An insured's failure to disclose facts that she had been treated for a thyroid condition and had an operation for the removal of the thyroid gland, in answering questions in the application for a hospitalization policy as to whether she had had medical or surgical treatment within the past seven years, and ever had surgery, is material misrepresentation and the suppression or leaving out of such facts is a bar to recovery under a hospitalization policy. Kuritzky v. National Casualty Company, 261 A.D. 1083, 27 N.Y.S.2d 5.         In the same case it was held that even though assured's misrepresentation regarding her prior medical hospitalization was innocently made it would void the policy as it materially affected the acceptance of the risk or hazard assumed by the insuror.

) The misrepresentations, even if made innocently, were on this application in 1930 material to the risk, since they prevented the defendant from exercising its choice. ( Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 261; Kuritzky v. National Cas. Co., 261 App. Div. 1083.) Even if their materiality were a question of fact for the jury, yet the defendant was entitled to a direction of a verdict in its favor on the uncontradicted testimony as to its established policy of rejecting applications for disability insurance with a history of cerebro-spinal meningitis, within five years preceding the application.

a material false representation of fact, which was made with knowledge of its falsehood, or recklessly, without belief in its truth, with the intention that it should be acted upon by the complaining party, and actually induces him to act upon it, to his injury. (See Arthur v Griswold, 55 N.Y. 400; Brackett v Griswold, 112 N.Y. 454. ) It is well settled that the fact that the misrepresentation was made in good faith or as a result of inadvertence, mistake, negligence or ignorance, will not preclude it from being deemed material and a cause for the avoidance of the policy obtained in reliance upon it, and if such misrepresentation induces the insurer to assume the risk which otherwise it would not have taken, there is a legal ground of avoidance and actual fraud need not be established since it is not a material factor in avoidance of the contract under such circumstances. (See Sommer v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 281 N.Y. 508; Piccininni v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 250 App. Div. 498; Kuritzky v National Cas. Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 776, revd on other grounds 261 App. Div. 1083; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.v Kaplan, 168 Misc. 24, affd 258 App. Div. 1038; Kirschner v Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 157 Misc. 635.) Thus, the courts have held that false representations, if material to the risk, void the policy even though made in good faith.

Soc. ( 267 App. Div. 785, 786, aff'd 294 N.Y. 935) the court stated: "The misrepresentations, even if made innocently, were on this application in 1930 material to the risk, since they prevented the defendant from exercising its choice. ( Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. 273 N.Y. 261; Kuritzky v. National Cas. Co., 261 App. Div. 1083.)"

It has been held that where there has been prior treatment for a thyroid condition the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. ( Kuritzky v. National Cas. Co., 261 A.D. 1083, revg. 23 N.Y.S.2d 776.) Coverage cannot be held to be applicable to conditions which exist at the time of application for insurance. ( Webster v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 131 A.D. 837, 404; Apter v. Home Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 266 N.Y. 333.)

It has been held that where there has been prior treatment for a thyroid condition the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. (Kuritzky v. National Cas. Co., 261 App. Div. 1083, revg. 23 N. Y. S. 2d 776.) Coverage cannot be held to be applicable to conditions which exist at the time of application for insurance.