Opinion
B321254
06-05-2023
In re J.J. et al., Persons Coming Under Juvenile Court Law. v. A.M., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP04838A, Brett Bianco, Judge.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MORI, J.
INTRODUCTION
A.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388petition to reinstate family reunification services with her daughter and then terminating her parental rights. Mother contends that the court abused its discretion by summarily denying her section 388 petition without a hearing. Contrary to the court's finding, mother also contends she established the beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of parental rights. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and Jerome J. (father) have one child together, J.J. (born Sept. 2019).
Father is not a party to this appeal. Therefore, we provide only limited background regarding father.
On June 17, 2020, DCFS received a referral alleging general neglect of J.J. by mother and father. The caller reported that mother and father smoked marijuana in J.J.'s presence on a daily basis. In addition, father was left to care for J.J. while mother was at work. It was also reported that father kept an unregistered handgun in the home.
On June 18, 2020, a social worker interviewed a relative on the phone. The relative "had serious concerns regarding the safety and well-being of [J.J.]." When the relative had recently arrived to pick up J.J., father appeared "so high that he could not stand up properly." Father had been alone with the child while mother was at work. The relative reported mother failed to take father's marijuana use seriously. The relative stated that mother smoked marijuana as well. The relative informed the social worker that father had posted several videos on social media, including a video of himself smoking marijuana, driving under the influence, displaying drugs and a gun, and mother smoking marijuana while at the beach with father and J.J.
On June 25, 2020, a social worker came to the family home for an unannounced visit. When the social worker entered the home, she "smelled a strong order of marijuana" and father "was observed to be under the influence." Mother told the social worker that she rarely smoked marijuana and could not recall the last time she did. She denied abusing marijuana. Despite the smell of marijuana, mother denied father smoked marijuana in the home or around J.J. Mother also denied leaving J.J. at home with father while she was at work. Instead, mother stated that she leaves J.J. with a paternal relative. She further denied that father had an unregistered handgun.
The social worker next spoke with father. "[F]ather was observed to have red glossy eyes and . . . having trouble keeping his balance at times." At first, father denied he was "high," but later admitted he went outside to smoke marijuana and then came back in. He denied smoking marijuana inside the home or around J.J. When asked who watches J.J. while mother is at work, father responded that he did.
The social worker discussed with mother and father that there were inconsistencies with their statements regarding who cared for J.J. while mother was at work. Mother again denied father supervised J.J. The social worker voiced concern over J.J.'s safety based on father appearing high, the smell of marijuana in the home, and the inconsistent statements. Mother and father then signed a safety plan stating they would submit to a drug test, and father would not supervise J.J. while under the influence.
On June 26, 2020, and again on July 9, 2020, mother missed scheduled drug tests. On July 15, 2020, mother tested positive for marijuana.
On July 7, 2020, the social worker spoke with paternal great-grandmother, who reported that she babysat J.J. four to five times a week when mother was at work.
On July 28, 2020, the social worker arrived at the family home. The social worker observed father sleeping on the bed and mother attempting to wake him up. Mother explained J.J. did not go to daycare that day, as she left J.J. with father. The social worker reminded mother of the importance of not leaving J.J. with someone who was under the influence of drugs. When the social worker requested to speak to father, mother tried to wake him again. When father eventually woke up, the social worker warned the parents of the possibility of DCFS's intervention. Father and mother stated they understood. On July 31, 2020, the social worker verified J.J. was attending daycare full-time.
On August 25, 2020, the social worker arrived at the family home and informed mother of DCFS's decision to file a dependency petition on behalf of J.J. Mother responded that she understood DCFS's concerns and that was the reason she placed J.J. in daycare. Mother expressed that it was "less stressful" for her to have J.J. in daycare rather than worry that father was sometimes "'too high.'"
On September 1, 2020, DCFS received a new referral alleging J.J. was the victim of general neglect by mother and father. The caller reported father was gang-affiliated and posted a video on social media of himself driving with J.J. in the backseat. In the video, father said that "he always stays strapped whether his daughter is with him or not." The caller said father kept a loaded gun inside of the home.
DCFS reported father was subsequently arrested for possession of a loaded firearm after law enforcement searched his vehicle. However, father had been released on bail. Mother later admitted she had paid for father's bail. Mother denied she was aware father possessed a gun. Mother told the social worker she was able to protect J.J. and would not leave the child in father's care while she was at work.
The social worker then received a phone call from a relative who expressed concern for J.J. The relative reported additional videos posted on social media of father. The social worker viewed a video of father driving, waving a gun with J.J. in the backseat, saying "'daughter or not I'm strapped bitch.'" In another video, father appeared to be resisting arrest for robbing a jewelry store. In the last video, father was holding a bottle of Promethazine syrup, waiving a gun, and stating, "[W]e staccin [sic] up."
It is unclear from the record whether this is the same relative who previously raised concern over J.J.'s safety.
The social worker contacted J.J.'s daycare, and it reported J.J. had not attended daycare in the last two to three weeks. It was also reported that during the time J.J. was attending daycare, either mother or father would drop off and pick up J.J. DCFS noted this information was inconsistent with what mother had reported, namely that J.J. was still attending daycare and there was no mention of father dropping off or picking up J.J.
On September 11, 2020, the juvenile court issued an order removing J.J. from parental custody. DCFS placed J.J. in foster care.
On September 15, 2020, DCFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of J.J. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The petition alleged that both mother and father were current abusers of marijuana, which rendered them incapable of providing regular care and supervision of J.J. It further alleged that J.J. was of a young age requiring constant care and supervision, and mother's and father's substance abuse interfered with their ability to take proper care of the child. In addition, father placed J.J. in a detrimental and endangering situation when he brandished a firearm while driving with her.
At the September 18, 2020 detention hearing, the juvenile court found there was a prima facie case that J.J. fell within section 300, there was substantial danger to her physical health, reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for detention, and there were no reasonable means to protect her without detaining her from parental physical custody. The court removed J.J. from parental custody and ordered monitored visitation three times a week for three hours each visit.
The social worker interviewed mother about the allegations in the petition. Mother reported father provided care for J.J. when daycare was closed. Mother denied ever abusing marijuana and stated she no longer used marijuana. She also stated she had last used the drug in August, "[n]ot in September, not in October." DCFS reported that on October 6 and 28, 2020, mother tested positive for marijuana. On October 20, 2020, mother did not show up for her drug test. When she previously used marijuana, mother stated she never smoked it around J.J. She later admitted J.J. was with her on July 15, 2020, a day on which she tested positive for marijuana.
Mother also denied father had a history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of marijuana. Mother reported she and father were no longer in a relationship and she is currently focusing on getting J.J. back. Despite these statements, mother anticipated she would get back together with father once J.J. was returned to her care. Mother reported that she was currently receiving virtual visits as well as monitored in-person visits with J.J.
At the November 5, 2020 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition and declared J.J. a dependent. The court gave DCFS discretion to place J.J. in the home of paternal great-aunt (Jaclyn J.). Family reunification services and visitation rights were provided as set forth in the court-ordered case plan. Specifically, the court ordered a full drug program with aftercare and random drug testing for mother as well as parenting programs and individual counseling to address case issues. The court ordered monitored visitation a minimum of three times a week for three hours each visit.
On November 10, 2020, when J.J. was twelve months old, DCFS placed J.J. with Jaclyn J. and her father, paternal great-great grandfather. In her new placement, J.J. appeared comfortable as she "smiles, laughs, and [is] relaxed in the arms of her caregivers." On November 23, 2020, J.J. started attending daycare.
DCFS reported that mother enrolled in parenting classes on October 13, 2020, and in an outpatient drug program and individual counseling on November 23, 2020. Despite mother's reported engagement, participation, and progress in treatment, she had continued to test positive for marijuana on those occasions when she would appear for drug testing. Mother's marijuana use prevented DCFS from liberalizing her visitation with J.J. DCFS had approved Jaclyn J. as the monitor for visitation. According to Jaclyn J., mother had been consistent with weekly visitation and completed caretaking tasks for J.J. with no safety concerns.
At the May 5, 2021 six-month review hearing, the juvenile court noted mother was doing well in her programs and her levels of marijuana were coming down. The court stated that mother needed to continue participating in the programs and to "wean herself off of marijuana." In addition, mother needed to make more of an effort to regularly drug test. The court then found that continued jurisdiction over J.J. was necessary and mother's compliance with the case plan had been substantial.
DCFS reported that mother subsequently completed her outpatient drug program but was terminated from her mental health services. Despite completing her drug program, mother had continued to use marijuana and failed to submit to any drug tests. Mother's individual counselor reported mother was terminated from services on June 16, 2021, because she did not meet her treatment goals. Mother admitted her marijuana use had exceeded recreational levels as she used it to "cope with life stressors and ha[d] not been able to decrease her use." Mother's visitation continued to require supervision because DCFS had not been able to verify or assess mother's substance use.
According to Jaclyn J., mother continued to consistently visit J.J. on her days off from work, about two times per week. Mother "would complete all caretaking tasks, such as feeding, diaper changing and age appropriate play." Mother also participated in planning J.J.'s second birthday party, which she attended as well.
At the November 3, 2021 twelve-month review hearing, DCFS recommended termination of reunification services. Mother's counsel submitted on this recommendation. The juvenile court found that continued jurisdiction was necessary and that mother's compliance with the case plan had been minimal. The court then terminated reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing. Mother's visitation remained monitored.
DCFS reported J.J. continued to attend daycare and had weekly visitation with mother. DCFS further reported J.J. was surrounded by her family members and displayed good attachment with her relative caregivers. However, mother continued to require supervision based on her failure to address her substance abuse. Despite this concern, DCFS observed J.J. had a bond with mother and J.J. enjoyed visitation. Jaclyn J. told DCFS she wanted to adopt J.J. with her father, paternal great-great grandfather.
On March 16, 2022, a social worker met with Jaclyn J. and paternal great-great grandfather to discuss the process of adoption. DCFS reported that Jaclyn J. and paternal great-great grandfather "are committed to providing the child with a permanent and stable home through adoption." J.J. had adjusted well to the prospective adoptive home and all of her needs were being met. J.J. was affectionate and sought their attention, as well as listening to their direction. J.J. had a positive and healthy relationship with the prospective adoptive parents.
DCFS reported mother visited J.J. once a week on Sundays for eight hours. Mother's interactions with J.J. had been engaging, safe, and age appropriate. It was reported that J.J. was happy to see mother and comfortable with her.
On June 1, 2022, mother filed a request to change the juvenile court's order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing. (§ 388.) Mother argued she had continued to stay clean and sober and attached two negative drug tests taken a week apart on April 7 and 14, 2022. There was no evidence that mother took any drug tests or received negative results between April 15, 2022 and the June 1, 2022 hearing. Mother also contended there were no concerns regarding her visits with J.J. Mother requested J.J. be returned to her care, or in the alternative, that the court reinstate reunification service. She stated the requested modification was in J.J.'s best interest because she had continued to improve herself, maintained visitation, and continued to have a bond with the child.
On June 2, 2022, the juvenile court issued its tentative to deny mother's petition without a hearing and invited mother's counsel to argue against the tentative. Mother's counsel simply argued mother had provided two drug tests, indicating she was not using marijuana anymore. The court then adopted its tentative, denying mother's petition without a hearing based on mother's failure to demonstrate a prima facie showing that there had been a change of circumstances or that the proposed change would be in the best interest of the child. The court then moved on to the permanency planning hearing.
Counsel for DCFS recommended termination of parental rights and contended that no exception to adoption exists. Despite no issues being reported from mother's visits, counsel stated visitation remained monitored because mother had not been drug testing. As such, there was no significant parental bond between mother and J.J. Moreover, counsel argued J.J. was detained from mother when she was only one year old, and J.J. was two and a half years old. Therefore, J.J. had been out of parental custody for most of her life and was deserving of permanency that the caregivers were able to provide for the child. J.J.'s counsel joined in DCFS's recommendation for termination of parental rights.
Mother's counsel responded that the parental beneficial relationship exception applied. Counsel argued mother had maintained regular visitation and contact, and J.J. would benefit from a continuing relationship. Counsel noted J.J. was comfortable with mother and happy to see her during visits. The interaction between mother and J.J. was appropriate and there had been no reported safety concerns.
Moreover, DCFS acknowledged the bond between J.J. and mother.
After argument, the court found that continued jurisdiction was necessary and that J.J. was adoptable by clear and convincing evidence. The court recognized the quality of visitation by mother had been good, and "certainly there would be a bond that a parent could form with a young child." The court noted that "it makes sense a two year old would be happy to be around the parent being oblivious to all the underlying issues that are still ongoing." However, the court found that any benefit accruing to J.J. from the relationship with mother was outweighed by the physical and emotional benefit J.J. would receive through the permanency and stability of adoption, and that adoption was in the best interest of the child. After finding no exception to adoption applied, the court terminated parental rights and designated J.J.'s relative caretakers as the prospective adoptive parents.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Section 388 Petition
Mother challenges the juvenile court's summary denial of her section 388 petition. Mother argues that she made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that a change would be in the best interest of the child, and the court therefore abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
A . Legal Principles
"After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.'" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) "'The burden thereafter is on the parent to prove changed circumstances pursuant to section 388 to revive the reunification issue. Section 388 provides the "escape mechanism" that . . . must be built into the process to allow the court to consider new information.'" (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 447.)
"Section 388 accords a parent the right to petition the juvenile court for modification of any of its orders based upon changed circumstances or new evidence. [Citations.] To obtain the requested modification, the parent must demonstrate both a change of circumstances or new evidence, and that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child. [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] To obtain an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, a parent must make a prima facie showing that circumstances have changed since the prior court order, and that the proposed change will be in the best interests of the child. [Citations.] To make a prima facie showing . . . the allegations of the petition must be specific regarding the evidence to be presented and must not be conclusory." (In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478, fn. omitted; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1) [a section 388 petition may be denied without a hearing if it "fails to state a change of circumstance or new evidence . . . or fails to show that the requested modification would promote the best interest of the child"].)
"In determining whether a parent has made a prima facie showing under section 388, we may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case." (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 711.) We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition for an abuse of discretion. (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1, 7; In re Alayah J., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.) "'"The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court."'" (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318- 319.)
B. Analysis
Mother contends her petition demonstrated she was no longer using marijuana and "[t]hat development was a significant change in circumstance."
The juvenile court terminated mother's reunification services on November 3, 2021, and mother filed her section 388 petition on June 1, 2022, the day before the permanency planning hearing. In the petition, mother stated that she "continued to stay clean and sober." The only new evidence mother submitted was two negative drug test results on April 7 and 14, 2022. Two negative drug tests taken in eight days, approximately six weeks before the permanency planning hearing, are not sufficient to demonstrate a significant change of circumstances. Liberally construed, mother's petition demonstrates at most "changing," not changed, circumstances. (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615; see also In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531, fn. 9 ["It is the nature of addiction that one must be 'clean' for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform"].) Mother had seven months (between the court's termination of reunification services and the permanency planning hearing) to consistently drug test for marijuana, but failed to do so. Indeed, she provided no evidence that she drug tested or received negative test results after April 14, 2022.
Mother contends her drug use was "the last obstacle" to reunifying with her daughter. Mother's argument oversimplifies the issues that led to court intervention and does not acknowledge that the court may consider the entire history of the case. Initially, mother denied abusing marijuana and that father used marijuana in the home and around J.J., but that was shown to be false. Mother then admitted to continued use of marijuana, that her use exceeded recreational levels, and that she used marijuana to cope with life stressors. Although mother completed an outpatient drug program, she continued to test positive for marijuana and later refused to drug test. Therefore, DCFS was unable to properly assess mother's substance abuse and liberalize visitation. Mother's individual counseling was also terminated because, despite her insight regarding the way she used marijuana to self-medicate and the impact it had on her parenting, she continued to struggle with implementing new coping skills that would allow her to provide adequate supervision over her child. Moreover, mother previously stated that she intended to reunite with father once J.J. was returned to her care. When J.J. was in her care, mother actively misled DCFS that someone other than father was caring for J.J. while she was at work, despite mother's acknowledgment that father would sometimes be "too high" to care for the child.
We conclude mother failed to make a prima facie showing of a change of circumstances within the meaning of section 388 and therefore the juvenile court acted within its discretion in denying mother's petition without a hearing.
The other information mother submitted in support of her section 388 petition (i.e., the lack of concern regarding mother during her visits) did not constitute new evidence reflecting a change of circumstances subsequent to the November 3, 2021 termination of reunification services. There was no dispute that mother acted appropriately during monitored visitation with J.J. prior to termination.
Because mother failed to show changed circumstances, we need not, and do not, address the question of whether her section 388 petition also failed to make a prima facie showing that the requested order would be in J.J.'s best interests. (See In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157.)
II. Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
Mother contends she established the beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of parental rights. We disagree.
A. Legal Principles
Once the juvenile court terminates reunification services and determines a dependent child is adoptable (a finding not in dispute here), it must select adoption as the permanent plan and terminate parental rights unless it finds doing so would be detrimental to the child under one of several statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630-631 (Caden C.).)
The beneficial parental relationship exception applies if the parent has "maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Our Supreme Court clarified the three elements a parent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the exception: (1) the parent's "regular visitation and contact with the child"; (2) the child's "substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent," "the continuation of which would benefit the child"; and (3) the termination of "that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636.) "When the parent has met that burden, the parental-benefit exception applies such that it would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).)" (Id. at pp. 636-637.)
The first requirement, regular visitation and contact, is "straightforward" and "[t]he question is just whether 'parents visit consistently,' taking into account 'the extent permitted by court orders.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
"As to the second element, courts assess whether 'the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) "[T]he relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as '[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs.'" (Ibid.) Focusing on the child, "courts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents." (Ibid.) Recognizing that "rarely do '[p]arent-child relationships' conform to an entirely consistent pattern," the Supreme Court stated that "it is not necessary-even if it were possible-to calibrate a precise 'quantitative measurement of the specific amount of "comfort, nourishment or physical care" [the parent] provided during [his or] her weekly visits.'" (Ibid.)
"Concerning the third element-whether 'termination would be detrimental to the child due to' the relationship- the court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) "[C]ourts need to determine . . . how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship-in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child's life." (Ibid.) Thus, "'[i]f severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,' even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would 'harm[ ]' the child, the court should not terminate parental rights." (Ibid.)
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court's findings whether the parent has consistently visited the child and whether a beneficial parental relationship exists. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We review for abuse of discretion the court's finding whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because of the beneficial parental relationship. (Id. at p. 640.) We review for substantial evidence any factual findings underlying the juvenile court's weighing of the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of adoption. (Ibid.) This "hybrid standard" Caden C. endorsed "simply embodies the principle that '[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child's best interests for the trial court's determination in that regard, reached pursuant to the statutory scheme's comprehensive and controlling provisions.'" (Id. at p. 641.)
B. Analysis
The parties do not dispute that mother satisfied the first and second element of the Caden C. test. Instead, their disagreement lies in whether the juvenile court erred by finding she did not satisfy the test's third element.
To the extent mother argues the juvenile court failed to make specific findings concerning the third element of the beneficial parental relationship exception, this argument lacks merit. There is no requirement that the juvenile court, in finding the exception inapplicable, recite specific factual findings regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Thus, although a statement by the juvenile court of its reasons for its decision is helpful in conducting appellate review, it is not a legal requirement. (Ibid.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that any benefit J.J. derived from her relationship with mother was outweighed by the benefit J.J. would receive through the permanency and stability of adoption. Mother did not sufficiently show how the child would be affected by losing a parental relationship with her.
Evidence that J.J. had positive, albeit monitored, visits with mother is not enough to preserve parental rights. (See In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 ["The parent must do more than demonstrate 'frequent and loving contact[,]' [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant"]; see also In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 [contact between parent and child will always "confer some incidental benefit to the child," but that is insufficient to meet the standard].) J.J. had lived with Jaclyn J. and paternal great-great grandfather since she was twelve months old. They provided day-to-day parenting to J.J. for the majority of her life and were able and willing to provide care, permanency, and stability. Notably, J.J.'s counsel agreed with and supported the plan of adoption. Mother's relationship with J.J. was not that extraordinary case where preservation of parental rights outweighs the preference for adoption. (In re G.B., supra, Cal.App.4th at p. 1166; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 558-559.)
In sum, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We concur: COLLINS, Acting P.J., ZUKIN, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.