstances and DCFS did not authenticate Mother's claims. Her parenting program and counseling began in 2022. In therapy she is merely" 'processing the emotions associated with the case.'" An incomplete parenting program and start of therapy show changing circumstances. The court noted that the children are under age three and entitled to permanency.
Moving to the permanent plan, the court found that the children are adoptable and returning them to the parents is detrimental. The conditions that justified jurisdiction continue. A parental bond "does not exist." Mother did not carry her burden of showing regular visitation or a substantial positive emotional attachment such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the children. Although a bond "can be repaired," it is not the sort of significant bond that meets the parent-child bond exception in section 366.26. The court terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A parent of a dependent child may seek modification of an order "upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence." (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) "[T]he parent must sufficiently allege both a change in circumstance or new evidence and the promotion of the child's best interests." (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157.) Mother challenges the denial of a modification. She does not address the order terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26.)
1. Appeal and Review
The denial of a modification is appealable. (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1444.) Modification requests are "addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416 (Jasmon); In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.) A court exceeds the limits of discretion if its determination is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
2. Standard for Granting a Modification When Reunification Services Are Bypassed
We start by acknowledging that the court bypassed services. Reunification services may be bypassed when, as here, a child is adjudicated a dependent because a parent caused "severe physical harm" to a sibling or half sibling, and the child would not benefit from reunification services with offending parents. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).) If the bypass provision applies, the court "shall not order" reunification services unless it finds, "by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child." (Id., subd. (c)(2); In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141; In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1152-1153 [services denied "because the parents had 'not held themselves accountable for the serious injuries'" to their infant].)
"When a juvenile court bypasses reunification services due to a finding that a child suffered 'severe physical abuse' [citation], the focus of the dependency proceedings turns to the child's need for permanence and stability instead of family reunification." (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.) Children have a fundamental right to a placement that is stable and permanent. (Jasmon, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 419.)
A parent may seek modification of an order denying services due to severe abuse. (§ 388, subd. (a)(2).) However, the legislative presumption against services in severe abuse cases heightens the evidentiary burden at a hearing to consider a section 388 petition requesting services. (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1157- 1158.) "In such a case, a juvenile court may modify an order denying reunification services only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the services would be in the child's best interests, and only if it makes the same findings that would have been required to offer services at the disposition hearing instead of bypassing services." (Id. at p. 1158; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(C).)
The court considers the act causing severe physical harm; the circumstances leading to the harm; the severity of emotional trauma; any history of abuse of other children; the likelihood the child may be safely returned to the offending parent's care within 12 months without continuing supervision; and whether the child desires reunification. (§ 361.5, subd. (i).)
Modification requires "a substantial change in circumstances." (In re Heraclio A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 569, 577.)" 'A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent . . . might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child's best interests.'" (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206.) To decide the petition, the court may consider the entire history of the case. (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258; In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.)
Reunification services are limited to reduce "the length of time a child has to wait for a parent to become adequate." (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308.) A parent may receive six months of services when a child under age three is removed from custody, "but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care." (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Services are extended only if there is reason to believe the child can be safely returned to parental custody within the extended period. Services are "first presumed, then possible, then disfavored." (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 845.)
A child enters foster care on the date of the jurisdiction hearing or 60 days after his or her initial removal, whichever is earlier. (§ 361.49.) Here, 60 days from the children's detention hearing is November 3, 2020.
3. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Mother's Request to Begin Services
When detained in 2020, V.M., Jr. was one year old and M.M. was three months old. Mother sought to begin reunification services two years after detention. In that time, she did not address the problems that led to dependency jurisdiction. DCFS encouraged Mother to seek counseling and engage in programs, but she was "not willing to participate."
Not until 2022 did Mother enroll in programs or seek counseling. There is no evidence that she learned to protect the children's safety. Mother and/or Father inflicted grievous blunt-trauma injury on M.H.; if Father caused it, Mother accepted and excused his brutality, saying she has no concerns about him and denying that he harmed M.H. Mother gave specious excuses for injuries M.H. suffered months before the potentially fatal blow to her stomach-facial bruising, split lip, burst blood vessels in her eyes, severe burn on her hand, and torn-off thumbnail.
"Despite overwhelming evidence that [M.H.] had been brutally treated on more than one occasion and that either she or Father had inflicted the injuries, Mother was unwilling to acknowledge any source for [M.H.]'s injuries. Since Mother knows which of the two of them must have inflicted the injuries, her refusal amounts to a willful denial of the injuries themselves. In those circumstances, there is no reason to believe further services will prevent her from inflicting or ignoring the infliction of similar injuries in the future. For the same reason, there is no evidentiary basis for finding . . . that reunification with Mother would be in the best interests of [the children]." (In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1077-1078.)
As far as we can tell, Mother and Father still live together. The record does not show otherwise. There is little likelihood, let alone a substantial probability, that the children can safely return to parental custody. Even if services had not been bypassed, the time for reunifying with such young children lapsed under section 361.5.
From 2020 to 2022, Mother did little except avoid contact with DCFS. She did not use up available visitation time. In counseling, she did not focus on the trauma she caused. Her relationship with the children is shallow. M.M. barely relates to her and V.M., Jr. asked to end a visit early to go "home" to the foster family. There is no evidence that the children desire reunification with Mother.
Apart from Mother's lack of progress, she "did not state [s]he was currently able to provide the children a stable, safe permanent placement. [She] sought only to continue the dependency proceedings, which had been initiated [two years] earlier. 'Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.' [Citation.] This showing of changing circumstances is not sufficient." (In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) Absent a showing that Mother can presently provide a safe, permanent home, an extension of the proceedings is unwarranted.
Mother's petition states that services are in the children's best interests because she shares a bond with them, visits regularly, and they should be raised by her. Her reasoning notably focuses on her needs, not the children's needs. In determining a child's best interest, the court considers (1) the seriousness of the reason for dependency jurisdiction; (2) the strength of the bonds between the child, the parent and the caretakers; and (3) whether the problems leading to dependency may be easily removed or ameliorated. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530-532.)
The children were removed for the most serious reason: The parents engaged in or condoned extreme violence that nearly cost the life of a child. Neither parent took responsibility for M.H.'s injuries, caused by someone kicking or punching a defenseless child. Relatives said both Mother and Father physically abused all three children. Abusive parental behavior cannot be ameliorated without accepting responsibility. "[S]erious physical abuse of a child by an adult constitutes a fundamental betrayal of the appropriate relationship between the generations." (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 76-77.)
Neither M.M. nor V.M., Jr. is strongly bonded with Mother. They have spent nearly all their young lives with the prospective adoptive parents, who tend to all their needs and are effectively the only parents they know. Until 2022, Mother's visits were inconsistent, with minimal engagement. She has not seen to the children's needs or progressed to unmonitored visitation, let alone demonstrated an ability to take custody.
"[T]he welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a duty, to protect." (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.) The children's interest in permanency and stability outweighs the remote possibility of reunification with Mother. Though reunification is favored at the beginning of the dependency process, the opposite is true at the end of the process, when the child deserves a stable, permanent home. (Jasmon, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 420.)
The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother's petition to have custody of the children or receive services. The court's subsequent order terminating parental rights is unchallenged: Mother does not deny that the legislative preference for adoption applies here.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
We concur ASHMANN-GERST, J., HOFFSTADT, J.