Opinion
B316855
03-23-2023
In re ADRIAN E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. JACQUELINE S. et al., Defendants; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, JESSE B. et al., Objectors and Respondents; PATRICIA D., Intervener and Appellant.
Joseph D. MacKenzie for Intervener and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Law Offices of Arthur J. LaCilento and Arthur J. LaCilento for Objectors and Respondents. Children's Law Center of California, Ann-Marissa Cook and Amanda Rogers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 20CCJP01013A Tamara Hall, Judge. Conditionally reversed, stayed and remanded for an immediate hearing.
Joseph D. MacKenzie for Intervener and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Law Offices of Arthur J. LaCilento and Arthur J. LaCilento for Objectors and Respondents.
Children's Law Center of California, Ann-Marissa Cook and Amanda Rogers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
HOFFSTADT, J.
This is a juvenile dependency case involving a very young child. The child's foster parents with whom the child was placed days after his birth sought an order declaring them to be de facto parents with an eye toward adopting the child. The child's Colorado-based grandparents sought an order moving the child to their custody. The juvenile court granted the order requested by the grandparents and thereafter denied the order requested by the foster parents as "moot." This was error. The evidence compels a finding that the foster parents qualified as de facto parents, and the juvenile court's failure to recognize this and its consequent refusal to let them participate in the proceedings renders invalid the order authorizing the child's placement with the paternal grandparents. We therefore order the juvenile court to grant the foster parent who appealed de facto parent status, conditionally reverse the order authorizing the child's placement with the paternal grandparents, and direct the juvenile court to immediately convene a new hearing to assess which placement is in the best interest of the child at the time of the hearing on remand. To avoid the disruption attendant to unnecessary movement of the child, we exercise our inherent authority to preserve the status quo by ordering the child to remain with the paternal grandparents during the pendency of the hearing on remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
David M. (father) and Jacqueline S. (mother) had Adrian E. in February 2020.
Mother has longstanding mental health issues, including schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations. Mother has often refused to take her medications and, during those times, engages in aggressive, assaultive behavior. She has struck relatives on several occasions, and was involuntarily hospitalized the day before Adrian was born as well as less than a week afterwards.
Father has autism and learning disabilities, and has indicated he is unable to care for Adrian.
Adrian was born early with some special needs, and was placed in the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).
The paternal grandfather (along with his new wife) (collectively, the paternal grandparents) live in Colorado.
II. Procedural Background
A. Initial petition and detention
On February 18, 2020, as Adrian was being released from the NICU, he was detained and, within a day or two, was placed with Patricia D. and Sonia M. (the foster parents). Within days of accepting custody, the foster parents expressed their interest in adopting him should he not be reunited with his parents.
On February 21, 2020, the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over Adrian due to (1) mother's history of mental and emotional problems, (2) mother's history of "violent and aggressive assaultive behavior," and (3) father's "unwillingness and inability to provide ongoing care and supervision"; the Department alleged that these circumstances place Adrian at substantial risk of serious physical harm, thereby justifying dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Between March 2020 and July 2020, the Department had some contact with the paternal grandparents, and by July 2020, the paternal grandparents indicated that they were "willing to provide permanent placement" for Adrian if the parents failed to reunify. At no point did the Department provide the paternal grandparents with the written notice mandated by section 309, subdivision (e), for relatives of potential dependent children.
B. Jurisdiction, disposition and reunification
On July 22, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the allegations and declared Adrian a dependent child. The court also formally removed Adrian from mother's and father's custody, leaving him in the custody of the foster parents. The court also ordered the Department to initiate an investigation of the paternal grandparents' home pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).
On January 20, 2021, the juvenile court conducted the sixmonth status review hearing, terminated reunification services, and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing.
By this time, Adrian had been in the foster parents' custody for nearly a year. He had developed a "strong bond" with them, and they offered him a "loving and safe environment."
C. Postreunification period
1. Motions on file
On April 19, 2021, the foster parents filed a motion, pursuant to section 388, seeking an order convening a hearing under section 361.3 (the section according a "preference" to relatives) and an order to deny the paternal grandparents' right to custody, which would collectively prevent the Department from moving forward on plans to transfer Adrian to the custody of the paternal grandparents absent a court order or emergency. On May 7, 2021, the court set the 388 petition for a hearing. On May 19, 2021, the court granted the motion in part by prohibiting the Department from changing Adrian's custody absent a court order. The court postponed ruling on the other portion of the foster parents' section 388 motion.
Also on May 19, 2021, the paternal grandparents filed a motion seeking a custody hearing under section 361.3. The foster parents opposed the motion.
On June 2, 2021, the foster parents filed a motion to be deemed de facto parents of Adrian.
On July 7, 2021, the paternal grandparents filed a motion, pursuant to section 388, seeking an order placing Adrian in their custody.
2. Juvenile court's rulings
After consolidating these motions for hearing and holding evidentiary hearings over the course of four days in August and September 2021, the juvenile court decided to hear the paternal grandparents' section 388 motion first, leaving the foster parents' de facto parent motion undecided. Due to this order of events, the foster parents were not permitted to participate in the hearings. On September 21, 2021, the court issued an order (1) granting the grandparents' section 388 motion to transfer Adrian to their custody in Colorado, (2) denying as "moot" the foster parents' request to be deemed de facto parents, and (3) denying as "moot" the foster parents' section 388 motion. The court did not separately rule on the paternal grandparents' section 361.3 motion, but ultimately viewed it as distinct from the section 388 motion.
On September 28, 2021, Adrian was transported to the paternal grandparents' custody in Colorado.
D. Appeal
Patricia D. (but not Sonia M.) (Patricia) filed a timely notice of appeal. That notice did not identify any specific orders, and instead listed just about every reporter's transcript. Because Patricia's brief attacks the juvenile court's order denying her de facto parent status as well as the order granting paternal grandparents custody of Adrian, we will address those orders.Because the paternal grandparents are the real party in interest opposing the orders the foster parent attacks on appeal, we invited them to participate as respondents in this appeal.
While this matter was pending on appeal, the juvenile court on January 13, 2022, terminated the parents' parental rights over Adrian.
DISCUSSION
Patricia argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her request for de facto parent status and in granting the paternal grandparents' section 388 motion. Addressing these arguments requires us to confront three questions: (1) Did the juvenile court err in denying Patricia's request for de facto status, (2) if there was error, does this error invalidate the juvenile court's section 388-based order authorizing Adrian's transfer to the paternal grandparents' custody, and (3) if the transfer order is invalid, what is the appropriate remedy? We review a juvenile court's ruling denying de facto parent status or granting a section 388 motion for an abuse of discretion. (In re Abigail L. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 169, 178 (Abigail L.) [de facto parent status]; R.T. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1300 (R.T.) [section 388 motion].) In assessing whether an error is prejudicial, we ask whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent that error. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60.)
Patricia also argues at various points that the juvenile court is biased and no longer impartial. We have reviewed the record, and find no support for this argument. Patricia's request to have the case reassigned on remand to a different judge is accordingly denied.
I. De Facto Parent Status
A de facto parent is a "'a person who has been found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, . . . and who has assumed that role for a substantial period.'" (In re A.F. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 692, 699 (A.F.), quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502(10).) De facto parents are accorded certain procedural rights in a juvenile dependency case-namely, (1) the right to "[b]e present at [all] hearing[s]" involving the child, (2) the right to "[b]e represented by . . . counsel," and (3) the right to "[p]resent evidence" and to be heard. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.534(a), 5.530(b)(2); In re P.L. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1361 (P.L.).) De facto parents have no right to reunification services and no right to visitation. (A.F., at p. 700.) Acquiring the status of a de facto parent is also no guarantee that the child will be placed or will remain in that parent's custody. (Ibid.; Abigail L., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 177-178; In re B.S. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 888, 897 (B.S.).) Instead, de facto parent status merely secures the right (1) to present relevant information to the juvenile court, so that "all legitimate views, evidence, and interests are considered" in making placement decisions regarding the child (A.F., at p. 701), and (2) to have a proverbial "seat at the table," so that the de facto parent can assert their "own interest in companionship, care, custody and management of the child" and thereby offer up themselves as a "alternative" placement option (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 693 (B.G.); In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 77-78 (Kieshia E.)). These limited rights dovetail with the "key reason" why the courts invented the concept of a de facto parent in the first place: De facto parents, by virtue of their close relationship with the child, "may provide critical information that assists the [juvenile] court in determining what disposition is best for the child." (A.F., at p. 701; B.G., at p. 693.)
Indeed, the limited rights of a de facto parent are why the appellate courts are split over whether they even have the standing to appeal a juvenile court's placement decision. (Compare B.S., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [no standing]; P.L., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1361-1362 [no standing] with In re Vincent M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 943, 953 [standing].) This split is not implicated in this case because this case deals with the precursor issue of whether the foster parents were wrongly denied de facto parent status in the first place and thus wrongly denied the opportunity to participate in the juvenile court's decision-making process (rather than the substantive propriety of the resulting decision). Individuals seeking de facto parent status have the right to appeal the denial of that status. (In re Crystal J. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 186, 190; In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1195.)
Whether an adult qualifies as a de facto parent turns on the totality of the circumstances. (See In re Bryan D. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 127, 141 (Bryan D.).) Relevant circumstances include: (1) "whether the child is psychologically bonded to the adult," (2) "whether the adult has assumed the role of a parent on a day-to-day basis for a substantial period," (3) "whether the adult possesses information about the child that other participants do not possess," (4) "whether the adult has regularly attended juvenile court hearings," and (5) "whether a future proceeding may result in an order permanently foreclosing any future contact with the adult." (A.F., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 700; Abigail L., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 177.) De facto parent status is "ordinarily liberally granted on the theory that a court only benefits from having all relevant information on the best interests of the child." (Bryan D., at p. 141; Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 76 [doctrine has been "liberally applied to ensure that all legitimate views, evidence, and interests are considered in dispositional proceedings involving a dependent minor"].) An adult may become ineligible for de facto parent status if they have "act[ed] in a manner that is fundamentally inconsistent with the role of a parent" by acting in an "unsuitable" manner. (Bryan D., at p. 142; In re Antonio G. (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 369, 377 (Antonio G.); § 361.3, subd. (d).)
Applying this standard, the juvenile court's finding that Patricia did not qualify as a de facto parent was an abuse of discretion because the evidence compels a finding, as a matter of law, that she is. (Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838 [where party had burden of proof below, reversal required when evidence compels a finding in that party's favor as a matter of law].) It is undisputed that Adrian had a "close bond" with the foster parents; that they had been Adrian's day-to-day caretakers for nearly all of the first 19 months of Adrian's life (from February 2020 until their motion was denied in September 2021); that they accordingly possessed information about Adrian that no one else possessed; that they regularly attended juvenile court hearings involving Adrian; and that the juvenile court's future orders could completely cut off their contact with him. Indeed, the evidence was so overwhelming that the Department consistently acknowledged as much to the juvenile court and has conceded as much in this court. Although, by virtue of the juvenile court's order granting the paternal grandparents' section 388 motion, Adrian has been out of the foster parents' custody since October 2021, this does not undermine our conclusion because de facto parent status can be accorded to "former" custodians, including those who are former custodians solely by virtue of juvenile court orders being attacked on appeal. (E.g., Abigail L., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 179; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.534(a) [recognizing the potential for a "present or previous custodian" to be a de facto parent entitled to standing in dispositional and later hearings].)
The paternal grandparents do not dispute that Patricia meets the above-described definition of a de facto parent, but offer two arguments in response.
First, they contend that the juvenile court already effectively granted the foster parents de facto parent status. We reject this contention for two reasons. To begin, it directly contradicts the juvenile court's actual ruling-which denied the foster parents' motion for de facto status due to mootness. Further, and more to the point, the contention lacks merit. The paternal grandparents urge that de facto parent status does not entitle a person to actually participate in court proceedings beyond being able to attend and watch those proceedings, and that the foster parents here were able to show up to the hearings, to talk to the Department's social workers, and to file their motion for de facto parent status; thus, the paternal grandparents declare, the foster parents were effectively granted all the rights de facto parents possess. The paternal grandparents are wrong. Although, as noted above, de facto parents are not entitled to reunification services, visitation or a guaranteed right to custody, they are entitled to participate as litigants in proceedings where they have relevant evidence to present. (See also B.G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 693 [de facto parents "should be permitted to appear as parties to assert and protect their own interest" and are not "restricted to the limited role of an amicus curiae"].) The paternal grandparents cite In re B.F. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 811 (B.F.) and In re Damion B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 880 (Damion B.) in support of their position that de facto parents are entitled to be little more than proverbial flies on the wall, but overread those cases: B.F. held that de facto parents did not have an "automatic right" to receive copies of all documents pertinent to the case (B.F., at p. 817), and Damion B. held that the de facto parents in that case were not entitled to introduce testimony because they had not demonstrated that the testimony would "add pertinent information" and had not "explained what actual evidence" would be presented (Damion B., at p. 890.) Here, by contrast, the foster parents had pertinent information to offer regarding what is in Adrian's best interest-which was a key element of the paternal grandparents' section 388 motion-after being Adrian's custodian for 19 months.
Second, the paternal grandparents suggest that Patricia is somehow precluded from being deemed a de facto parent because, in the view of the paternal grandparents, the foster parents did not act in Adrian's best interest, interfered with Adrian's visits with them, and "lied about them" to the Department. Although, as noted above, an adult's conduct in a manner "fundamentally inconsistent with the role of a parent" may forfeit de facto parent status (Bryan D., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 142), all the paternal grandparents point to here is their subjective belief that the foster parents acted not in Adrian's best interest; if that were enough to defeat de facto parent status, the doctrine would become meaningless.
II. Effect of Erroneous De Facto Parent Ruling on Grandparents' Section 388 Motion
A section 388 motion is a vehicle for urging a juvenile court to modify one of its prior orders (including its prior custody placement of a child); to prevail on such a motion, the movant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there has been a "change in circumstances," and (2) modifying the prior order is in the best interest of the child. (§ 388; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D); In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 316-317 (Stephanie M.).)
The juvenile court's erroneous denial of the foster parents' de facto parent status request necessitates invalidating and hence conditionally reversing its section 388-based order moving Adrian's custody from the foster parents to the paternal grandparents. That is because (1) the remedy for erroneous denial of de facto parent status is an order granting that status (Bryan D., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 146-147), and (2) the grant of de facto parent status would have enabled the foster parents to participate in the section 388 proceedings (which, as noted above, the juvenile court did not permit), and thereby to offer detailed information about Adrian's first 19 months of life. It is reasonably probable that the absence of that information, by virtue of the juvenile court's erroneous de facto status ruling, affected the juvenile court's assessment of what was in Adrian's best interest (which is a critical component in the analysis of a section 388 motion). (Katzoff v. Superior Court (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1083-1086 (Katzoff) [error in denying de facto parent status necessitated vacating placement decision made without the benefit of the information the de facto parents would have provided].) Not surprisingly, the Department also agrees that invalidating the section 388 order is necessary.
The paternal grandparents disagree, urging that the juvenile court's denial of Patricia's de facto parent status-even if erroneous-was harmless because so much time has passed since the juvenile court's September 2021 hearing granting the paternal grandparents custody that there is no "substantial probability" the court would make any other placement decision now. The paternal grandparents cite In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 719-724 (Isabella G.) in support of their position, but that case actually refutes their position because it holds that a relative who lost custody of a child for two and a half years was still entitled to a hearing on whether the transfer of the custody out of the relative's custody was appropriate-despite the passage of that time. (Ibid.) The same is true here: The passage of time has not rendered harmless the juvenile court's erroneous failure to allow Patricia to present pertinent evidence at the hearing on remand bearing on Adrian's best interest. (Cf. In re Arturo A. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 229, 244-246 (Arturo A.) [dismissing appeal of order terminating reunification services and rejecting associated ineffective assistance of counsel claim because parent could not show deficient performance of counsel was prejudicial].)
Because invalidation of the juvenile court's ruling on the grandparents' section 388 petition is warranted by virtue of its exclusion of the foster parents from adjudication of that petition, we have no occasion to further consider the merits of the court's ruling. This is why we denied the grandparents' second motion to augment the record, as the items they sought to add bore only on an issue we find unnecessary to our decision.
III. Remedy on Remand
Now that we have determined that Patricia should be deemed a de facto parent and that the juvenile court's section 388-based order granting the paternal grandparents custody of Adrian is invalid, the remaining question is what should happen on remand.
We instruct the juvenile court to immediately convene a hearing to determine which placement is in the best interest of Adrian at the time of the hearing on remand.
We need not decide whether the hearing on remand is technically categorized as a "relative placement" hearing under section 361.3, or a change-of-circumstances hearing under section 388. That is because both types of hearing are currently permissible to address where Adrian should be placed. A section 361.3 hearing is a hearing where a person who qualifies as a "relative"-which includes paternal grandparents (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(2))-may ask the juvenile court to "independently assess" and to exercise its "independent judgment" as to whether placement with that relative is appropriate under the numerous factors set forth in section 361.3, subdivision (a). (In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 498, 502; Antonio G., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 378-379; In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 15-17; see § 361.3, subd. (a).) A section 361.3 hearing is appropriate, even when first requested after reunification services have ended, where-as here-it is undisputed that the Department did not in writing properly inform the relative of their rights under section 361.3 prior to the termination of those services. (Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722-723; R.T., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300; In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 577, 592-593, 595; see generally, § 309, subd. (e) [setting forth requirements].) A section 388 hearing is also appropriate to address the placement of a child based on changed circumstances. (E.g., In re Cody R. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 381, 395.) Critically, both hearings look to which placement is in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1) [listing "best interest of the child" as the first relevant factor]; Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 862-863 ["The linchpin of a section 361.3 analysis is whether placement with a relative is in the best interests of the minor"]; Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 321 [adopting same principle]; § 388, subd. (a)(2) [requiring proof that "the proposed change is in the best interests of the child"].) Indeed, because there is no doubt that the paternal grandparents are relatives and that there has been a change in circumstances, the key issue remaining is which placement is in Adrian's best interest.
Patricia offers two responses. First, she argued to the juvenile court that the Department complied with section 309 "as far as [counsel could] tell" because the Department eventually contacted the paternal grandparents, but this fails to address the absence of written notice or the absence of proof that the paternal grandparents were notified of the full universe of information required in a proper section 309 notice, which may have borne on their choices. Second, she argues to this court that paternal grandparents hemmed and hawed about whether to get involved until after the reunification period ended, implicitly urging us to find that the utter failure of notice did not matter to the paternal grandparents' decision-making process, such that we should overlook the Department's noncompliance with section 309. We decline the invitation to effectively negate section 309's clear mandates with a speculative inquiry into whether the paternal grandparents would have acted with greater alacrity had they received all of the information to which they were statutorily entitled.
The focus of the hearing on remand is which placement is in Adrian's best interest at the time of the hearing on remand (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1291 [looking to "the circumstances existing at the time of the hearing"]; In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 734 [same]) rather than what would have been in Adrian's best interest 17 months ago, when the juvenile court held that original section 388 hearing. Thus, the court must consider the bond Adrian has formed with his paternal grandparents since they took custody of him nearly 18 months ago, and whether disrupting that bond by "remov[ing him] . . . from a home where he has been cared for" during the past year and a half will be in his best interest. (Katzoff, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 1085 [indicating such a showing would be "difficult" to make]; see also, Arturo A., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 244-246 [same].)
Given the heavy burden Patricia will bear in demonstrating that it is in Adrian's best interest to uproot him from his longstanding placement with the paternal grandparents, we elect to exercise our inherent authority to preserve the status quo-by leaving Adrian in the custody of the paternal grandparents- pending the hearing on remand regarding which placement is in Adrian's best interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 923 [noting "power of a reviewing court . . . to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo"]; In re Michael H. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1373, fn. 9 [applying Code of Civil Procedure section 923 in dependency proceedings]; accord, Cal. Hotel &Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 216, fn. 42 [noting "the inherent power of the court to make an order to preserve the status quo"].)
Patricia urges us not to do so, contending that, pending the hearing on remand, Adrian must be immediately placed back in her custody because the section 388 order shifting custody to the paternal grandparents has been conditionally reversed. We disagree. Adrian has now been with the paternal grandparents for over a year; to yank him from his current placement, when it is yet to be determined whether he may end up right back there if the paternal grandparents prevail on remand, would be incredibly disruptive and not in his best interest. (Accord, Sanchez v. Sanchez (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 810, 815, 817-818 ["unless we . . . continue the status quo [of a child's placement], we expose the child[] to the possibility of even further undesirable and possibly reversible dislocations" in derogation of "the best interests of the child"]; In re Adoption of Cox (1962) 58 Cal.2d 434, 443 ["staying execution of the order requiring that [current custodians] relinquish custody . . . pending determination of the appeal from such order" "for the best interests of the minor" child].) "The passage of time is a significant factor in a child's life; the longer a successful placement continues, the more important the child's need for continuity and stability becomes in the evaluation of [his] best interests." (In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 855.) While leaving Adrian with his paternal grandparents during this upcoming remand period may not be the theoretically purest outcome because we are not completely unmaking the chain of errors that led to the current placement, our task is to do what is in the best interest of the child-not act as the Guardians of Theoretical Purity. Patricia points to two cases in support of her argument that immediate transfer of custody is required, but neither case is even remotely on point, and one of them has been overruled (albeit on other grounds). (In re Nemis M. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1344; Dawnel D. v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 393, overruled by Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order denying Patricia's request for de facto parent status is reversed, and the court is directed to enter an order granting her that status. The juvenile court's order granting the paternal grandparents' section 388 motion is conditionally reversed and the juvenile court is directed to immediately hold a hearing to determine which placement is in Adrian's best interest now, allowing both the paternal grandparents and Patricia to participate. If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court finds that Adrian should remain placed with the paternal grandparents, the court's order granting the paternal grandparents' 388 motion is reinstated. In the interim, we exercise our inherent authority to preserve the status quo by allowing Adrian to remain in the paternal grandparents custody pending the outcome of the hearing on remand.
WE CONCUR: LUI, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.