Kunz v. Bailey

7 Citing cases

  1. Fielder v. Johnson

    333 Ga. App. 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 4 times
    Addressing Kunz in light of the addition of subsection (d) to the statute

    Citing those circumstances, the Father argued that subsection (b) of the Grandparent Visitation Statute, together with Kunz v. Bailey, made it clear that the Grandparents' petition for visitation could not be sustained, given that it was filed as an original action. 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).In Kunz, biological grandparents filed an action seeking visitation with the child born to their son. Prior to the action being filed, their son had terminated (surrendered) his parental rights to the child, and the child's mother had then married another man, who thereupon had adopted the child.

  2. Evans v. Sangster

    768 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times
    Noting the order expressly recognized the mother's judgment as to the best interest of the child regarding visitation shall be given deference but is not conclusive

    (Emphasis supplied.) Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 362, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012). And the legislature provided that this right of intervention exists “notwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 19–8–19[,]” which pertains to the effect of an adoption decree.

  3. Barnhill v. Alford

    315 Ga. 304 (Ga. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    Specifically, the Barnhills argue that, because they have not been separated (at least since February 2019 when Katheryn adopted the Child) and the Child has lived with them continuously, Alford's action is not permitted. See Kunz v. Bailey , 290 Ga. 361, 362, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012) (holding that "by virtue of the limiting language in the last sentence of OCGA § 19-7-3 (b), grandparents may only file an original action for visitation when the parents are separated and the child is not living with both parents" (emphasis in original)). The Barnhills also argue that, after Katheryn initiated the adoption proceedings, Alford's only avenue for obtaining visitation rights to the Child was by intervening in the adoption action pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3 (b) (1) (B) ("[a]ny family member shall have the right to intervene in and seek to obtain visitation rights ... whenever there has been an adoption in which the adopted child has been adopted by ... a stepparent, notwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 19-8-19"), but Alford did not do so.

  4. Hastings v. Hastings

    S12F0873 (Ga. Oct. 1, 2012)

    Both the legislature and our courts have repeatedly confirmed that an adoptive parent stands on the same footing and has the same rights and obligations as a biological parent. See OCGA § 19-11-3 (9) (defining "parent" as "the natural or adoptive parents of a child" under Child Support Recovery Act); see also Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 362 (720 SE2d 634) (2012) (declining to limit the term "parents" to include only the natural or biological parents of child where specific language of statute did not create such distinction between any class of "parents"); Davis v. LaBrec, 274 Ga. 5, 7 (549 SE2d 76) (2001); Ivey v. Ivey, supra at 264 Ga. 437. "[I]t is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed in relation to other statutes, and all statutes dealing with the same subject matter are construed together and harmonized wherever possible so as to give effect to the legislative intent." Baum v. Moore, 230 Ga. App. 255, 257 (496 SE2d 307) (1998).

  5. Hastings v. Hastings

    291 Ga. 782 (Ga. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    Both the legislature and our courts have repeatedly confirmed that an adoptive parent stands on the same footing and has the same rights and obligations as a biological parent. See OCGA § 19–11–3(9) (defining “parent” as “the natural or adoptive parents of a child” under the Child Support Recovery Act); see also Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 362, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012) (declining to limit the term “parents” to include only the natural or biological parents of child where specific language of statute did not create such distinction between any class of “parents”); Davis v. LaBrec, 274 Ga. 5, 7, 549 S.E.2d 76 (2001); Ivey v. Ivey, supra at 264 Ga. 437, 445 S.E.2d 258. [I]t is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed in relation to other statutes, and all statutes dealing with the same subject matter are construed together and harmonized wherever possible so as to give effect to the legislative intent.

  6. Pate v. Sadlock

    814 S.E.2d 760 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that a court cannot delegate decisions regarding custody or visitation to an expert

    (i) Georgia’s "Grandparent Visitation Statute," OCGA § 19–7–3, grants any grandparent the right to seek visitation of a minor grandchild in two ways: (1) by filing an original action for visitation rights; or (2) by intervening in an existing action concerning custody, divorce of the parents or a parent, termination of parental rights or visitation rights, or in certain cases involving adoption. OCGA § 19–7–3 (b) (1) ; see also Kunz v. Bailey , 290 Ga. 361, 362, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012). Grandparents may file an "original action" requesting such visitation rights only once during any two-year period and not "during any year in which another custody action has been filed concerning the child."

  7. Hudgins v. Harding

    722 S.E.2d 355 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    We recently interpreted the term “parents” as used in this last sentence of current OCGA § 19–7–3(b) to include both “biological” or “natural parents,” as well as adoptive parents. See Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga.App. 710, 712–713, 706 S.E.2d 98 (2011), aff'd sub nom. Kunz v. Bailey, 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012). Based on this interpretation of OCGA § 19–7–3(b), the paternal grandparents in Bailey were not authorized to seek visitation of a minor child adopted by his stepfather on the ground that the child lived together with his stepfather and his biological mother.