Opinion
B329719
07-26-2024
In re A.E. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.E., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Nos. 22CCJP02321D, E, Philip Soto, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
VIRAMONTES, J.
INTRODUCTION
J.E. (Father), the father of the dependent children, appeals from the juvenile court's findings and orders made on May 23, 2023, ordering continued suitable placement of his children A.E. and C.E. While Father's appeal was pending, the court returned both A.E. and C.E. to Father's custody. We find Father's appeal is moot as to children A.E. and C.E. and decline to exercise discretionary review.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Dependency petition
Father and H.G. (Mother) are the parents of A.E. and C.E. On June 15, 2022, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), alleging Father physically abused children J.W., D.E., J.E., Jr., A.E., and C.E. The petition further alleged that Father demonstrated violent and aggressive behavior toward the maternal great-grandmother in the presence of J.W. and D.E., and had unresolved issues with substances, including ongoing abuse of alcohol and marijuana. DCFS later amended its petition to include allegations that Father violated the court's safety orders. Although parents have three other children together, only A.E. and C.E. are the subject of this appeal.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On June 29, 2022, the juvenile court detained the children from Father and placed them with Mother. Thereafter, on July 15, 2022, the juvenile court detained the children from Mother.
On November 1, 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated the petition. The juvenile court declared all five children dependents of the juvenile court, removed them from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for both parents.
II. Contested review hearing
Father's case plan included participation in random and on demand drug testing, a 12-step program, parenting classes, individual counseling with a licensed DCFS approved counselor, and compliance with all protective court orders.
At the May 23, 2023 review hearing, Father requested the return of A.E. and C.E. to his custody while submitting on further family reunification services for the three older children. DCFS argued against returning the two children to Father's care. Counsel for the children also opposed Father's request and asked the court to follow DCFS's recommendation. The juvenile court denied Father's request to return A.E. and C.E. to his custody.
Father appealed on May 25, 2023. On September 13, 2023, more than two months prior to Father's filing of his opening brief for this appeal, the juvenile court returned A.E. and C.E. to Father's care. On March 14, 2024, DCFS filed a motion to dismiss the appeal due to mootness, which this court initially denied. On June 28, 2024, we sent a Government Code letter requesting the parties to address whether this appeal was moot, and Father did not file a response. DCFS again argued that the appeal is now moot.
DCFS requests that we take judicial notice of the September 13, 2023 minute orders releasing A.E. and C.E. to Father's care. Father does not oppose the motion. Here, we grant the request to take judicial notice because the minute orders are part of the juvenile court's record and we review them solely to evaluate mootness. (Evid. Code, § 452; In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86, 110.)
Earlier denial of DCFS's motion to dismiss by this court does not preclude later consideration of the issue. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 900 ["a summary denial of a motion to dismiss the appeal should not preclude later full consideration of the issue, accompanied by a written opinion, following review of the entire record and the opportunity for oral argument"].)
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the detriment finding during the six-month review hearing. DCFS contends the appeal is moot, among other points. Having reviewed the record, we agree with DCFS that the appeal is moot because we are unable to grant any effective relief.
I. Mootness
A. Governing law
The California Supreme Court affirmed that the mootness doctrine applies to juvenile dependency appeals: "A court is tasked with the duty' "to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it." '" (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
While an order terminating the juvenile court's jurisdiction tends to render an appeal moot, dismissal is not automatic, and must be decided "on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot." (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) "A case becomes moot when events' "render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief."' [Citation.] For relief to be 'effective,' two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks." (Ibid.)
B. The appeal from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders are moot as to children A.E. and C.E.
In this case, we can grant no effective relief. DCFS argues that the appeal is moot as to children A.E. and C.E. because both children have been returned to Father's custody. Although Father did file a reply brief, he did not address mootness in the reply. Nor did Father file an opposition to DCFS's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. Additionally, Father did not respond to our Government Code letter asking the parties to address mootness. We now dismiss Father's appeal as moot because the juvenile court has already granted Father the relief he seeks by returning A.E. and C.E. to his care.
First, Father does not point to any ongoing harm so we can grant no effective relief. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) On September 13, 2023, the juvenile court placed A.E. and C.E. with Father, thereby granting Father the relief he seeks on appeal. (See ibid.) Second, we cannot rectify any harm here. (Ibid.) The children at issue are already with Father, so this is nothing to rectify. (Ibid.) The appeal is moot.
II. Discretionary review
Even where an appeal is moot, we may exercise discretionary review to reach the merits if certain factors are met. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 287.) We decline to do so here.
A. Governing law
The Supreme Court explained that "no single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise discretionary review of moot appeal," and "[a] reviewing court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is appropriate to exercise discretionary review to reach the merits of a moot appeal, keeping in mind the broad principles and nonexhaustive factors." (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286-287.)
The high court outlined three main factors. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 285-286.) First, we should consider whether the challenged findings and order could impact current or future dependency proceedings. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, we may consider whether the finding against the parent is "particularly pernicious or stigmatizing." (Id. at pp. 285-286.) Finally, we may also consider why the appeal became moot by considering "[p]rinciples of fairness" and the "interest of justice," since "features of dependency proceedings tend to make appeals prone to mootness problems" such as "the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent." (Id. at p. 286; In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 224.)
Ultimately, in deciding whether to exercise discretionary review, we are "guided by the overarching goals of the dependency system: 'to provide maximum safety and protection for children' with a 'focus' on 'the preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional wellbeing of the child.'" (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.)
B. The appeal does not warrant discretionary review
Father does not request we exercise our discretion to decide the merits of the moot appeal as he never briefed mootness. We see no reason to exercise discretionary review as A.E. and C.E. are already in Father's care.
DISPOSITION
Father's appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: STRATTON, P. J., GRIMES, J.