Opinion
B311361
11-23-2021
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMANDA C. et al., Defendants and Appellants. In re A.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Landon Villavaso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Amanda C. Elena S. Min, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Eric S. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from dispositional orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 20CCJP04533, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Landon Villavaso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Amanda C.
Elena S. Min, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Eric S.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BENDIX, ACTING P.J.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) asserted dependency jurisdiction over A.S., a child who was then seven years old. The juvenile court later sustained an amended dependency petition alleging that A.S. suffered injuries due to her father's, Eric S.'s (father's), failure to supervise and protect her adequately; father violated a family court order requiring that A.S. not be left at home without an adult present; and A.S.'s mother, Amanda C. (mother), possessed a drug pipe in the child's home and had a history of violent physical and verbal altercations.
Regarding the jurisdictional allegations against father, DCFS offered evidence showing that A.S.'s older half brother physically assaulted her at a time when the two were at home alone. The court removed A.S. from mother's and father's custody, and issued a case plan that required mother to attend individual counseling sessions and father to undergo a psychological assessment. Mother and father appealed those dispositional rulings. During the pendency of this appeal, a clinical psychologist examined father and issued a report.
First, we conclude mother forfeited her appeal because she did not object to the individual counseling order at the disposition hearing. Next, we reject DCFS's argument that father's compliance with the order requiring him to undergo a psychological assessment moots his appeal because the agency has not shown we are unable to provide father with effective appellate relief. Lastly, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in ordering father to submit to a psychological assessment because that court reasonably could have found that father's aggressive, controlling, and overbearing behavior was indicative of a psychological condition that prevented him from adequately safeguarding A.S. from her half brother.
Finding no error, we affirm the dispositional rulings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize only those facts relevant to this appeal.
On August 28, 2020, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging jurisdiction over then-seven-year-old A.S. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1).
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 300, subdivision (a) provides that dependency jurisdiction is appropriate if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child's parent or guardian." (§ 300, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b)(1) authorizes jurisdiction if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . ." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
Concurrent with the dependency petition, DCFS filed a detention report. Mother and father separated in 2019, and mother began to live with her fiancé (fiancé) thereafter. On July 22, 2020, a family court issued an order awarding father primary physical custody of A.S. and granting mother overnight visits with the child. The family court order further provided that A.S. "is never to be left alone" and that "there is always to be an adult present" with her. One of father's other children resided with him and A.S.-i.e., A.S.'s half brother, Aaron S. Aaron S. is approximately seven years older than A.S.
The remainder of this paragraph and the following three paragraphs summarize relevant aspects of the detention report and its attachments.
On August 25, 2020, an unidentified individual reported to DCFS that earlier that day, father took A.S. to the hospital, where it was discovered the child had two black eyes and "bruising of different stages throughout her body." DCFS took A.S. into protective custody the following morning.
On August 26, 2020, Aaron S. told the agency "he was playing basketball with [A.S.] in the back yard[, ] . . . he accidentally elbowed A.S. on the eye," and A.S. "flew and landed on top of a chair causing her to sustain a bruise on her right eye." Also on that date, father told the agency he had received a text message from Aaron S. stating that "he accidentally elbowed [A.S.] on her eyes while playing basketball," and that father brought A.S. to the hospital when he returned home from work because he noticed that A.S.'s "eye was very swollen and almost closed." When the interviewing social worker "questioned father about [A.S.] often getting bruises, father stated the child is very active and is always playing and it is possible the majority of the bruise[s] are a result of the child falling while playing."
Attached to the detention report is a report concerning law enforcement's investigation of the incident. The police report indicates that A.S. told officers she" 'was playing basketball with [her] brother and . . . was elbowed in the eye and fell into a chair[, ]'" and that when A.S. was asked how she got bruises on her arms and legs, she responded she" 'play[s] rough and [her] dog jumps on [her].'" According to the police report, when officers informed father at the hospital that A.S. would be placed in protective custody, father "became irate and told [the officers they] were idiots." The report states that father "yell[ed] profanities at [the officers] and told [them they] were traumatizing her," and that father "left the hospital stating, 'I'm going to leave before I do something that gets me arrested.' "
On September 3, 2020, the juvenile court declared father to be the presumed father of A.S., detained A.S. from mother and father, placed A.S. in shelter care, and authorized mother and father to have monitored visits with A.S.
DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on October 9, 2020. On September 22, 2020, the agency interviewed a police detective assigned to investigate this matter. The detective stated he contacted one of A.S.'s adult half siblings, Brittany, "who initially denied [suffering] any kind of abuse [while] growing up." The detective claimed, however, that after he showed Brittany photographs of A.S. with her injuries, Brittany "began crying immediately" and disclosed that "she . . . witnessed the father grabbing the mother by the throat and picking her up off the ground." Per the detective, Brittany told him that when she was a minor, "father gave her a black eye [and] he told her to say that she hit her eye on the cabinet." The detective also claimed Brittany "described the father as abusive, angry, and . . . set off by anything."
The remainder of this paragraph and the following three paragraphs summarize pertinent portions of the jurisdiction/disposition report.
On October 5, 2020, DCFS interviewed one of A.S.'s other adult half siblings, Breanna. Breanna asserted father does not "have problems with anger management," but conceded that father" 'yells a lot.' "
The agency interviewed father on September 24, 2020. Father reported that his father was alcoholic, father's mother died when he was eight years old, and his father physically assaulted him on more than one occasion in the years following his mother's passing.
In the jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS recommended the juvenile court declare A.S. a dependent of the court, remove the child from her parents' physical custody, and provide mother and father with reunification services. In particular, the agency sought an order requiring mother to participate in "[i]ndividual counseling to address case issues and childhood trauma."
DCFS filed last minute information reports on November 19 and 23, 2020, and on January 7, February 18, and March 16, 2021. An administrator at A.S.'s foster care agency told DCFS on November 13, 2020 that father exhibited" 'aggressive and overbearing behavior[, ]'" and that "father appear[ed] to have a need to control every aspect of this case . . . ." On November 16, 2020, the administrator suggested that father had insisted the foster care agency undertake COVID-19 protocols beyond those recommended by medical professionals, and the administrator also stated that "in her 10 years working with [DCFS] in this capacity, she ha[d] never seen . . . 'such a hostile and aggressive biological parent granted so much access to the youth's care.' "
The rest of this paragraph and the following four paragraphs discuss pertinent aspects of these five reports.
On November 20, 2020, A.S.'s foster caretaker told DCFS she believed father is "very demanding" and "controlling." The caretaker claimed when A.S. did" 'something that [father] d[id]n't like, [A.S.] w[ould] get very frightened, very scared[, ]'" and that "father ha[d] intense mood swings and shifts from being really angry to being overly apologetic." The caretaker related that approximately two weeks before her November 20, 2020 interview with the agency, father stated during a virtual visit that he could not" 'take it anymore'" and he was going to" 'vomit'" because A.S. was eating gelatin, and A.S.'s "face [appeared to communicate the following in response:] 'Oh my god. I don't know what I just did[.]' "
On January 4, 2021, A.S.'s foster caretaker told DCFS that the prior day, A.S. admitted "it was not Father who hit her but that it was her brother, Aaron, who hit her." The caretaker "reported that the child stated she was scared of father being mad at her" and "was afraid of how father would react to her disclosure if he found out." The caretaker also claimed that during a monitored telephone call father had with A.S. on August 27, 2020, father told A.S." 'we have to protect Aaron'" and reminded A.S. to say that she does not want to live with mother. A police detective reported A.S. told him she disclosed to her foster caretaker "that the reason why she didn't want to tell anyone about Aaron was because she thought father was going to hurt Aaron."
Father refused to allow DCFS to interview him or Aaron S. on February 5, 2021. Father said "he ha[d] retained an attorney and due to [Aaron S.'s] having a criminal charge he d[id] not wish to speak with [the interviewing social worker] or to have [Aaron] speak with [the interviewing social worker]." On February 18, 2021, a police detective told the agency that he had cited Aaron and released him to father.
Father later told the agency that "Aaron should not have done what he did to [A.S.], . . . he believe[d] that Aaron ha[d] anger issues that need[ed] to be addressed, but he did not believe that Aaron did what he did to [A.S.] out of malice." On March 11, 2021, Aaron S.'s therapist stated, "Aaron was doing pretty well working through his past trauma" in his individual counseling sessions. Aaron's therapist stated she was aware of "the incident leading to [A.S.]'s detention; [A.S.'s] disclosure that Aaron was the person who hurt her; and[ ] Aaron's Juvenile Court case," and that "Aaron ha[d] been through a lot for a child his age, which ha[d] contributed to his behaviors."
On February 22, 2021, DCFS lodged a proposed case plan for mother that recommended, inter alia, she participate in individual counseling to address "case issues including substance abuse, domestic violence, childhood trauma, [and] child safety and protection . . . ."
On March 19, 2021, the juvenile court held an adjudication/disposition hearing. The court admitted into evidence, inter alia, the detention report and its attachments, the jurisdiction/disposition report, and the last minute information reports filed on November 19 and 23, 2020 and on January 7, February 18, and March 16, 2021. At the hearing, father testified he was not "aware of Aaron's tendencies to be aggressive," and A.S. did not "disclose to [father] that her brother might be physically abusive towards her." Father indicated that even after medical personnel and law enforcement told him A.S.'s injuries had not been accidentally inflicted, he "still believed that [A.S.] got those injuries from being a tomboy and playing around . . . ." Father also intimated that he refused to allow DCFS to interview himself or Aaron regarding this incident because Aaron's criminal counsel advised Aaron not to discuss it.
The juvenile court struck the sole jurisdictional allegation that was predicated on section 300, subdivision (a), and sustained four counts asserting jurisdiction based on subdivision (b)(1)-i.e., amended count b-1, amended count b-2, and counts b-3 and b-4.
The juvenile court seems to have struck this count because section 300, subdivision (a) authorizes jurisdiction only if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child's parent or guardian" (see § 300, subd. (a), italics added), and DCFS's counsel conceded "it appears that Aaron is the perpetrator [of the physical abuse], and he's not [A.S.'s] parent."
As amended by the court, count b-1 provides: "On 08/25/2020, the child[, A.S., ] was medically examined and found to be suffering a detrimental condition consisting of multiple contusions to the child's body in different stages of healing. The child sustained bruises to the child's back, in different stages of healing; two hematomas to both eyes. The child had bruising around the child's neck; posterior auricular bruising, as well as multiple bruises on the child's legs and inner thighs. In addition, the child had bruising on the child's pelvic area, vagina and buttocks[.] The child had 2-scratch marks on the child's chin. The child's father['s] . . . explanation of the manner in which the child sustained the injuries are not [sic] consistent with the child's injuries. Some of [t]he child's injuries are consistent with non-accidental trauma and physical abuse. Such injuries would ordinarily not occur, except as the result of deliberate, unreasonable, and neglectful acts by the child's father . . . who had care, custody and control of the child. Such deliberate, unreasonable and neglectful acts on the part of the father[ ] endanger the child's physical health, safety and well-being, create a detrimental home environment and place the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger."
Amended count b-2 reads: "On numerous occasions, the child['s (A.S.'s)] father . . . left the child and the child's half-sibling, Aaron S[., ] . . . home alone, in violation of a Court order indicating that the child[, A.S., ] was never to be left without an adult present. The father's failure to comply with Court orders[ ] endangers the child's physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger."
Count b-3 provides: "[A.S.'s] mother . . . placed the child in a detrimental and endangering situation in that the mother possessed a drug pipe in the child's home, within access of the child. Such a detrimental and endangering situation established for the child by the mother endangers the child's physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger."
Count b-4 states: "[A.S.'s] mother . . . has a history of engaging in violent physical and verbal altercations. On 03/23/2020, law enforcement intervention was required when the mother and [fiancé] . . . got into a verbal altercation which led to the mother throwing her cell phone across the room and slapping [fiancé]. The mother then threw a full plastic soda bottle at [fiancé], striking his left forearm. The mother began to chest bump [fiancé] and punched [fiancé's] face with a closed fist multiple times. Further, during the domestic violence incident, the mother and [fiancé] were both under the influence of alcohol. Such conduct on the part of mother placed the child at risk of harm."
After the juvenile court issued its jurisdictional rulings, the court observed DCFS had announced its recommended disposition in its reports, and then asked mother's counsel for her position on this issue. Mother's counsel then asked that: "she not be ordered to continue [drug and alcohol] testing" or, in the alternative, she instead "be required to test only on suspicion"; and the court release A.S. to mother's custody, or, in the alternative, provide mother with unmonitored visitation and assess certain relatives for possible placement of A.S.
Mother's counsel did not contest DCFS's recommendation that mother participate in individual counseling sessions, nor did she claim the agency had not properly notified her of DCFS's recommended disposition. Indeed, mother's counsel referred to DCFS's "proposed case plan" in her argument, suggesting that she was fully aware of the proposed case plan's contents. Mother's counsel closed her argument concerning disposition by stating, "Submitted."
The juvenile court subsequently declared A.S. a dependent of the court, removed A.S. from her parents' custody, and ordered DCFS to provide reunification services to A.S. and her parents. In particular, the court ordered father to undergo a psychological assessment, and mother was ordered to participate in individual counseling addressing "case issues including substance abuse, domestic violence, childhood trauma, [and] child safety and protection . . . ."
After issuing its dispositional rulings, the juvenile court asked mother's counsel, "Anything else or anything I left off[?]" Mother's counsel responded: "No, Your Honor."
Mother and father timely appealed the juvenile court's March 19, 2021 rulings.
On September 2, 2021, DCFS filed a last minute information report (Sept. 2, 2021 last minute information report), along with an attachment dated July 23, 2021 indicating that a clinical psychologist had conducted a psychological assessment of father (psychological assessment report). The psychological assessment report states, inter alia, that "in terms of having the capacity to ensure for his children's safety, [father] will need significant therapeutic intervention," and "it will be important for [father] to receive individual and family therapy to assist him in understanding how the violent upbringing he experienced as a child is impacting his parenting." Furthermore, DCFS stated in its report that the psychological assessment "report raises some serious issues which need to be addressed before reunification can occur with Father," and the agency proposed that "the concerns and issues recommended in the psychological [assessment] report . . . be[ ] addressed in family counseling."
On September 2, 2021, the juvenile court held a status review hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e). Among other things, the court admitted into evidence the September 2, 2021 last minute information report, found by clear and convincing evidence that returning A.S. to her parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child, and ordered that A.S. remain in foster care and that DCFS continue to provide A.S. and her parents with family reunification services.
We previously granted DCFS's motion for judicial notice of the minute order for the September 2, 2021 hearing, the September 2, 2021 last minute information report, and the psychological assessment report.
On November 4, 2021, the juvenile court held a status review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (f). The court did not return A.S. to mother or father because it found by clear and convincing evidence that doing so would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child, and it ordered DCFS to continue to provide A.S. and her parents with family reunification services. The court scheduled a section 366.22 review hearing for February 24, 2022.
We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the juvenile court's minute order for the November 4, 2021 hearing. (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
DISCUSSION
A. Mother Forfeited Her Challenge to the Order Requiring Her to Participate in Individual Counseling
In her opening brief, mother contends the juvenile court erred in ordering her to participate in individual counseling. DCFS counters mother forfeited this appellate claim by failing to object to the individual counseling order during the proceedings below. Because mother did not file a reply brief, she offers no response to DCFS's claim of forfeiture.
At the March 19, 2021 adjudication/disposition hearing, mother did not object to DCFS's recommendation that she attend individual counseling sessions. Rather, her counsel challenged other aspects of DCFS's recommended disposition, thereby indicating mother's attorney was aware of DCFS's proposed case plan. Even after the juvenile court ordered mother to participate in individual counseling, the court afforded her counsel an opportunity to raise any objection she may have had to that ruling. Mother's counsel declined that invitation.
"[T]he failure to object to a disposition order on a specific ground generally forfeits a parent's right to pursue that issue on appeal . . . ." (In re Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 345.) Admittedly, "we have discretion to entertain [a] challenge to [a] juvenile court's order notwithstanding the parent's failure to object on that basis in the juvenile court" if "the appeal involves an important and purely legal issue subject to our independent review . . . ." (See ibid.) Mother makes no attempt to invoke that discretion. Rather, by failing to respond to DCFS's appellate brief, mother tacitly concedes her claim of error is not properly before us. (Cf. Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89-90 [concluding that the appellants made an implicit concession by "failing to respond in their reply brief to the [respondent's] argument on th[at] point"].) We accept her concession and decline to reach the merits of her appeal.
B. DCFS Fails to Establish That Father's Appeal Is Moot
"An appeal may become moot where subsequent events . . . render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief. [Citations.]' "An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings."' [Citation.]" (In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436.) "[T]he burden of persuasion with respect to mootness is on the respondent . . . ." (Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. County of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 721.)
DCFS's sole argument in support of its contention that father's appeal is moot is that he "has already participated in the court-ordered psychological assessment." The agency does not address the fact that we could order the juvenile court to strike the psychological assessment report. (See In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1499 ["The reviewing court may affirm, reverse or modify any judgment or order appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or order to be entered, or direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had."].) Nor does DCFS claim that the report has no impact on the pending dependency proceedings.
In any event, the psychological assessment report is germane to whether A.S. may reunify with her father because it impugns father's parenting abilities. For instance, the report asserts father "will need significant therapeutic intervention" in order for him to have "the capacity to ensure for his children's safety . . . ." Although the minute orders from the September 2, 2021 and November 4, 2021 status review hearings do not clarify whether the psychological assessment report affected the court's decisions to continue A.S.'s placement in foster care and require father to participate in further reunification services, DCFS did not supply us with the transcripts of those proceedings to allow us to rule out that possibility. Additionally, the court may rely upon the report in determining whether to return A.S. to father's care at the section 366.22 status review hearing scheduled for February 24, 2022.
(See In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 756 [noting that at a status review hearing held pursuant to section 366.22, the juvenile court shall return the child to her parent" 'unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to . . . her parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the . . . child[, ]'" quoting § 366.22, subd. (a)].)
Accordingly, DCFS has not met its burden of showing that father's compliance with the order in question bars us from providing him any effective relief. Consequently, we turn to the merits of father's appeal.
C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Ordering Father to Submit to a Psychological Assessment
Section 362, subdivision (a) provides: "If a child is adjudged a dependent child of the court on the ground that the child is a person described by Section 300, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child, including medical treatment, subject to further order of the court." (§ 362, subd. (a).) Subdivision (d) provides in pertinent part: "The juvenile court may direct any reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the child who is the subject of any proceedings under this chapter as the court deems necessary and proper to carry out this section . . . . The program in which a parent or guardian is required to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the child is a person described by Section 300." (§ 362, subd. (d).)
"The juvenile court has 'wide latitude' in formulating reasonable disposition orders for the care, custody, support and well being of juvenile dependents." (In re K.T. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 24 (K.T.).) "We review the juvenile court's disposition orders for an abuse of discretion [citation], and review for substantial evidence the findings of fact on which dispositional orders are based." (Id. at p. 25.)
"A court exceeds the limits of legal discretion if its determination is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. The appropriate test is whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason." (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851 (L.W.).)
Under the substantial evidence standard," '" 'we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.' [Citation.] 'We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.'"' [Citations.]" (See In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204, 219 (S.R.).)
If substantial evidence does not support the factual findings upon which a dispositional order is based, then the issuance of that order constitutes an abuse of discretion. (See K.T., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 22, 25-26; see also In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 641 ["Review for substantial evidence applies to factual determinations; abuse of discretion applies when a lower court must delicately balance factual determinations to assess an uncertain future situation. But where . . . 'the appellate court will be evaluating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion, there likely will be no practical difference in application of the two standards.' [Citations.]"].)
Father maintains the juvenile court lacked the authority under section 362, subdivision (d) to order him to submit to a psychological assessment because his "mental health was not a condition that led to the dependency" proceedings. Father points out that "the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over A.S. based on Father's inadequate supervision of the child which led to her sustaining some nonaccidental injuries, his violation of a family court order requiring her to have adult supervision, and Mother's substance use and domestic violence in her relationship with her new fiancé." Father also claims that individual counseling and parenting education would have been sufficient to address any concerns the court had regarding his temperament. He further contends there was no "evidence that [he] had a mental health issue at all." We reject father's contentions under the deferential standard of review applicable to this claim of error.
The record contains evidence that father experienced trauma as a child, given that his mother died when he was eight years old and his alcoholic father physically abused him thereafter. The record also suggests father had difficulty managing his temper. In particular, there was evidence that father yelled profanities at the officers investigating A.S.'s injuries, he yelled frequently on other occasions, and he physically abused one of A.S.'s older half siblings, Brittany, who had described father as "abusive, angry, and . . . set off by anything." The agency also presented evidence that father was overbearing and tried to control every aspect of his monitored visits with A.S.
Further, DCFS offered evidence that father was unwilling to take steps to mitigate the risk of harm to A.S. Specifically, a detective claimed Brittany disclosed that father directed her to conceal the fact that he gave her a black eye, and there was evidence that father ignored a medical professional's opinion that A.S.'s injuries were not inflicted accidentally, and that, in the hopes of allowing Aaron S. to escape potential criminal liability, father told A.S. to "protect" Aaron and refused to allow DCFS to interview him or Aaron. Even after A.S. disclosed that Aaron caused her injuries, father minimized Aaron's behavior by saying "he did not believe that Aaron did what he did to [A.S.] out of malice."
The agency also introduced evidence A.S. told her foster caretaker that A.S. "was afraid of how father would react to her disclosure" that Aaron abused her. Similarly, there was evidence that A.S. stated she "didn't want to tell anyone about" Aaron's abusive behavior "because she thought father was going to hurt Aaron."
Under these circumstances, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that father potentially had a psychological condition that (1) prevented him from acknowledging the physical threat that Aaron S. posed to A.S.; (2) discouraged A.S. from informing her father of the extent and nature of the threat; and (3) otherwise impeded father from implementing the measures needed to safeguard A.S. from the substantial risk of serious physical harm posed by Aaron. Accordingly, the juvenile court's dispositional order is supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the court did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a patently absurd manner when it found that a psychological assessment could eliminate this risk of harm by enabling the court to determine whether father had such a condition and, if so, how it could be addressed.
Father resists these conclusions, insisting the evidence does not demonstrate he "had any mental health or psychological condition," but merely shows that he "may have had a troubled past and was not, perhaps, the most attentive or sensitive parent . . . ." He also claims he was "able to overcome the issues that led to dependency of his older children and successfully reunified with them in 2012."
We may not, however," '" 'reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment[, ]'" '" but we must instead" '" 'draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support'" '" the juvenile court's findings and orders. (See S.R., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.) Applying the governing standards of review, we conclude for the reasons stated above that the juvenile court reasonably could have found father potentially had a psychological condition that interfered with his ability to supervise and protect A.S. Furthermore, father's contention that individual counseling and parenting education alone would remedy his behavioral problems ignores the fact that we consider only whether the dispositional ruling "exceeded the bounds of reason." (See L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 851.) We conclude it did not.
Father claims "even the juvenile court expressed some hesitation regarding the psychological assessment portion of the disposition order." This assertion is meritless. At the March 19, 2021 hearing, the court merely asked father's counsel whether there was "any reason why [it] should not be ordering [his] client to submit to a psychological assessment . . . ." This question does not suggest the court believed its dispositional ruling was inappropriate, but instead indicates the court was willing to hear argument on this issue.
In sum, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to undergo a psychological assessment.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court's March 19, 2021 dispositional orders requiring mother to participate in individual counseling and father to submit to a psychological assessment.
We concur: CHANEY, J., CRANDALL, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.