Opinion
B315680
11-07-2023
In re M.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. F.M., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 21CCJP03827, Robin R. Kesler, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CURREY, P.J.
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court made jurisdictional findings that F.M.'s (father's) substance abuse and mental health issues placed his child M.M. (born March 2021) at risk of harm. The court issued a disposition order removing M.M. from father's custody. On appeal, father challenges the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and removal order, arguing they are unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
The court also made a jurisdictional finding that M.M.'s mother, J.M. (mother), likewise placed M.M. at risk of harm through her substance abuse. The court ordered M.M. removed from mother's custody. Mother did not appeal.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the case, so we do not fully restate those details here. Instead, in the Discussion, post, we discuss the facts as needed to provide context for and resolve the issues presented on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdictional findings
Father challenges the juvenile court's sustaining of counts b-2, b-3, j-1, and j-2 of the petition. He argues the juvenile court's findings on those counts are unsupported by substantial evidence. Because we can affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over M.M. if any of the statutory bases for jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773), we will focus our discussion on count b-2.
In reviewing a juvenile court's jurisdictional finding for substantial evidence, we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the court's finding. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) In conducting this analysis, "[w]e do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, [n]or resolve evidentiary conflicts." (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) We affirm the juvenile court's finding as long as a reasonable trier of fact could have reached it. (In re I.J., supra, at p. 773.) For these reasons, a party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal bears an "'enormous burden.'" (People v. Vasco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 137, 161.)
"'The basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.'" (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) In deciding whether the child is at risk of harm, the juvenile court may consider past events, as "[a] parent's past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior." (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the hearing, however, "[t]here must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur." (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)
In sustaining count b-2, the juvenile court found father's substance abuse placed M.M. at substantial risk of harm. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) In challenging that finding as unsupported by substantial evidence, father essentially argues the juvenile court incorrectly concluded mother was credible in her statements to a social worker that father smoked marijuana, drank alcohol "every day, all day," and used a lot of methamphetamine "all the time," and "a lot during the day." Father likewise argues the juvenile court erred by finding not credible his statements that he was not using or abusing substances.
In support of these arguments, father points out that parts of the record suggest he was not abusing substances when the court made its jurisdictional finding on count b-2, and other parts of the record suggest mother was not the most reliable source of information. As noted above, however, in reviewing the juvenile court's ruling for substantial evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence nor substitute our own credibility determinations for those of the juvenile court. (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) Given that the juvenile court believed mother's statements that father had serious substance abuse issues, including constant alcohol and methamphetamine use, it was not unreasonable for the court to find prima facie evidence of risk of harm to M.M. (See, e.g., In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 766-767, disapproved on another ground by In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283 [in cases involving "children of such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to their physical health and safety[,]" a "finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm."]; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 449, overruled on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn.7 [noting methamphetamine is "'an inherently dangerous drug known to cause visual and auditory hallucinations, sleep deprivation, intense anger, volatile mood swings, agitation, paranoia, impulsivity, and depression'"].) We therefore conclude the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding on count b-2 is supported by substantial evidence.
M.M. was six months old at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.
As noted above, because we affirm the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding on count b-2 as being supported by substantial evidence, we need not address father's arguments that the court's jurisdictional findings on counts b-3, j-1, and j-2 are unsupported by substantial evidence. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
II. Substantial evidence supports the removal order
We next consider father's challenge to the juvenile court's removal order. As with the court's jurisdictional finding analyzed above, we affirm the removal order if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides the juvenile court may remove a child from the custody of a parent if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody."
In Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th 989, our Supreme Court clarified the nature of substantial evidence review applicable to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding made under the clear and convincing evidence standard. It held: "[A]n appellate court must account for the clear and convincing standard of proof when addressing a claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under this standard. When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence." (Id. at pp. 10111012.)
The facts supporting jurisdiction also support removal of M.M. from father's physical custody. As noted above, the record contains evidence that father drank alcohol "every day, all day," and used methamphetamine "all the time." Other facts contained in the record likewise support the removal order. For example, father locked M.M.'s half-sibling, I.K. in an RV for hours at a time. According to the detention report, during the time I.K. was locked in the RV, I.K. was talking to rats and bugs. Additionally, mother went to a domestic violence shelter because father was abusing her. Mother stated father had been physically violent toward her, including kicking her in the stomach when she was pregnant with M.M., as well as pushing her down a flight of stairs in front of I.K. When a safety check was conducted at the family's home, a jar of marijuana and three blades were found in a closet accessible to the children. Based on these facts, we conclude the juvenile court's finding of substantial danger to M.M. if left in father's custody is supported by substantial evidence, and we accordingly affirm the court's removal order.
In arguing the removal order should be reversed, father renews his contention that substantial evidence does not support the finding that he was abusing substances. We reject this contention for the same reasons explained above analyzing father's challenge to the court's jurisdictional finding on count b-2.
Before going to the domestic violence shelter, mother lived with father in his RV.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional finding and dispositional order are affirmed.
We concur: COLLINS, J., ZUKIN, J.