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Kyle v. Georgia Lottery Corp.

304 Ga. App. 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
Kyle v. Georgia Lottery Corp.

4 Citing cases

  1. India-American Cultural Ass'n, Inc. v. Ilink Prof'ls, Inc.

    296 Ga. 668 (Ga. 2015)   Cited 4 times

    Indeed, a prior state registration gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of validity. Kyle v. Georgia Lottery Corp., 304 Ga.App. 635, 637(2), 698 S.E.2d 12 (2010), quoting Harod v. Sage Products, 188 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1375 (S.D.Ga.2002). And, while IACA's offered affidavits may have rendered in dispute iLink's claims of abandonment or assignment of the Marks, the superior court was not required to find that they had “overcome” the statutory presumption of validity, for the purpose of the grant of interim injunctive relief. Indeed, the statutory scheme, specifically OCGA § 10–1–451, not only provides for the permissive grant of injunctions by a court of competent jurisdiction in subsection (a), but in subsection (b) contains the mandate that such a court “shall grant injunctions to enjoin subsequent use by another of the same [mark] ... if there exists a likelihood of injury to business reputation....”

  2. Kyle v. Georgia Lottery Corp.

    290 Ga. 87 (Ga. 2011)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that the Georgia Lottery Corporation was entitled to sovereign immunity as an instrumentality of the State, in part because "its main purpose is to generate net proceeds to be used to support improvements and enhancements for educational purposes and programs"

    Kyle appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling in its entirety. Kyle v. Ga. Lottery Corp., 304 Ga.App. 635, 698 S.E.2d 12 (2010). This Court granted certiorari and posed the following questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the Georgia Lottery Corporation was entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a bar to a suit raising claims arising outside the Georgia Tort Claims Act? and (2)Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that OCGA § 10–1–440 requires the bona fide use of a trademark to make out a claim concerning the trademark's infringement?

  3. Georgia Department of Community Health v. Data Inquiry, LLC

    313 Ga. App. 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that sovereign immunity had not been waived despite work done in reliance on contract negotiations because the negotiations had not resulted in a written contract between the plaintiff and the State

    ; Merk v. DeKalb County, 226 Ga.App. at 193(1), 486 S.E.2d 66 (“[A]n implied contract will not support a waiver of sovereign immunity under the provisions of the Georgia Constitution [.]”) (citation omitted).See also Kyle v. Ga. Lottery Corp., 304 Ga.App. 635, 636(1), 698 S.E.2d 12 (2010) (physical precedent only) (The defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity from the plaintiffs' claims because there was no written contract between the parties, and no statute authorizes a waiver of sovereign immunity for equitable claims against the State.). 3.

  4. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Gold

    318 Ga. App. 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that “[o]ur Constitution and statutes do not provide for a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity in declaratory-judgment actions”

    Merk v. DeKalb County, 226 Ga.App. 191, 193(1), 486 S.E.2d 66 (1997).Dollar, 232 Ga.App. at 522(2), 502 S.E.2d 472;accord Kyle v. Ga. Lottery Corp., 304 Ga.App. 635, 636, 698 S.E.2d 12 (2010) (physical precedent only).See Tackett v. Ga. Dep't of Corr.