A petition to open judgment is an appeal to the equitable powers of the court. Therefore, this Court's standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Kurtz v. Allied Corp., 561 A.2d 1294 (Pa.Commw. 1989). The issues before this Court on appeal are: (1) whether the notice provisions of Rule 237.1 regarding the entry of a default judgment apply to workers' compensation cases, and (2) whether a supersedeas retroactively discharges an employer's prior obligation to pay benefits, therefore barring entry of a default judgment against the employer.
A default judgment is a judgment "where the defendant usually does not appear and either has or takes no opportunity the argue his case." Kurtz v. Allied Corp., 561 A.2d 1294 (Pa.Commw. 1989). There was no default in the underlying Ebersole case.
We acknowledge this Court's rulings that "[a]n order of the Board vacating a [WCJ's] order and remanding the case for further findings of fact has the effect of reinstating [an NCP] issued before the [WCJ's] decision . . . ." Mason v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hilti Fastening Sys. Corp.), 657 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995); see also Kurtz v. Allied Corp., 561 A.2d 1294, 1298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) ("[T]he effect of an order of the Board vacating the [WCJ's] decision and remanding the case to the [WCJ] for further findings is to reinstate the [NCP] prior to the [WCJ's] decision."). In the instant matter, however, the Schock I order specifically vacated the Board's order and instructed the Board to return the matter to the WCJ to explain the objective bases for her credibility determinations underlying her termination decision.
A claim that there was an error before the WCJ's award is not a basis for lifting the judgment. Kurtz v. Allied Corp., [561 A.2d 1294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989)].Clayton v. City of Phila., 910 A.2d 93, 97 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
A claim that there was an error before the WCJ's award is not a basis for lifting the judgment. Kurtz v. Allied Corp., 127 Pa.Cmwlth. 384, 561 A.2d 1294 (1989). Employer contends that it has "paid" the judgment with the notice of offset it filed against Claimant's workers' compensation award for pensions paid from January 1998 to September 2004, the period reflected in the judgment for past worker's compensation benefits not paid.
We agree. An order of the Board vacating a referee's order and remanding the case for further findings of fact has the effect of reinstating a notice of compensation payable issued before the referee's decision or, as in this case, a prior decision granting a claimant benefits. Kurtz v. Allied Corp., 127 Pa. Commw. 384, 561 A.2d 1294 (1989). Hence, Claimant's benefits should have been reinstated by the Board as of the date the referee first terminated Claimant's benefits, in this case, December 16, 1988. There is no authority supporting the Board's holding that Claimant's benefits should be reinstated on the date it vacated the order; using that date results in Claimant being deprived of benefits for more than one year.
A petition to strike judgment will only be granted where fatal defect appears on the face of the judgment and the petitioner must support his petition with clear and convincing evidence. Kurtz v. Allied Corporation, 127 Pa. Commw. 384, 561 A.2d 1294 (1989). On appeal, this court is limited to determining whether the trial court made errors of law or clearly abused its discretion in denying the motion to strike judgment.
A petition to strike a default judgment will only be granted where a fatal defect appears on the face of the record. Feigley v. Suomela, 129 Pa. Commw. 81, 564 A.2d 1032 (1989); Kurtz v. Allied Corporation, 127 Pa. Commw. 384, 561 A.2d 1294 (1989). George contends that two fatal defects appear on the face of the record, 1) Navarro failed to join George's employer, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, as a necessary and indispensable party, and 2) the complaint failed to set forth a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
The decision whether to open a default judgment is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent an error of law or clear manifest abuse of discretion, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Kurtz v. Allied Corp., 127 Pa. Commw. 384, 561 A.2d 1294 (1989). It is a well established rule that in order to grant a petition to open a default judgment, the following three criteria must be met: (1) the petition to open must be promptly filed; (2) a meritorious defense must be shown; and (3) there must be a reasonable excuse for failure to respond.