June 11, 1997). Minn. Stat. § 176.061 does "not give the employer/insurer an independent right of indemnity against a tortfeasor for benefits mistakenly paid by the employer for a non-work-related injury." Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1994). Accordingly, American has no statutory right of indemnification against Crum Forster and BCBS.
A unilateral misunderstanding is insufficient to justify reopening a judgment; instead, Christine must show that there was mutual mistake when entering into the judgment and decree. See Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1994) (applying Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02); see also Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522 n.3 (noting that section 518.145 mimics rule 60.02). Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that Christine's misinterpretation does not justify reopening the judgment.
Id., subd. 2(1). Martinez argues that Travelers did not assert its intervention interest, and that it is precluded from doing so because the injury is not work related and cannot be subrogated under Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1994). The district court concluded that it was not proper to determine whether D'Antonio's injury was "work related" in a collateral offset motion because Martinez was raising the issue for the first time in its posttrial motion.
The district court also had a sufficient basis to hold that Reynolds failed to establish that granting his motion to vacate will not substantially prejudice BDF or Lake Ann. Vacating a judgment will cause substantial prejudice when another party stands to lose a benefit it secured under the judgment. Kubiszewski v. St. John, 498 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Minn. App. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 518 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1994). Reynolds insists that vacating the order will not automatically undo the sale of VRCC's share of Hidden Oaks because the order approved, but did not mandate, the sale.
But husband's claimed misunderstanding does not justify reopening the judgment. See Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1994) (in interpreting mistake provision in Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, supreme court held that unilateral mistake does not justify reopening judgment); see also Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 n. 3 (Minn. 1997) (noting that language of Minn. Stat. § 518.145 closely parallels that of rule 60.02). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen the judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522 n. 3. Interpreting the mistake provision in rule 60.02, the supreme court held that unilateral mistake does not justify reopening a judgment under rule 60.02. Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1994). Appellant's mistake, if any, is unilateral and does not justify reopening the decree.
The court does not set aside agreements based on unilateral expectations. Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1994). Also, appellant has failed to show that he does in fact have joint custody.
But the case law does not support so broad an interpretation. See, e.g., Kubiszewski v. St. John, 498 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Minn.App. 1993) (affirming denial of motion to vacate even when no indication of plaintiff error), rev'd on other grounds, 518 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1994); Ayers v. Rudolph's Inc., 392 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn.App. 1986) (same); State v. $14,000 Dollars in Various Denominations of United States Currency, 345 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Minn.App. 1984) (same). The cases cited by the firefighters excusing attorney error with blameless clients are distinguishable because the attorneys in those cases provided reasonable explanations for their mistakes.
But vacation is not an appropriate remedy to deal with unanticipated consequences of a settlement or inexcusable mistake. See, e.g., Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1994) (unilateral expectation); Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 246 N.W.2d 565 (1976) (inexcusable mistake); Newman v. Fjelstad, 271 Minn. 514, 519, 137 N.W.2d 181, 184-85 (1965) (unexpected consequences). In addition to relief that may be sought on a void or satisfied judgment, the statute lists three causes for relief that may be asserted with a reasonable time, not more than one year after entry of the judgment:
Interpreting the mistake provision in rule 60.02, the supreme court held that unilateral mistake does not justify reopening a judgment under rule 60.02. Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1994). Henry's mistake, if any, is unilateral. His mistake alone does not justify reopening the decree.