Opinion
B312508
03-15-2022
In re L.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. A.C., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County, No. 21CCJP00471 of Los Angeles, Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge.
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
KIM, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following A.C.'s (father) assault of G.S. (mother), the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over the couple's infant daughter (the child) and removed physical custody of her from father. On appeal, father contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings and its removal order. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
The family came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) on January 1, 2021, based on a domestic violence incident between father and mother. On that day, Huntington Park police officers responded to the family home following a report of domestic violence. Mother told the police that, during an argument, father grabbed her by the neck and began to squeeze, causing her to feel as if she was about to pass out. Father then punched her with a closed fist twice on the right side of her head, knocking her to the floor on which she struck the back of her head. Father proceeded to straddle mother's body and choke her a second time. The paternal grandmother came into the house and intervened. She succeeded in pulling father off mother so that mother could lift herself off the floor and onto the couch. But father then pushed mother and used his hands to choke her again. As father's grip got tighter, the paternal grandmother intervened again and separated the two. During the altercation, the child was inside the residence sleeping in a bedroom.
On January 7, 2021, a social worker interviewed mother, who explained that after the paternal grandmother's intervention, mother went into the bedroom, and called the police. Father left the home prior to the police arriving. According to mother, the incident was her first physical altercation with father, who was not a violent person, and she was "shocked" by it. She also claimed father had not returned to the home since the incident and had only texted her once to apologize. Mother needed time to decide whether to continue her relationship and she declined a restraining order because she wanted father to have contact with the child.
The social worker interviewed father the same day. According to father, the altercation began when mother "threw herself at [him]," prompting him to grab her arms to keep her at a distance. He told her to calm down, but she would not listen. Father became upset and admitted grabbing mother "with his arm around her neck to calm her down." But he denied choking her or hitting her in the head. Father next "sat . . . mother on the sofa and grabbed her by the neck," but again, only to calm her down. When father released mother, she went into the bedroom and called the police. He left to avoid arrest.
Although father claimed there had never been any prior physical altercations with mother, he admitted they had prior verbal altercations, including one that prompted a neighbor to call the police. According to father, "he was only given a verbal warning" after that incident.
When the social worker contacted the Huntington Park Police Department, the investigating detective advised that the District Attorney would not be pursuing criminal charges against father because mother did not want to prosecute.
On February 3, 2021, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing, at which it found the Department had made a prima facie showing that the child was a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, detained her from father, and released her to mother under Department supervision. The court also issued a stay away order against father, granted him visitation with a monitor other than mother, and ordered the Department to provide him with reunification services.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In the April 13, 2021, jurisdiction/disposition report, the social worker advised that she had conducted follow-up interviews with mother and father. They informed her that they did not need any services, but that they would be willing to participate in them if required. Since the detention hearing, father had been visiting regularly with the child three days a week for two hours each visit. The monitor, the paternal grandmother, reported that father interacted well with the child and expressed no concerns about the visits. Father told the social worker that he wanted to return to the home, but mother expressed lingering uncertainty about a continued relationship.
On May 17, 2021, the juvenile court conducted the jurisdictional hearing at which it sustained count b-1. The court explained, "Here the events that occurred recently [are] what led to the [filing of the] petition . . . . [L]aw enforcement was involved. [And i]t does appear that altercations between the parents are escalating. The Department cites in its reports that reconciliation by the parents is a concern given that at this point . . . father has not participated in any programs to mitigate the . . . concerns that brought the matter before the court. [¶] And the description of . . . father grabbing mother by the neck and placing his hands around her neck is certainly a significant minimization in terms of the [police report] description of what occurred. [¶] . . . [¶] Similarly, apart from the fact that the [domestic violence] is escalating, father has not taken any steps to mitigate the concerns, the extreme seriousness of mother being strangled multiple times by . . . father, [and] law enforcement being involved. In this case, [the child] is of a very young and tender age. . . . [S]he's even more vulnerable because of her young age. . . . [¶] So the court does agree with the Department's assessment that given . . . the totality of these issues, it does place [the child] at risk."
The juvenile court then proceeded to disposition. The court removed the child from father's custody, citing to the serious nature of his assault of mother requiring the involvement of law enforcement and the young age of the child. The court also noted that father had not made any meaningful efforts to address the Department's concerns. And, the court pointed to the fact that the parents intended to reunite, as well as mother's unwillingness to obtain a protective order. The court therefore ordered certain services for father.
Father timely appealed from the jurisdictional findings and disposition order.
III. DISCUSSION A. Jurisdiction
Father contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings. According to father, "there is no substantial evidence connecting the single domestic violence incident . . . on January 1, 2021, to a risk of harm to [the child] on May 17, 2021." We disagree.
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides for juvenile court jurisdiction where "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . ." We review jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
According to father, "[j]urisdiction cannot be based on a single incident." Father is mistaken. (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025-1026 [providing guidance on factors a juvenile court should consider in evaluating risk to a child based on a single episode of endangering conduct].) "Although there must be a present risk of harm to the minor, the juvenile court may consider past events to determine whether the child is presently in need of juvenile court protection." (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289.) Moreover, "[e]xposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis of a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)." (In re. R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941.)
Contrary to father's assertion, there was substantial evidence showing that the parents' history of verbal disputes, the escalating level of conflict between them, and father's violent assault of mother posed a significant risk of harm to the child as of the date of adjudication. Father, during his initial assault, not only choked and punched mother, knocking her to the ground where he continued choking her, he then renewed his attack after the paternal grandmother's intervention, choking mother a third time, seemingly undeterred by the presence of a third-party trying to restrain him. That conduct warranted the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the child and also underscored the need for removal and Department intervention until such time as father acknowledged and sought successful treatment for his issues.
Moreover, father denied choking mother, reporting that he had only placed his hands on her neck to "calm her down." He also denied that he needed services to address the issues that brought the family to the Department's attention and, at the time of the adjudication hearing, he had not participated in any such services. (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 ["One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge"].) Although the child was not harmed during the incident, the juvenile "court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child." (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165.) And, the child's tender years made her especially vulnerable to harm from a future violent assault of mother by father.
B. Removal Order
Father next contends that, even if the facts supported an assertion of jurisdiction over the child, there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's order removing physical custody from him.
"'"In dependency proceedings[, ] the burden of proof is substantially greater at the dispositional phase than it is at the jurisdictional phase if the minor is to be removed from his or her home"' or the physical custody of a parent. [Citation.] The applicable statute, section 361, subdivision (c), '"is clear and specific: Even though children may be dependents of the juvenile court, they shall not be removed . . . unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the child's physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being and there are no 'reasonable means' by which the child can be protected without removal."' [Citations.]
"A finding of parental abuse cannot alone provide the clear and convincing evidence necessary to justify removing a child. [Citations.] Rather, the juvenile court must determine whether a child will be in substantial danger if permitted to remain in the parent's physical custody, considering not only the parent's past conduct, but also current circumstances, and the parent's response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention. [Citations.]
"'On appeal from a dispositional order removing a child from a parent we apply the substantial evidence standard of review, keeping in mind that the trial court was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.' ([In re] Ashly F.[ (2014)] 225 Cal.App.4th [803, ] 809; see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 . . . ['when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof'].) '"'The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.' [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520-521.)
As we discuss above, father's violent conduct toward mother, the escalating conflict between him and mother, his minimization of his conduct, his failure to acknowledge the need for support, and the child's young age supported the juvenile court's conclusion that removal of the child from father was necessary to protect her from substantial danger.
To the extent father asserts that the juvenile court failed to adequately detail the evidence in support of the disposition order, the record of the disposition hearing, which demonstrates that the court cited to the evidence supporting its removal decision, is to the contrary.
IV. DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction findings and disposition order are affirmed.
We concur: BAKER, Acting P. J., MOOR, J.