Kutnick v. Grant

3 Citing cases

  1. Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Corp.

    66 Ill. 2d 616 (Ill. 1977)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that a plaintiff whose action was dismissed for want of prosecution after being on the "no progress" calendar for two years was still entitled to refile under the predecessor of today's section 13-217

    There is, however, a series of Illinois cases which treats a motion to dismiss the second suit under Rule 103(b) by evaluating and measuring all that occurred between the time of the filing of the first suit and service of summons in the second action refiled under section 24. Tidwell v. Smith (1965), 57 Ill. App.2d 271, is the progenitor of such judicial requirements as "self-initiated delay" and "extreme, self-initiated delay" as the test on such a motion. Such language in varying terms has been employed in Franzese v. Trinko (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 152, 155, Kutnick v. Grant (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 37, 39, Sandman v. Marshall Field Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 427, 431, Brown v. Burdick (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1071, 1074, Ray v. Bokorney (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 141, 145, and Quirino v. Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc. (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 148, 150. Some view section 24 as an aid to the diligent suitor only. Sandman v. Marshall Field Co., Brown v. Burdick, and Quirino v. Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc. Obviously, a limitations statute does not involve diligence.

  2. Kutnick v. Grant

    65 Ill. 2d 177 (Ill. 1976)   Cited 20 times
    In Kutnick the court noted that section 24 of the Limitations Act was amended to include dismissals for want of prosecution five months after Rule 273 became effective.

    Judge Brussell, after hearing argument, dismissed the case with prejudice on February 14, 1974; the order did not state reasons for the dismissal. The appellate court reversed ( 33 Ill. App.3d 37), and we granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Section 24 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 24a) provides, in part, that when an "action is dismissed for want of prosecution then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires during the pendency of such suit, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new action within one year * * * after such * * * action is dismissed for want of prosecution."

  3. Kahle v. John Deere Co.

    104 Ill. 2d 302 (Ill. 1984)   Cited 102 times
    Holding voluntary dismissal order is final and appealable order

    The purpose of the statute authorizing the refiling within one year after the voluntary dismissal of the case is to protect the plaintiff from his loss of the right to relief on the merits because of some procedural defect. ( Kutnick v. Grant (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 37; Brown v. Burdick (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1071.) Its provisions should not be abused by using the statute as a means of forum shopping. I suggest that the General Assembly consider limiting the right to refile after a voluntary dismissal under section 13-217 to prevent the abuse apparent in this case.