Opinion
B324984
07-25-2023
In re X.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. F.R., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 21CCJP01123A, Nichelle L. Blackwell, Judge Pro Tempore. Dismissed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KIM, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
F.R. (father) appeals from an order terminating parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.Father seeks a reversal and remand for compliance with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224 et seq.). Because father lacks standing to appeal, we dismiss.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
We limit our recitation of facts to those relevant to appealability, except as is necessary for context.
Father is the alleged father of X.R. (the child), who was a newborn at the time the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a section 300 petition. A.C. (mother) is the child's biological mother. Mother reported that father was incarcerated when the child was born.
Though father was initially identified as the biological father of X.R., the record demonstrates, as we discuss below, that he is at most an alleged father.
In March 2021, the Department filed a dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based on mother and the child testing positive for methamphetamine at the child's birth.
At the March 15, 2021, detention hearing, mother and father filed Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) forms for the child, indicating that "[n]one of the above apply" regarding Indian status and stated that the ICWA-020 forms were correct. The juvenile court found it had no reason to know the child was an Indian child and that ICWA did not apply.
Father also submitted a Statement Regarding Parentage (JV-505) form, indicating that he did not know if he was the child's parent. Father requested a DNA test for paternity, which the juvenile court granted. The court detained the child from mother and father's custody, and ordered monitored visits for mother.
On April 30, 2021, the Department filed an amended petition.
In the jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department noted that father's whereabouts were unknown and that it had initiated a due diligence search. Meanwhile, on April 7, 2021, the child's foster parent had taken the child for DNA testing.
On May 12, 2021, the juvenile court held the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Neither mother nor father appeared at the hearing. The court found that father was only an alleged father because he did not appear for the DNA test and had failed to contact his counsel or the Department. The court sustained two counts from the amended section 300 petition, declared the child a dependent of the court, and removed him from mother and father's custody.
At the six-month status review hearing on November 10, 2021, the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing. Neither father nor mother appeared.
In the Department's section 366.26 report filed March 10, 2022, the Department reported that mother and father's whereabouts were unknown. Neither had any contact with the child. The Department attached to the report the child's birth certificate, which indicated that father was not named as the biological father of the child.
In a last minute information for the court filed June 9, 2022, the Department reported that father had been found incarcerated at the Men's Central Jail in Los Angeles.
On September 27, 2022, the juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing for the child. Mother and father did not appear. Father's counsel reported that father had been transported to the courthouse but refused to appear because he wanted to return to the jail facility as quickly as possible. The court admitted into evidence the Department's reports, including the reports for the child's sibling, and judicially noticed its prior orders and findings. The court terminated the parental rights of mother, father, and anyone claiming to be the child's parent. Father appealed.
The court also held the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing for the child's sibling, who is not a subject of this appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
"[I]n California an alleged father may acknowledge or establish paternity by voluntarily signing a declaration of paternity at the time of the child's birth, for filing with the birth certificate (Fam. Code, § 7571, subd. (a)), or through blood testing (Fam. Code, § 7551).... [¶] '[T]o have standing to appeal, a person generally must be both a party of record and sufficiently "aggrieved" by the judgment or order.' [Citation.] An alleged father who has not acknowledged or established he is a parent within the meaning of title 25 United States Code section 1903(9) lacks standing to challenge a violation of the ICWA notice provisions." (In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708709, fn. omitted; see also In re. E.G. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533 ["Until biological paternity is established, an alleged father's claims of Indian heritage do not trigger any ICWA notice requirement because, absent a biological connection, the child cannot claim Indian heritage through the alleged father"].)
Here, father is not named on the child's birth certificate. Further, although he requested a paternity test, he failed to appear for the test and made no further efforts to change his parental status beyond that of an alleged father. He therefore lacks standing to challenge a purported violation of the ICWA provisions. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
IV. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: BAKER Acting P. J., MOOR, J.