Opinion
B325196
11-17-2023
In re F.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. G.S., Defendant and Appellant; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, F.S., a Minor, etc., Respondent.
Konrad Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Janette Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent F.S.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 19CCJP04047D Phillip Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
Konrad Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Janette Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent F.S.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ADAMS, J.
G.S. (father) appeals from juvenile court orders finding he is the biological father of minor F.S. but denying his request to be declared F.S.'s presumed father. We affirm the trial court's orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Only mother was named in the dependency petition the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed in March 2022. In advance of the detention hearing, father submitted a JV-505 judicial council form Statement Regarding Parentage. He declared that he told "friends and family members" that F.S. was his daughter and he participated with F.S. in "parent-child bonding, supervision, child care, going to the park, going to eat at restaurants." He represented that he provided F.S. with clothing and food and that she spent time with his family at family gatherings and holidays. He stated F.S. had lived with his father (the paternal grandfather) and stepmother from 2014 to 2016. Father requested that the court order DCFS to release F.S. to his custody or consider placing her with the paternal grandfather and his stepmother. Father also called DCFS and reported he was living with his girlfriend and son in San Pedro. He told DCFS that he was "planning to enter an inpatient program" for his substance abuse issues. He had last seen F.S. in 2021 when mother contracted COVID-19.
In a parentage questionnaire, mother attested father was not present when F.S. was born. He did not sign the birth certificate or other paperwork naming him the father. She also declared she and father were not married or living together at the time F.S. was conceived or born, that F.S. had been raised by mother and another adult, and that father had not openly held himself out as F.S.'s father or received F.S. into his home. Mother also reported to DCFS that father abused drugs and "is in and out of jail."
At the March 29, 2022, detention hearing, the juvenile court found father to be an alleged father. F.S. and her half-siblings were detained from mother. Father did not appear.
At father's subsequent arraignment on the petition in April 2022, the court appointed counsel and instructed father to work with his attorney to provide a new Statement of Parentage. In his new statement, father declared he had represented to family, friends, and a court that F.S. was his daughter. He provided financial support "through" the paternal grandfather and stepmother, most recently nine months earlier. He stated F.S. "would spend anywhere between two to three days a week" with the paternal grandfather and his stepmother, which included overnight visits, but mother's boyfriend stopped the visits in late 2021 after mother was hospitalized. F.S. also "spent many days and overnights" with father's sister, aunt, and mother. Father visited F.S. "through" his parents at their home, and his parents assisted "with school pickups and drop offs, summer school sign ups, birthday parties etc." He also declared that he participated in birthdays and family gatherings with F.S. and had given her gifts on her birthdays, Christmas, and other holidays.
Father cites his new Statement of Parentage to contend "he had often picked up and dropped off F.S. at school and personal events." However, the statement says father's parents, not father, took on these responsibilities.
In DCFS's May 2022 jurisdiction/disposition report, mother described father's family as "very supportive," but stated father "has not been active in [F.S.]'s life as much as his family has." The paternal grandfather and father's stepmother told DCFS that father splits his residence between their home and the home of "the mother to his other child." His stepmother reported she and the paternal grandfather "provided assistance to mother through the child's life." She further stated that she and the paternal grandfather" 'would help [F.S.] so that's how [father] was seeing her,'" and that he" 'would not see [F.S.] by himself but when she would come see us[,] [father] would come over.' "
When DCFS later spoke with father in April 2022, his only request was to have visits with F.S. Father told DCFS, "She does not have to live with me but I do want to see her." He agreed with F.S. continuing to live with her half-sibling's father (hereafter stepfather).
At the jurisdiction hearing on May 2, 2022, the court ordered DCFS to re-interview father to ascertain "what contact father has with the Minor since birth and any impediments as to visits/contacts/relationship." DCFS could not reach father but spoke instead with father's stepmother. Father's stepmother again reported father "was not active in [F.S.]'s life" and had "not been consistent since [F.S.] was probably two or so." She stated that she and father's other family members were "the only [ones] who really have the relationship, not [father]." She reported that father did not have a place of his own and could not care for F.S. without assistance.
Mother and F.S.'s maternal grandmother wrote letters to DCFS regarding father's relationship with F.S. Mother stated that in 2015, father was incarcerated and "waived" his rights to F.S. in a previous proceeding, as father "wanted nothing to do with it." F.S.'s maternal grandmother stated father "gave up his paternal rights in 2014, chose not to have any relationship with [F.S.] nor did he provide any child support."
Later in May 2022, father reported to DCFS that he was incarcerated when mother was two months pregnant with F.S. and was not released until F.S. was two years old. DCFS reported father did "no[t] play[ ] an active role in [F.S.]'s life." Father told DCFS he" 'just let[s] her mom do her thing'" and sees F.S. when she visits his parents. Father reported that his past interactions with F.S. occurred only when he saw her at the paternal grandfather's home. He also stated F.S. could not live with him because he did not have stable housing, but he requested visitation.
At the May 20, 2022, disposition hearing, the juvenile court removed F.S. from mother. The court ordered DNA testing for father and continued the hearing as to F.S. Father filed a notice of appeal. At the September 8, 2022, continued disposition hearing, the court found father is F.S.'s biological father based on the DNA results. However, the court continued the matter further as it had received information indicating F.S. did not want to visit father. In addition, F.S.'s stepfather had requested that the court declare him F.S.'s presumed father.
F.S. subsequently told a DCFS social worker she did not really know father, she did not want to visit him or the paternal grandparents, and, although the social worker encouraged her to participate in visits with father, she refused. At the October 6, 2022 continued disposition hearing, father again objected to the court's denial of his request for presumed father status. He indicated he was not requesting reunification services, he did not want custody of F.S., and he only wanted visitation. He did not object to the visits being monitored. The juvenile court ordered visitation to take place in a therapeutic setting. Father filed a second notice of appeal.
Prior to the first review hearing, DCFS submitted a report indicating F.S. continued to refuse to visit father. She had only recently enrolled in mental health services, thus visits with father in a therapeutic setting had yet to begin. DCFS noted that father's family continued to advocate for visitation with F.S. and request case information, but father was not directly involved. He was not receiving family reunification services from DCFS.
At the November 17, 2022 review hearing, father again objected to the juvenile court's denial of his request for presumed father status. Father asked the court to order conjoint therapy with F.S. and to allow him telephone calls with her. The juvenile court terminated the suitable placement order and returned F.S. to mother's home under DCFS supervision. As to father, the court re-stated its order for monitored visits in a therapeutic setting. Father filed a third notice of appeal.
On February 23, 2023, we granted father's motion to consolidate his appeals.
On May 31, 2023, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction. The court issued a juvenile custody order indicating father had been declared F.S.'s biological father, awarding mother sole legal and physical custody, and further ordering that father have monitored visitation with F.S., in a therapeutic setting. The order provided that F.S.'s wishes were to be taken into account before visits occurred. Father did not appeal these orders.
DISCUSSION
I. Mootness
Arguably, this appeal is moot in light of the juvenile court's order terminating jurisdiction. "A case becomes moot when events' "render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief."' [Citation.] For relief to be 'effective,' two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks." (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) Here, because father seeks presumed father status but does not seek custody or in any way challenge the juvenile custody order, there is no "specific legal or practical consequence that would be avoided" by reversal of the juvenile court's denial of his request for presumed father status. (Id. at p. 273.) He cites no legal authority to support his argument that the lack of presumed father status alone, disconnected from a request for custody, is an "ongoing harm" sufficient to keep the case from being moot. (Id. at p. 276.)
On July 26, 2023, F.S., through counsel, filed a request for judicial notice of the juvenile court orders terminating dependency jurisdiction and issuing a juvenile custody order. F.S. also filed a respondent's brief arguing the court should dismiss this appeal as moot. We granted the request for judicial notice. Father declined to file a reply brief. We subsequently invited father to submit supplemental briefing to respond to F.S.'s mootness argument. On September 28, 2023, father filed a letter brief opposing dismissal. DCFS has informed this court it takes no position on the appeal.
Nevertheless, "[e]ven when a case is moot, courts may exercise their 'inherent discretion' to reach the merits of the dispute." (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 282, 283, 285 [court's discretion is "particularly important" in dependency proceedings because they are prone to dismissal for mootness which could"' "insulat[e] erroneous or arbitrary rulings from review"' "].) Courts consider "a variety of factors" in exercising this discretion, including whether a challenged finding" 'could be prejudicial to the [parent] or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings ....'" (Id. at p. 285.) A parent does not have to show any "specific legal or practical consequence that would be avoided upon reversal ...." (Id. at pp. 283, 287; see, e.g., In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 121 [considering merits of an appeal even though mother "assume[d] that there will be future dependency proceedings and offer[ed] no other specific harm that sustained jurisdictional and dispositional findings may bring her"].) We exercise this discretion to address the merits of father's challenge to the juvenile court's denial of his request for presumed father status.
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Denying Presumed Father Status
"A man who has held the child out as his own and received the child into his home is a 'presumed father.'" (In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801 (Jerry P.), citing Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).) "[T]he policy underlying the section 7611(d) presumed parent presumption is the protection of already developed parent-child relationships for purposes of providing stability to children." (R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 776.) Further, "[i]t is not the living arrangements, but the relationship between the child and the adult that is the primary factor in determining whether the adult should be deemed a presumed parent." (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 900.)
"There are no specific factors that a trial court must consider before it determines that a parent has 'received' a child into the home and has established a parental relationship." (W.S. v. S.T. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 132, 145.) Courts have considered "whether the man actively helped the mother in prenatal care; whether he paid pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his ability to do so; whether he promptly took legal action to obtain custody of the child; whether he sought to have his name placed on the birth certificate; whether and how long he cared for the child; whether there is unequivocal evidence that he had acknowledged the child; the number of people to whom he had acknowledged the child; whether he provided for the child after it no longer resided with him; whether, if the child needed public benefits, he had pursued completion of the requisite paperwork; and whether his care was merely incidental." (In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1211 (T.R.).)
We review the trial court's rejection of father's claim to presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) for substantial evidence. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653 (Spencer).) Because father had the burden of proving the facts supporting his entitlement to presumed father status (T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210), we determine "whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the father as a matter of law." (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on another ground by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 4.)
There was no such evidence here. The evidence was largely uncontested, it showed father had not established a parent-child relationship with F.S., and it did not compel a presumed father finding as a matter of law.
Father was incarcerated when mother was two months pregnant with F.S. He was not released until F.S. was two years old, foreclosing any possibility that he assisted mother during the pregnancy or birth. He did not appear on the birth certificate. Both mother and F.S.'s maternal grandmother indicated father had "waived" his parental rights years earlier. There was no evidence that father attempted to have his name placed on the birth certificate or otherwise asserted his legal rights related to F.S. until these proceedings.
Further, there was no evidence that father established a relationship with F.S. after his release from custody. The record is replete with consistent statements from father, his stepmother, and F.S.'s mother, that father is not actively involved in F.S.'s life. By his own admission, his involvement with F.S. was limited to interactions they had when F.S. visited his own parents. His stepmother confirmed father does not visit F.S. himself and there was no evidence that father made any effort to see F.S. outside of his parents' home.
Additionally, there was no evidence that father ever assumed caregiving responsibilities for F.S. or otherwise met her needs during her visits to his parents' house. Considering father resides at times at his father's and stepmother's home, these interactions with F.S. appear incidental to his living arrangement. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude father's visits with F.S. at his parents' home allowed father to "avoid the constant parental-type tasks that come with having the child in his own home-such as feeding and cleaning up after the minor, changing her clothing, bathing her, seeing to her naps, putting her to bed, taking her for outings, playing games with her, disciplining her, and otherwise focusing on the child." (In re A. A. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 771, 786-787 [father's visits with minor at the maternal grandmother's home and parents' home was not sufficient for presumed father status].) The fact of these visits, therefore, did not compel the finding that father has a parent-child relationship with F.S. sufficient to be awarded presumed father status. (Id. at p. 786 [biological father's visits with child in other people's homes "can be seen as a matter of convenience for [father]"]; Spencer, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1653 [father living with the child at the mother's house "was not demonstrative of [his] commitment to the child" where father resided there "out of personal convenience and self-interest"].)
Finally, father argues he established presumed status "through" the involvement and support of his family. He contends the paternal grandfather's and stepmother's home is his home for purposes of the statute, and he cites his family's involvement in F.S.'s life as indicative of his support. This argument is unavailing. To qualify as a presumed father, father had to marshal evidence showing he has a demonstrated parental relationship with F.S. (Jason P. v. Danielle S. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1023; Jerry P., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 801-802 [presumed parent must demonstrate" 'a full commitment to his paternal responsibilities-emotional, financial, and otherwise' "].) Father cannot cite his family's care for F.S. to demonstrate by proxy that he personally established the necessary parental relationship with F.S., particularly on this record, given his concession that he has had no active role in F.S.'s life.
The evidence does not compel the conclusion that father satisfied the requirements for presumed father status. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to deny his request.
DISPOSITION
The orders denying appellant's request for presumed father status are affirmed.
We concur: LAVIN, Acting P. J. EGERTON, J.