Kulow v. State

13 Citing cases

  1. Amoles v. State

    No. 05-21-00556-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 19, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    A Brady violation occurs when the State suppresses, willfully or inadvertently, material evidence favorable to the defendant. Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd). Favorable evidence includes impeachment as well as exculpatory evidence.

  2. Gutierrez v. State

    No. 03-23-00450-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 16, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87; see Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd). "The Supreme Court later explained that Brady essentially created a federal constitutional right to certain minimal discovery."

  3. Potter v. State

    No. 09-21-00386-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 6, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    We cannot say the trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial. See Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2017, pet. refd). Additionally, on the record before us we cannot say the alleged 39.14 violation had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Fortuna v. State, 665 S.W.3d 861, 869 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.)

  4. Daniels v. State

    No. 04-21-00471-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 2, 2023)

    , a defendant bears the burden to show that the delay resulted in prejudice"-i.e., that "the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed earlier." Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd).

  5. Fillmore v. State

    No. 03-22-00504-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 31, 2024)

    . See, e.g., Lee v. State, 549 S.W.3d 138, 145-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (complaint of improper statements during State's opening statement and direct examination of witnesses); Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 609, 612-13 (complaint of Article 36.22 juror misconduct); Barnett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 133-34 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2005) (complaint that trial court coerced jurors), aff'd, 189 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Importantly here, the rule has been used in the review of appellate issues about requested mistrials for (a) untimely disclosure of discovery material, see Hernandez v. State, 610 S.W.3d 106, 113 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref'd); see also Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd) ("When favorable evidence is not concealed but disclosed untimely, a defendant bears the burden to show that the delay resulted in prejudice. . . . Prejudice is not shown where the information is disclosed in time for the defendant to make effective use of it at trial."

  6. Cravens v. State

    No. 05-21-00947-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 28, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    When favorable evidence is not concealed but disclosed untimely, the defendant bears the burden to show the delay resulted in prejudice. Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2-17, pet. ref'd) (citing Little, 991 S.W.2d at 866).

  7. State v. Garcia

    No. 13-21-00404-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 18, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    ; Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd).

  8. Davila v. State

    NUMBER 13-19-00068-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 27, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    examine Rhines and Flores regarding any alleged assurances made in exchange for Rhines's cooperation; thus, Davila made effective use of the information at trial. See Fears, 479 S.W.3d at 327 ("When information is disclosed mid-trial, the prejudice inquiry involves determining whether the disclosure came in time to make effective use of it at trial."); see, e.g., Little, 991 S.W.2d at 865-67 (holding State's failure to inform the defendant regarding lost paperwork from the defendant's blood alcohol test until after expert testified, but before the defendant cross-examined expert, did not constitute a Brady violation because the defendant received information in time to use it effectively at trial); Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that, where the State allegedly failed to disclose the statement of an inmate that the defendant did not really assault him, but the defense called the inmate to testify to that effect, any Brady violation was harmless); Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd) (holding no Brady violation where the defendant was not prevented from cross-examining the witness on the delayed disclosure issue). We further note that Davila's failure to request a continuance when Brady evidence was disclosed at trial, at minimum, suggests that the tardy disclosure of the evidence was not prejudicial to him.

  9. State v. Muniz

    NUMBER 13-19-00090-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 27, 2020)   Cited 1 times
    Setting out that defense counsel testified that had he been aware of the undisclosed evidence, he would have changed his trial strategy and specifically detailed the manner in which his strategy would have changed

    A Brady violation occurs when the State suppresses—willfully or inadvertently—material evidence favorable to a defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd). To demonstrate reversible error under Brady, an appellant must show (1) the State suppressed evidence, regardless of the prosecution's good or bad faith; (2) the suppressed evidence is favorable to appellant; and (3) the evidence is material—that is, there is a reasonable probability that, had the favorable evidence been disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

  10. Ex parte Kulow

    563 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. App. 2018)   Cited 2 times
    Explaining that " defendant convicted of a misdemeanor offense may attack the validity of the conviction by way of habeas corpus if he is either confined or restrained as a result of a misdemeanor charge or conviction or is no longer confined, but is subject to collateral legal consequences resulting from the conviction"

    The trial court sentenced Kulow to one year’s confinement in county jail. SeeKulow v. State , 524 S.W.3d 383, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd). Kulow was released on bond pending appeal when the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals refused review, and the mandate issued on November 10, 2017.