Kysor Indust. Corp. v. Frazier

21 Citing cases

  1. SHAW v. PLAY DIRTY COLORADO ATV TOURS, L.L.C.

    Civil Action No. 07-cv-01513-WYD-KMT (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2009)   Cited 2 times

    The mere occurrence of an accident in connection with the use of a product does not necessarily make the product defective and unreasonably dangerous. Shultz v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 734 P.2d 146, 148-49 (Colo.Ct.App. 1986) (citing Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982)). "[A] manufacturer has no duty to produce the safest product possible, but rather has a duty merely to avoid placing on the market a product which presents an unreasonable risk of harm to others."

  2. McHargue v. Stokes Div. of Pennwalt

    686 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Colo. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    Strict liability, however, is not the equivalent of absolute liability, and the fact that an accident may occur in connection with the use of a product does not necessarily mean that the manufacturer is liable. Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 911 (Colo. 1982). While some courts have eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement, it is well established that under Colorado law a plaintiff must prove both that the product was defective and that it was unreasonably dangerous in order to prevail under Section 402A.

  3. Bartholic v. Scripto-Tokai Corporation

    140 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Colo. 2000)   Cited 27 times
    In Bartholic, a child caused injury to another child after using a lighter that the parents had kept on top of a hot water heater in a closet.

    "Strict liability, however, is not the equivalent of absolute liability, and the fact that an accident may occur in connection with the use of a product does not necessarily mean that the manufacturer is liable." McHargue v. Stokes Div. of Pennwalt, 686 F. Supp. 1428, 1434, (D. Colo. 1988) (citing Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 911 [Colo. 1982]).

  4. Perez v. Sunbeam Prods.

    Civil Action 21-cv-01915-PAB-KAS (D. Colo. Sep. 29, 2023)

    In its reply, Target argues that “the fact that an individual was injured in relation to use of a product ‘does not establish that the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous.'” Docket No. 56 at 8 (quoting Colo. Jury Instr., Civil § 14:7 and citing Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 911 (Colo. 1982); Shultz v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 734 P.2d 146, 148-49 (Colo.App. 1986); Kern v. Gen. Motors Corp., 724 P.2d 1365, 1366 (Colo.App. 1986); Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324, 327 (Colo.App. 1985)).

  5. Staley v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.

    106 F.3d 1504 (10th Cir. 1997)   Cited 16 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that where district court erroneously denied a challenge for cause but plaintiff used peremptory challenge to remove challenged juror, and made no allegation that jury as seated was biased, error was harmless

    Indeed, our research has revealed no Colorado cases specifically adopting or rejecting this defense. We agree with plaintiffs that Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982), more nearly supports their position on this issue than Firestone's. The Kysor court stated that although a user is an expert in the field that "does not preclude a finding of a defective and unreasonably dangerous product due to a failure to warn or instruct as to the safe and proper method" of using the product.

  6. Romero v. International Harvester Co.

    979 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1992)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that Colorado law imposes post-sale duty to warn only when product was defective and unreasonably dangerous at time it was manufactured and sold; Colorado law recognizes no "rigid distinction" between negligence and strict liability failure to warn concepts

    1983)).See also Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 910 (Colo. 1982); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983, 987 (1975). Section 402A of the Restatement provides as follows:

  7. Ceroni v. 4Front Engineered Solutions, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 11-cv-00667-BNB-KLM (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    In addition to evidence of a defect, which Mr. Pettit's statement provides, the plaintiff also must present some evidence that the product "was defective at the time it was sold by the defendant or left [its] control." CJI-Civ. 14:1 (2011) at ¶4; Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 911(Colo. 1982)(stating that "[t]he burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured party; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained"). The plaintiff has offered no evidence to establish this element of a strict product liability claim. Nor is the mere occurrence of an accident in connection with the use of a product sufficient to establish that the product was defective at the time it left the defendant's control.

  8. Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.

    522 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1994)   Cited 13 times
    Explaining the burden is on the manufacturer in claims arising from alleged defects in the design of a product to show the product conformed to the state-of-the-art standards in existence at the time it was manufactured

    Still others suggest that government regulations may furnish a proper standard by which to measure feasibility. See, e.g., Frazier v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 43 Colo. App. 287, 293, 607 P.2d 1296, 1301 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982). We believe evidence on any one or all of these factors would be relevant and material on the question of whether a state of the art defense has been sufficiently established to warrant submission to the jury.

  9. Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific

    859 P.2d 85 (Wyo. 1993)   Cited 9 times

    Therefore, it is the law of this case that misuse of the product is an affirmative defense, which we perceive to be the appropriate rule in any event. We perceive this case to be similar to Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982). The jury apparently concluded the stair treads only were dangerous because of the way in which Anderson used them, and the failure to warn of the alleged product defect did not result in any dangerous condition in this case, absent the manner in which Anderson used the stair treads.

  10. Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton

    845 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that nonsettling defendant's right of setoff is limited to amounts actually collected from settling defendants and does not include amounts provided for in settlement agreements that have not been paid; holding "properly allocated the risk that no amounts under the settlement agreement will be paid to the guilty tortfeasors rather than the innocent injured party"

    Instead, the scope of liability under section 402A is limited. See Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 911 (Colo. 1982). To establish liability under section 402A, a plaintiff is required to establish that a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous.