Defendant, Beatrice Preston, was named defendant in Kufalk v. Hart (N.D. Ill. 1985), 610 F. Supp. 1178, in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois; that Federal action was pending at the time the present suit was filed. The defendant, Preston, tendered her defense in the Federal court action to her insurer, the plaintiff herein, Illinois Farmers Insurance Company (hereinafter IFIC).

Allegations that Meints had taken sexual liberties with his students are of obvious concern to the community of Lockport. See, e.g., Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (holding plaintiff's oral criticism of defendants' "application and interpretation of regulations concerning the prevention of abuse" of disabled clients to be of public concern and therefore constitutionally protected). Whether the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act ("ANCRA"), ch. 23, § 2051 et seq. then compelled reporting to the DCFS is irrelevant to whether or not Cromley's speech is constitutionally protected.

Charles has been cited on behalf of the proposition that the Seventh Circuit applies Parratt to deprivations of life. See, e.g., Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1984); Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178, 1190 (N.D.Ill. 1985). In fact, the opinion makes clear that the court was unsure about the reach of Parratt and based its judgment on alternative holdings.

In Blum, the Court held that "a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Id. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2786 (emphasis added); see Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178, 1184-85 (N.D.Ill. 1985); see also Baltz v. Shelley, 661 F. Supp. 1659, 175-76 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("encouragement or coercion" test of Blum and conspiracy approach of Tower interpreted as alternative routes to conclusion that psychiatrist assisting police acted under color of state law). B.

In this regard a recent Illinois Appellate Court case is most instructive. In Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Preston, 153 Ill. App.3d 644, 106 Ill.Dec. 552, 505 N.E.2d 1343 (1987), the insured was a defendant in a federal civil rights suit ( Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D.Ill. 1985)). Kufalk alleged in the federal suit that he lost his job and suffered emotional distress resulting in bodily injury, due to false, misleading, and pretextual statements made by the insured as part of a conspiracy.

It follows that if Thompson engaged in such conduct, she was not furthering the best interests of her employer. See, e.g., Siakpere v. Boucher, No. 84-C-6768, 1986 WL 5657, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1986) ("a trier of fact could infer that [defendant-employer] lost sight of the best interests of the corporation when he sought to get a valued employee fired") (citing Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1985)). Thus, even under the heightened pleading standard for claims against privileged corporate employees, Burton has stated a claim for tortious interference with employment expectancy.

It follows that if Reynolds engaged in such conduct, she was not furthering the best interests of her employer and was acting instead to further her own personal goals. See, e.g.,Siakpere , 1986 WL 5657, at *6 (“a trier of fact could infer that [defendant-employer] lost sight of the best interests of the corporation when he sought to get a valued employee fired”) (citing Kufalk v. Hart , 610 F.Supp. 1178 (N.D.Ill.1985) ). Thus, even under the heightened pleading requirements applied in light of the plausibly applicable privilege, Cox has stated a claim for tortious interference with employment expectancy.

. See Koehler ex rel. Koehler v. Juniata Cnty. Sch. Dist., 07–CV–0117, 2008 WL 1787632, at *9–11 (M.D.Pa. Apr. 17, 2008) (finding that members of nonprofit corporation acted in concert with school district to render those members state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because members and school district willfully “acted as a team” to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights); Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F.Supp. 1178, 1186 (N.D.Ill.1985) (finding that members of nonprofit corporation acted in concert with state department of mental health and developmental disabilities to render those members state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because plaintiff alleged “specific instances in which the [members of the nonprofit corporation] acquiesced in, or affirmatively repeated, various false, misleading and pretextual statements uttered by the state defendants”); Ray v. Edwards, 557 F.Supp. 664, 670–71 (D.C.Ga.1982) (finding that issue of fact existed as to whether state defendants and private nonprofit association of retarded citizens conspired to deprive former superintendent of his constitutional rights by dismissing him from his position, where plaintiff has alleged that the decision to terminate him was reached jointly and through a conspiracy among the state and private defendants). b. New York Civil Rights Law §§ 70

As we observed earlier, a property interest may arise from rules or understandings which have less formality than a state statute or municipal ordinance. Indeed, in the absence of such provisions, extrinsic evidence of a rule, policy or practice upon which legitimate expectation of continued employment can be based may provide the legal basis for the property interest. Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1263 (7th Cir. 1985); Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178, 1190 (N.D.Ill. 1985). See also Hermes v. Hein, 742 F.2d 350, 354-55 (7th Cir. 1984) (property interest in promotion may arise out of a de facto promotional program); Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D.Ill. 1983) (property interest in outside, part-time employment arose out of long-standing custom and practice).

Assuming that the St. Charles decision does hold that Parratt applies to deprivations of life, it is nonetheless clear that Parratt is inapplicable to deprivations of substantive constitutional rights. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1238 n. 39 (7th Cir. 1984); St. Charles, 712 F.2d at 1147 n. 5; Doty, 626 F. Supp. at 361; Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178, 1190 (N.D.Ill. 1985). Furthermore, in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, a case involving the fatal shooting of a young man by a police officer, the Seventh Circuit expressly held that an intentional or reckless deprivation of life by the state violates a substantive constitutional right. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1238 n. 39. ( Bell's holding was apparently based on the substantive rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.