Opinion
B334603
09-20-2024
In re JASON H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. A.H., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Carol A. Koenig, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 23CCJP03768, Linda L. Sun, Judge.
Carol A. Koenig, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
See California Standards of Judicial Administration section 8.1(1).
WEINGART, J.
Appellant A.H. (Mother) gave birth to two boys, Jason H. (born 2015) and G.H. (born 2023). J.H. (Father), the presumed father of both children, is not a party to this appeal. After G.H. had a positive toxicology test at birth for methamphetamine and amphetamine, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 based on Mother's substance abuse and Father's failure to protect both children.
All unspecified statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
At the detention hearing on November 6, 2023, the juvenile court detained G.H. from both parents and released Jason to Father. The juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in individual counseling, parenting classes, and substance abuse counseling with random weekly drug testing.
On January 5, 2024, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction and disposition hearing where it asserted jurisdiction over both children based in part on Mother's no contest plea. The court released G.H. to Father, granted Mother supervised visits with him, and set the matter for further proceedings. Although Mother's notice of appeal lists the January 5, 2024 orders regarding G.H., she makes no argument regarding them in her briefing and thus has abandoned any claim of error as to those orders. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) Her only contention on appeal is to the order as it pertains to Jason.
The court terminated jurisdiction of Jason subject to the filing of a juvenile custody order/final judgment, commonly referred to as an exit order. The exit order provided for joint legal custody, primary physical custody to Father provided that he and Jason continued to reside with paternal grandmother, and supervised visitation for Mother. The exit order also included, "I[f M]other wishes to modify this [exit order] in [f]amily [c]ourt, she must show evidence of participation in or completion of her court ordered case plan."
DCFS objected to termination of jurisdiction over Jason and did not request the court include the portion of the exit order at issue in this appeal. DCFS accordingly submitted a letter stating it has not filed a brief as it is not a proper respondent.
Mother's sole claim of error is that the juvenile court improperly attempted to limit the family court's authority to modify the exit order by pre-conditioning any such modification on a showing of participation in or completion of her court ordered case plan. Although Mother did not object when the juvenile court made this order, her lack of objection does not waive the error. (In re Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1456, fn. 4.) If the error, as here, can be decided based on undisputed facts, the appellate court may consider the claimed error regardless of a lack of objection below. (In re Rebecca S. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314.) Additionally, if the juvenile court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in making the challenged order, such order is void "when the [order] violated a comprehensive statutory scheme or offended public policy" even when parties have not objected. (In re Andres G. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 476, 483; see also In re Cole Y., supra, at p. 1456, fn. 4.) Here, the order violated a comprehensive statutory scheme giving the family court the authority to modify custody orders.
We review the terms of an exit order for abuse of discretion. (In re Cole Y., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1456.) Pursuant to section 302, subdivision (d) juvenile courts "may require participation in counseling and other programs in an exit order." (In re Cole Y., supra, at p. 1456.) That, however, is a different issue from "whether the juvenile court had authority to condition the family court's modification of an exit order upon the completion of counseling and other programs." (Ibid., italics omitted.) "Under section 302, subdivision (d), the decision to modify an exit order was, and is, within the province of the family court, and then only upon a finding of 'significant change of circumstances' and that the modification is in 'the best interests of the child.' The juvenile court, thus, did not have authority to condition the family court's modification of the exit order upon [Mother]'s completion of drug and parenting programs and counseling." (Ibid.) That the order here required either participation or completion of programs rather than completion alone, as a condition of modification, does not distinguish it from In re Cole Y. Because the juvenile court had no authority to impose any limitations on the family court's exercise of jurisdiction, the juvenile court abused its discretion in doing so. (Ibid.)
Our ruling does not, of course, limit the family court's consideration of Mother's participation in or completion of the ordered services should Mother seek to modify the exit order. Whether or not to modify the exit order is within the sound discretion of the family court. We hold only that the juvenile court may not direct what the family court may consider in any modification proceeding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally affirmed, and the matter remanded to the juvenile court to vacate and strike that portion of the exit order stating, "IF mother wishes to modify this JCO [juvenile custody order] in Family Court, she must show evidence of participation in or completion of her court ordered case plan."
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.