Opinion
B321099
09-21-2023
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 19LJJP00744C Stephanie M. Davis, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
STRATTON, P. J.
C.S. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order limiting her visits with her daughter S.T. to monitored virtual visits. In light of the subsequent termination of C.S.'s parental rights, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2019, the juvenile court declared S.T. a dependent child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and removed her from Mother's custody. Mother's visits were limited to monitored virtual visits in May 2021. On May 20, 2022, Mother requested the resumption of in-person visits. The court found returning to inperson visits was not in S.T.'s best interest and ordered monitored virtual visits to continue. Mother appealed.
On April 14, 2023, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights.
We grant County Counsel's request that we take judicial notice of the juvenile court's April 14, 2023 minute order. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.) We decline to take judicial notice of the remaining documents in the request for judicial notice as they are unnecessary to the resolution of the appeal.
DISCUSSION
Mother's appeal of the court's denial of her request for inperson visitation is moot. "[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error." (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) Here, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights with respect to S.T. "An order terminating parental rights severs the parent-child relationship and extinguishes all rights and obligations between the child and his or her parents." (Jackson v. Fitzgibbons (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 329, 334.) Mother did not appeal the termination of her parental rights. As Mother no longer has any right to visit S.T., even if we were to find the visitation order erroneous we could not grant her effective relief. (See In re N.S., at p. 60.)
Mother has not disputed the Department's argument that the case is moot, nor has she asked this court to reach the merits of the appeal despite its mootness. Accordingly, while we acknowledge that "[e]ven when a case is moot, courts may exercise their 'inherent discretion' to reach the merits of the dispute" (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282), there is no reason to exercise that discretion here and we decline to do so.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: WILEY, J., VIRAMONTES, J.