Opinion
2:14-cv-1495
12-17-2014
CHARLES E. KUROWSKI, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WASHINGTON, RON MCINTYRE, Code Officer, and RON MCINTYRE, Individually, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is the MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (ECF No. 3) filed by Charles E. Kurowski ("Plaintiff"). Plaintiff also filed a supplement to the motion (ECF No. 10). Defendants, City of Washington ("City") and Ron McIntyre ("McIntyre"), filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 11). For the following reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff's motion. Furthermore, the Court will STAY this case pending the resolution of the proceedings in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas.
I. Background
This is a civil rights action for injunctive relief and damages arising out of condemnation/demolition proceedings involving a building owned by Plaintiff, located at 83 North Main Street (the "building"). McIntyre is the City's Code Enforcement Officer who initiated the underlying proceedings.
Plaintiff, an attorney, and Defendants have a long history. Over the past several years, Plaintiff has represented several clients in lawsuits against the City and McIntyre and code enforcement actions brought by the City. Plaintiff has also been on the other end of litigation with the City. In 2005, the City filed a complaint alleging various ordinance violations against Plaintiff, following a fire that destroyed approximately 10 percent of his building. The City's Zoning Hearing Board conducted a hearing on the matter and apparently declared the building to be structurally sound. Thereafter, Plaintiff installed new windows and floors in the building. He also replaced a portion of the roof that had been damaged in the fire. Since then, he says, he has continued to spend money on maintenance and upkeep.
According to Plaintiff, the building has not been vacant since the fire in 2005. Several tenants have rented space in the building, and Plaintiff also used the building for storage. Throughout this time, Plaintiff avers, he never received notice that the building needed to be fixed or repaired to bring it into compliance with the City's property maintenance ordinances.
That changed in May 2012, when Plaintiff alleges he received a "First Notice for DEMOLITION" from McIntyre. The notice, dated May 5, indicated that an exterior inspection of the building revealed "serious structural deterioration, which has become a hazard to the neighboring properties and citizen's [sic]." Compl. Ex. E, ECF No. 1-6. The notice also advised Plaintiff that he had 10 days to arrange for an interior inspection of the building and that a list of necessary corrections would be prepared by McIntyre. Plaintiff immediately sent a response to McIntyre asking him to describe the corrections that needed to be made. Plaintiff never received a response. He did, however, receive a "Condemnation Notice" from the City, signed by McIntyre and also dated May 5, which indicated that McIntyre and unnamed representatives from the fire department had entered the building and found that Plaintiff's "efforts to remove the debris from this facility have not been accomplished." Compl. Ex. C, ECF No. 1-4. The notice further advised Plaintiff that the building had been declared "a very dangerous property pursuant to City Ordinance 1356, ICC Property Maintenance Code 2009 Section 108.1 entitled UNSAFE STRUCTURES, and no further access into [the building] shall be permitted." Id.
About a month later, Plaintiff received a "Second Notice for DEMOLITION" from the City. Plaintiff responded by sending McIntyre another letter asking how he could correct the purported violations, but again, he never received a response. Plaintiff alleges that he lost two prospective tenants for the building as a result of the City's actions.
On July 25, 2012, Defendant McIntyre posted a condemnation notice on the building. That same day, Plaintiff received a "FINAL NOTICE FOR DEMOLITION," directing him to remove everything from the building in preparation for the demolition. Despite these notices, the building was never demolished, as Plaintiff was apparently able to reach a settlement with the City solicitor.
In October 2014, however, a "Notice of Public Hearing" was posted on the building, stating that a hearing would be held in November to receive public testimony regarding whether several buildings, including Plaintiff's, should be declared nuisance properties and demolished. After receiving this notice, Plaintiff contacted McIntyre to request information about the proposed demolition, but he never received a response. Around the same time, Plaintiff received a letter from the City solicitor, stating that the Code Enforcement Department had determined that the building constitutes a public nuisance. In particular, the letter explained, the building is "unfit for human habitation," "a fire hazard," and "dangerous to the safety of persons and property." Compl. Ex. I, ECF No. 1-10. The letter also alleged that the building's utilities had been disconnected. Id. Plaintiff thereafter sent McIntyre a letter once again disputing several of the allegations made by the City with respect to the condition of the building.
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 31, 2014 - before the final vote to demolish the building was taken - by filing a seven-count Complaint alleging various violations of federal and state law: Count I, a "class-of-one" equal protection claim; Count II, a First Amendment claim; Count III, a First Amendment retaliation claim; Count IV, a claim for wrongful use of the legal process; Count V, a claim for reckless investigation in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; Count VI, a claim for defamation; and Count VII, a Monell claim against the City.
On November 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. After the public hearing was held on November 6, Plaintiff supplemented his motion with an update on the status of the underlying proceedings. According to Plaintiff's supplement, the City Council voted at the November 6th hearing to demolish his building. Afterward, Plaintiff received a letter advising him that he had 20 days to bring the building up to code or else it would be demolished. The letter also advised him that he had 30 days from November 12, 2014, within which to appeal the City's decision to the Washington County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to Pennsylvania's Local Agency Law. Plaintiff filed an appeal of the City's decision on December 8, 2014. See Washington County Court of Common Pleas Dkt. No. C-63-CV-201407621. The City and McIntyre are named as defendants in the state-court action. Id.
This Court may take judicial notice of the state-court docket and records. See Dec v. Penn. State Police, 2:12-CV-565, 2012 WL 6099078, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2012).
II. Discussion
In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff asks this Court to enjoin "any further condemnation or demolition proceedings" against the building. Pl.'s Mot. at 6, ECF No. 3. Such relief is also requested in his Complaint. Because Plaintiff is seeking to enjoin the underlying condemnation/demolition proceedings, the Court must consider whether it should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this action, or portions of this action, under the abstention doctrine first announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
In response to Plaintiff's motion, Defendants, without much in the way of explanation or citation to relevant authority, contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action. Liberally construed, Defendants' argument could be read as a request for the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this matter under the Younger abstention doctrine until the appeal of the City's decision has been resolved by the Pennsylvania courts. Even if that is not what Defendants intended - and it very well may not have been as, in support of their argument, they cite two Title VII cases which have absolutely no application to this case - the Court may raise the issue of Younger abstention sua sponte. See O'Neill, 32 F.3d at 786 n.1.
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, a federal district court may not enjoin pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Principles of comity and federalism require this result. Id. at 436. Although the Younger abstention doctrine was first articulated in the context of a state criminal case, it "has since been extended to non-criminal state civil proceedings and state administrative proceedings, in which important state interests are implicated[.]" O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). There are three requirements that "must be satisfied before a federal court may abstain from hearing a case over which it has jurisdiction: (1) there must be pending or ongoing state proceedings which are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional issues." Id. (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). Even if these requirements are met, however, abstention may be inappropriate whenever the state proceedings were initiated in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment or some other extraordinary circumstances exist. Id. at 789 n.11.
1. Pending or Ongoing Proceedings
There is no doubt that the condemnation/demolition proceedings brought against Plaintiff are "judicial in nature," as, much like criminal charges, these proceedings were initiated by McIntyre, on behalf of the City, to enforce perceived violations of the City's ordinances. See Nernberg v. City of Pittsburgh, 50 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that housing code enforcement proceedings were judicial in nature). The question, then, is whether the proceedings were "pending or ongoing" when Plaintiff initiated his suit in this Court. Our Court of Appeals has held that, in the context of "coercive" state administrative proceedings, a plaintiff must exhaust state-court judicial review of an administrative decision before filing suit in federal court. See O'Neill, 32 F.3d at 790-91 (explaining that state proceedings remain "pending" "where adequate state-court judicial review of the administrative determination is available to the federal claimants, and where the claimants have chosen not to pursue their state-court judicial remedies, but have instead sought to invalidate the State's judgment by filing a federal action"). Plaintiff has not done so. In fact, at the time he filed this action, the City Council had yet to take a final vote on whether to demolish the building. Only after filing this federal lawsuit did he perfect his appeal in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, as he was directed to do following the November 6th hearing. Attempts like this to short circuit the state judicial review process directly implicate the concerns raised in Younger. Since Plaintiff's appeal is still weaving its way through the Pennsylvania courts, it is "pending" for the purposes of Younger, and the first requirement has been established.
The term "coercive" is key. See O'Neill, 32 F.3d at 791 n.13. Whenever administrative proceedings are "remedial" rather than "coercive," plaintiffs "'need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing a § 1983 suit in federal court.'" Id. (quoting Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627-28 n.2 (1986)). A "remedial" action is one "brought by the plaintiff to vindicate a wrong which had been inflicted by the state." Id. In contrast, a "coercive" action is an "administrative proceeding[] initiated by the State, before a state forum, to enforce a violation of state law." Id. Here, as explained above, the proceedings are clearly coercive, in that the City brought a code enforcement action against Plaintiff for perceived violations of its ordinances.
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2. Important State Interest
The state-interest requirement "goes to the very core of the raison d'etre of Younger abstention inasmuch as the Supreme Court's holding in Younger rested primarily on considerations of 'comity,' a concept which encompasses 'a proper respect for state functions.'" O'Neill, 32 F.3d at 791 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). In this case, this requirement is seemingly satisfied, as both the City and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have a strong interest in seeing that local property maintenance codes are enforced. Nernberg, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 440 (citing Carroll v. City of Mt. Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998); Chez Sez III Corp. v. Twp. of Union, 945 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1991)). Indeed, ensuring the buildings are up to code is quintessentially a local function.
That is not the end of the inquiry, however. As the Court of Appeals has explained, the "mere fact" that a case arises out of an area of particularly local concern, such as enforcement of property maintenance codes, "is not enough" to require abstention. Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 409 (3d Cir. 2005) (Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1992); Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Twp., 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1982)). The Court of Appeals has instructed district courts to examine whether the requested relief would actually interfere with the state proceeding rather than blindly abstaining when faced with these types of situations. Id. (citing Gwynedd Properties, 970 F.2d at 1204 n.13). For example, "[i]n Gwynedd Properties, [the Court of Appeals] held that a federal claim challenging the discriminatory actions of township officials in making land use decisions - as opposed to a claim challenging the validity of the state's land use policies and laws - did not implicate important state interests for Younger abstention purposes." Id. (citing Gwynedd, 970 F.2d at 1202-1203) (emphasis in original). However, even if the federal claims themselves do not implicate important state interests, insofar as an injunction "would have the effect of nullifying" the state-court proceedings or "would result in a de facto review" of the state administrative decision, abstention is still proper. Gwynedd Properties, 970 F.2d at 1204. That is to say, even where a plaintiff's "claims do not directly involve important state interests, abstention may still be appropriate if a federal injunction preventing the [defendant] from acting in a discriminatory [or retaliatory] manner would have the effect of enjoining state proceedings that do involve important state interests." Addicition Specialists, 411 F.3d at 410.
Here, like the situation in Addiction Specialists and Gwynedd, Plaintiff alleges that McIntyre engaged in unconstitutional conduct in bringing the enforcement action against him. Thus, his claims do not directly involve an important state interest. However, the Court finds that granting the requested injunctive relief would effectively nullify the state condemnation/demolition proceedings, which do involve a clear and important state interest. Thus, the second requirement has been met.
3. Opportunity to Raise Constitutional Issues
It is unclear whether Plaintiff raised or even could have raised the constitutional arguments set forth in his Complaint at the public hearing held on November 6. That is not dispositive, though, as the Supreme Court has held that the third Younger requirement can be satisfied as long as "the federal claimant can assert his constitutional claims during state-court judicial review of the administrative determination." O'Neill, 32 F.3d at 792 (citing Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. at 629; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 436). Pennsylvania law allows a plaintiff to "raise constitutional claims during the judicial review of an administrative decision." Gentlemen's Retreat, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 109 F. Supp. 2d 374, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (citing Newcomer v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n of Fairchance Borough, 515 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); City of Philadelphia Tax Rev. Bd. v. Headley, 585 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); 2 Pa. C.S. § 753). Accordingly, the third requirement has been met, irrespective of whether these claims could have been brought before the City Council. Plaintiff can - and by the looks of his state-court action, apparently is - pursuing these issues in state court.
4. Bad Faith Exception
Having found that each of the three Younger requirements have been met, the Court must now consider whether any of the narrow exceptions to the doctrine are implicated. Courts consider a number of factors when deciding whether bad faith exists:
(1) whether the prosecution is frivolous or undertaken without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction, (2) whether it was motivated by the defendant's suspect class or in retaliation for the defendant's exercise of constitutional rights and (3) whether it was conducted in such a way as to constitute harassment and an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, typically through the unjustified and oppressive use of multiple prosecutions[.]Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Upon consideration of these factors and the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint, as supplemented by the allegations in his motion and supplement thereto, the Court cannot conclude that the code enforcement action was brought in bad faith. Nor has Plaintiff brought any other extraordinary circumstances to the Court's attention that would cause it to believe that Plaintiff's claims cannot be adequately resolved in the appropriate state forum.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is required to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. As a result, Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied. However, because Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights, and it is unclear whether such damages are available in the state forum, the Court must retain jurisdiction over this aspect of the case. See Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[A] district court, when abstaining from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief, should stay and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages . . . when such relief is not available from the ongoing state proceedings.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Addiction Specialists, 411 F.3d at 413 ("Where the availability of a claim in state court is questionable, our abstention jurisprudence weighs in favor of retaining jurisdiction."). Thus, the Court will stay Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for monetary damages until the proceedings in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas at Dkt. No. C-63-CV-201407621 - and any appeals therefrom - have concluded. An appropriate order follows.
McVerry, J. ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 15th day of December, 2014, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff's MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (ECF No. 3) is DENIED. However, insofar as Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, this case is STAYED pending the resolution of the proceedings in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas at Dkt. No. C-63-CV-201407621, including any appeals of the Court of Common Pleas' decision.
BY THE COURT:
s/Terrence F. McVerry
Senior United States District Court Judge
cc: James R. Jeffries, Esq.
Email: jimmylaw_2002@yahoo.com
John F. Cambest, Esq.
Email: office@law-dmc.com
Via CM/ECF