Opinion
No. 01 C 1753
August 12, 2003
OPINION
Plaintiff Jeremy Kunz sued the City of Chicago, several individual police officers, and an Office of Professional Standards (OPS) investigator. His four-count complaint alleges the following claims: Count I, a § 1983 claim against the City and individual officers alleging excessive force; Count II, a state-law claim for malicious prosecution; Count III, a § 1983 claim against the City and others for "unconstitutional conspiracy to cover-up;" and Count IV, a § 1983 claim against the City and others for deprivation of necessary medical care. The § 1983 claims against the City include allegations regarding failure to train, supervise, and otherwise discipline its officers, as well as a "policy and practice" of withholding exculpatory evidence from criminal defendants, that the City encourages a "code of silence," and that OPS conducts defective investigations.
On October 2, 2001, on the City's motion, I stayed discovery on the policy issues. Kunz has now moved to have this stay lifted. The City opposes this motion on the grounds that in light of its filed waiver of the need for Kunz to prove the "policy" issues, such discovery should not be done (and, indeed, no trial on those issues is needed).
A plaintiff may maintain an action against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if he can show that his constitutional rights were violated and that the violation was directly caused by a "custom, policy or practice" of the defendant municipality. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against the City, Kunz must show: (1) a violation of his constitutional rights; (2) an injury; and (3) that the injury and violation of rights was directly caused by the City's own action or inaction that carried the requisite degree of fault. Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
In this case, the City has admitted that the individual officers were acting in the scope of their employment, obligating the City to indemnify them for any judgment for compensatory damages. The remaining issue in this case is a factual one: whether Kunz's rights were violated. Policy or no policy, causation or no causation, the City will be obligated to pay if Kunz proves that his rights were violated. The City therefore desires to avoid the waste of time and money involved in litigating the pointless "policy" issues. Accordingly, the City filed a stipulation in which it agrees to waive proof of "policy and causation." Therefore, in this case, Kunz can prevail on his § 1983 claim against the City if he proves that his constitutional rights were violated by the defendant officers — that his injuries were caused by a beating rather than a fall and that his serious need for immediate medical care was ignored — without having to prove that this violation of his rights was directly caused by a City "custom, policy, or practice" having the requisite degree of fault. Because of the City's waiver, there is no legitimate justification for engaging in discovery on those issues. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
Accordingly, Kunz's Motion to Un-Stay Monell Discovery is DENIED as moot and the City's Motion to Bar Discovery (and Trial) of "Policy" Issues on § 1983 Claim Against the City is GRANTED.