The plaintiff appeals. Here, the record establishes, and the parties agree, that the Supreme Court properly rejected the jury's first verdict that was announced on the record on the basis that it was inconsistent (see Kumar v. PI Assoc., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 609, 610, 3 N.Y.S.3d 372 ; D'Annunzio v. Ore, 119 A.D.3d 512, 989 N.Y.S.2d 503 ; Kelly v. Greitzer, 83 A.D.3d 901, 902, 921 N.Y.S.2d 302 ).

Thus, the Realty defendants did not waive the issue of late service, even though they did not reject the tenants’ subsequent answer, which was not served until after the Realty defendants’ motions for leave to enter the default judgments had been granted (seeBennett v. Patel Catskills, LLC, 120 A.D.3d at 459, 990 N.Y.S.2d 594 ; Katz v. Perl, 22 A.D.3d at 807, 803 N.Y.S.2d 696 ). The Supreme Court should have granted the Realty defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their cross claim seeking contractual indemnification against Din (seeBilska v. Truszkowski, 171 A.D.3d 685, 687, 98 N.Y.S.3d 110 ; see alsoKumar v. PI Assoc., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 609, 612, 3 N.Y.S.3d 372 ). A party obtaining a default judgment must proffer evidence supporting its claim for damages (seeRawlings v. Gillert, 104 A.D.3d 929, 931, 962 N.Y.S.2d 325 ; Suburban Graphics Supply Corp. v. Nagle, 5 A.D.3d 663, 665–666, 774 N.Y.S.2d 160 ).

The Lafagues, who did not submit an affidavit from Williamson Jean Lafague, failed to establish, prima facie, that Williamson Jean Lafague was not at fault (seeHartfield v. Seenarraine, 138 A.D.3d 1060, 1061, 30 N.Y.S.3d 316 ). Since the complaint was dismissed insofar as asserted against Flatow and the Lafagues, we convert the cross claims against Flatow and the Lafagues into third-party causes of action (seeCabrera v. Shivecharan, 136 A.D.3d 960, 25 N.Y.S.3d 344 ; Kumar v. PI Assoc., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 609, 3 N.Y.S.3d 372 ; Soodoo v. LC, LLC, 116 A.D.3d 1033, 985 N.Y.S.2d 258 ). MASTRO, J.P., COHEN, CHRISTOPHER and WOOTEN, JJ., concur.

A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether to send a jury back for further deliberation (see Sharrow v. Dick Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 54, 62, 629 N.Y.S.2d 980, 653 N.E.2d 1150 ; Soto v. Famulari, 28 A.D.3d 639, 814 N.Y.S.2d 193 ). Before discharging a jury, the court has the power to inquire into an imperfect or incomplete verdict or where there is substantial confusion or ambiguity in the verdict (see Sharrow v. Dick Corp., 86 N.Y.2d at 60, 629 N.Y.S.2d 980, 653 N.E.2d 1150 ). " ‘When a jury's verdict is internally inconsistent, the trial court must direct either reconsideration by the jury or a new trial’ " ( Kumar v. PI Assoc., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 609, 610, 3 N.Y.S.3d 372, quoting Kelly v. Greitzer, 83 A.D.3d 901, 902, 921 N.Y.S.2d 302 ). Here, the jury's first verdict was internally inconsistent when it awarded damages to the plaintiff despite finding that the defendant's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries (see D'Annunzio v. Ore, 119 A.D.3d 512, 989 N.Y.S.2d 503 ).

We further conclude, however, that questions of fact preclude summary judgment on the cross claim for contractual indemnification to either Pro Coat or HSBC (see Johnson v Wal-Mart, 125 AD3d 1468, 1469; Payton v 5391 Transit Rd., LLC, 107 AD3d 1461, 1462), and thus we further modify the order by reinstating that cross claim. Inasmuch as Pro Coat is no longer a defendant in the action, the cross claim for contractual indemnification must be converted to a third-party claim (see Kumar v PI Assoc., LLC, 125 AD3d 609, 612; Soodoo v LC, LLC, 116 AD3d 1033, 1034). Entered: June 9, 2017

However, when a jury's verdict is internally inconsistent, the trial court must order either reconsideration by the jury or a new trial (see D'Annunzio v. Ore, 119 A.D.3d 512, 512, 989 N.Y.S.2d 503 ; Kelly v. Greitzer, 83 A.D.3d 901, 902, 921 N.Y.S.2d 302 ; Palmer v. Walters, 29 A.D.3d 552, 553, 814 N.Y.S.2d 689 ). Under the circumstances here, the jury's verdict as to liability was internally inconsistent because the jury attributed 15% of the fault for the accident to the plaintiff, despite having found that the plaintiff's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries (see Kumar v. PI Assoc., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 609, 610–611, 3 N.Y.S.3d 372 ; D'Annunzio v. Ore, 119 A.D.3d at 512, 989 N.Y.S.2d 503 ; Kelly v. Greitzer, 83 A.D.3d at 902, 921 N.Y.S.2d 302 ). The Supreme Court properly determined that the jury was confused about the meaning of the court's charge regarding proximate cause when it returned its liability verdict (see e.g. Kelly v. Greitzer, 83 A.D.3d at 902, 921 N.Y.S.2d 302 ; Palmer v. Walters, 29 A.D.3d at 553, 814 N.Y.S.2d 689 ).

ipts of her deposition testimony and the deposition testimony of the plaintiff and Jairaj Yamraj. Given the differing testimony as to how the accident occurred, Shivecharan failed to establish, prima facie, that she was not at fault in the happening of the accident and that the alleged negligence of the plaintiff and Jairaj Yamraj was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Cabrera v Magussen, 130 AD3d 664; Vavoulis v Adler, 43 AD3d 1154, 1155; cf. Gavrilova v Stark, 129 AD3d 907, 909). Since Shivecharan failed to establish her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, that branch of her cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cross claims asserted against her should have been denied, without regard to the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324). Since the complaint was dismissed insofar as asserted against Shivecharan, we convert the cross claims against Shivecharan into third-party causes of action (see Kumar v PI Assoc., LLC, 125 AD3d 609, 612; Soodoo v LC, LLC, 116 AD3d 1033, 1034). MASTRO, J.P., LEVENTHAL, AUSTIN and LASALLE, JJ., concur.

The Supreme Court should have granted the Realty defendants' motion for summary judgment on their cross claim seeking contractual indemnification against Din (see Bilska v Truszkowski, 171 A.D.3d 685, 687; see also Kumar v PI Assoc., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 609, 612). A party obtaining a default judgment must proffer evidence supporting its claim for damages (see Rawlings v Gillert, 104 A.D.3d 929, 931; Suburban Graphics Supply Corp. v Nagle, 5 A.D.3d 663, 665-666).

Wahl v. JCNYC, LLC, 20 N.Y.S.3d 65 (1st Dept. 2015). In Bhanmattie Rajkumar Kumar v. PI Associates, LLC, 3 N.Y.S.3d 372 (2d Dept. 2015), plaintiff tripped on a broken piece of sidewalk, and commenced an action against the landlord and tenant of the premises abutting the sidewalk. The defective condition on the sidewalk was located in front of, or adjacent to, a first-floor store that defendant Pretty Girl leased from the landlord PI. The lease provided that "Tenant, shall, at Tenant's own expense, make all repairs and replacements to the sidewalks and curbs adjacent thereto."