Opinion
Civil Action Number 98C-04-003-JOH.
Submitted. April 13, 2000.
Decided: June 30, 2000.
Upon Motion of Defendant for Summaty Judgment- DENIED
Robert Jacobs, Esq., of Jacobs Crumplar, P.A., attorney for plaintiffs.
Susan A. List, Esq., and Richard W. Pell, Esq., of Tybout, Redfearn Pell, attorney for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff James L. Kubasko, Sr., a Delaware resident, was injured while performing work for Pfizer, Inc., at a facility in Connecticut. Pfizer argues that his suit here should be dismissed as, under Connecticut law, it would be barred under that state's worker's compensation law. Kubasko argues Delaware law applies and would allow such a suit. He also argues that even if Connecticut law applies, his action would not be barred.
Plaintiff Joann Kubasko seeks damages for loss of consortium. Since the factual and legal issues primarily concern her husband, all references are to him.
After engaging in a choice of law analysis, this Court concludes that Delaware law applies. This results in the plaintiffs being able to maintain their action here. Accordingly, Pfizer's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pfizer's current summary judgment motion is its second. The Court held oral argument after the first but believed the record on the choice of law issues needed to be better developed. After some additional discovery, supplemental briefing was requested and allowed.
Kubasko had been self-employed for several years prior to the accident in this case, using the name Instra Tec. It is unclear whether this is a corporation or just a doing-business-as name. Instra Tec had "Agreements for Services" with a Delaware corporation known as Laboratory Management Services, Inc. [LMS]. The service Instra Tech was to supply to LMS was "the full benefit of Instra Tec's knowledge, experience and skill with respect to instrument calibration and maintenance on projects which [LMS] will stipulate." Their contract also provided that Instra Tec was to operate as an independent agent and not LMS's employee.
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B2 at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 7.
In October 1997, LMS and Pfizer entered into an agreement whereby LMS was to collect and enter some Pfizer equipment inventory into MCS. The work was to be at various Pfizer laboratories in Connecticut for an estimated cost of $49,500. The Pfizer/LMS contract did not specify which state's law was to apply. LMS, in turn, got Kubasko to do this work. Shortly after starting the work, he was riding in a van being driven by a Pfizer employee on the lab site. The van was in an accident and Kubasko was injured. He received some minimal emergency treatment at the plant health office. Neither Pfizer nor LMS provided worker's compensation payments to Kubasko. Nor did he file a worker's compensation claim in Connecticut against Pfizer. He has filed instead, this action seeking to hold Pfizer liable for the negligence of its employee who was driving the van.
The contract is brief and does not further identify "MCS."
APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court may grant summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There are no disputed factual issues relating to Pfizer's motion. The issues are only legal.
Schueler v. Martin, Del.Super., 674 A.2d 882, 885 (1996).
DISCUSSION
Pfizer's legal argument is twofold. First, choice of law analysis means that Connecticut law applies. Second, since that law applies, Pfizer would be considered a statutory employer and Kubasko a statutory employee. Connecticut law, Pfizer says, would bar this third-party action as Kubasko's exclusive remedy is to seek worker's compensation.
Kubasko, on the other hand, contends that the choice of law analysis results in Delaware law being applicable. Under that law, he would not be considered as an employee of Pfizer's and would be entitled to maintain this action. Even if Connecticut law applied, Kubasko argues that he would not be considered a statutory employee and would be allowed to pursue his cause of action.
The path to deciding the choice of law is known and clear. Delaware no longer uses the lex loci path to the resolution of choice of law. Instead, it utilizes the most signification relationship test. Section 145 of the Restatement states:
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, Del.Supr., 594 A.2d 38 (1991).
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, § 145.
Section 6 of the Restatement, in turn, provides:
(2) When there is no such [statutory] directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. at § 6.
The tests are qualitative not quantitative. The Court does not simply add up the interests on both sides and apply the law of the jurisdiction with the highest number of contacts. In personal injury actions such as this, the Restatement says the court should apply the law of the state where the injury occurred unless some other state has a significant relationship under § 6 principles. Even though that presumption exists, this Court is compelled to utilize § 145 and § 6 principles in determining the choice of law.
Lake, 594 A.2d at 48 n. 6.
McBride v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., Del.Supr., No. 234, 1992, Moore, J. (April 27, 1993) (ORDER).
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 146.
Turner v. Lipschultz, Del.Supr., 619 A.2d 912, 914-15 (1992).
Section 145(2) itemizes the contacts the Court is to use in applying § 6 principles. Examination of those items shows that the injury occurred in Connecticut and that the conduct allegedly causing Kubasko's injuries occurred in Connecticut. The next item is a mixed bag. Kubasko is a Delaware resident. LMS is a Delaware corporation with its place of business in Delaware. The record suggests, but is not clear, that LMS assigned work to Kubasko (Instra Tec) at various locations, but where is not in the record. His 1996 federal tax return shows money earned through his business and payment of a self-employment tax. The source of this income is not in the record. While Pfizer is a Delaware corporation, it maintains no facilities here.
The relationship between Kubasko and LMS would appear to be centered in Delaware. He lives here and LMS's offices are here. The Court notes, however, that even though the contract between them classifies him an independent contractor, the Court is not bound by that designation.
See Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., Del.Super., 332 A.2d 160, 163 (1975); McNatt v. Hopkins, Del.Super., C.A. No. 95C-10-041, Terry, J. (July 29, 1997).
The record shows that the only contact between LMS and Pfizer is the contract which brought Kubasko to Pfizer's laboratories in Connecticut. There is no indication that any other prior business relationship existed between these two or between Kubasko and Pfizer. While the Kubasko-LMS relationship appears to have been centered in Delaware, it cannot be said the LMS-Pfizer relationship was "centered" anywhere.
With this contract analysis in hand, the next step is to turn to the § 6 analysis.
The Needs of Interstate System
There is a need to provide parties with certainty and uniformity. Achievement of those lofty goals when seeking to reconcile different state laws, which at times conflict, is often an illusion. Delaware, as noted, would allow Kubasko's action; Connecticut may not. No matter what law is chosen here, a potential conflict exists. This § 6 factor, therefore, does not advance the analysis.
Relevant Policies of the Forum
As noted, if Kubasko is treated under Connecticut law as a statutory employee, his exclusive remedy was or is worker's compensation. Under Delaware law, however, he would be entitled to bring this action.
Since this cause of action, whatever his remedy, arose in October 1997, the Court is unable to say he could still pursue such a claim there.
There is a wrinkle here, however. Kubasko argues that Connecticut law would treat him as an independent contractor and not as statutory employee. He seems, on the other hand, to argue that under Delaware law, he would be treated as an employee and, therefore, would be able to bring this third-party action. He so argues by saying an action against an entity that is not one's immediate employer is allowed in this state.
That statement is correct for persons who are employees suing third-party non — employers. An independent contractor, however, is not considered an employee. As an independent contractor, Kubasko would still be entitled under Delaware law to sue Pfizer. The parties disagree whether applying Connecticut law means he is an employee or an independent contractor. The Court deems it unnecessary to resolve that issue of Connecticut law.
Weiss v. Security Storage Co., Del.Super., 272 A.2d 111 (1970), aff'd. Del.Supr., 280 A.2d 534 (1971).
The Court is cognizant that the policy of Connecticut is to broaden the sweep of the exclusivity provision of its worker's compensation law by potentially classifying persons in Kubasko's position as statutory employees. This broad sweep, however, seems to be ameliorated when dealing with worker's compensation cases of workers from other states injured on jobs in Connecticut. In Pimental v. Cherne Indus., Inc., the injured employee, who was from Massachusetts, was employed by a Massachusetts company. The employee brought a third-party action and the employer's carrier a subrogation action against the Connecticut town where the Massachusetts employee was hurt and the town's employee who allegedly negligently caused injury. The trial court, applying Connecticut law, dismissed the suit.
Conn. App.Ct., 698 A.2d 361 (1997).
On appeal, the trial court was reversed. The appellate court found that Massachusetts would allow the third-party and subrogation actions. Citing to a prior Connecticut Supreme Court decision, § 181 of Restatement (Second) of Conflict, and writings of Professor Larson, the court said Connecticut should honor Massachusetts' law and permit the action. The primary basis for this result is that the employment relationship was between a Massachusetts employer and Massachusetts employee. That fact gives that state the most significant relationship.
Simaitis v. Flood, Conn. Sup.r., 437 A.2d 828 (1980). Some question may exist about the full efficacy of Simaitis in light of Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., Conn. Sup.r., 588 A.2d 194 (1991). In that case, a New Jersey resident and employee of a New Jersey corporation was injured while driving in Connecticut. He received worker's compensation in New Jersey. He sought it also in Connecticut where the potential benefits were greater. The Cleveland court criticized the place of employee-employer relationship test in Simaitis, Id. at 201, but did not explicitly overrule Simaitis. Pimental and this case, however, concern the right to bring a third-party action and Cleveland does not control this decision as the Pimental court said it did not in that case. One could argue a certain implicit consistency, however. The benefits allowed in Pimental and Cleveland were better and the results achieved that end.
9 A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law (2000) § 143.04(1) at 143-23.
Pimental, 698 A.2d at 363.
Id.
If it were undisputed that Kubasko were an employee of LMS, the Pimental case makes it clear that Connecticut would honor Delaware law allowing this suit. But he might be an independent contractor. That distinction, in this Court's view, does not change the result. Connecticut, in all likelihood, would honor Delaware law enabling Kubasko to bring this action. That being the case, the relevant policies of Connecticut and Delaware coincide.
Other § 6 Factors
The relevant policies of other interested states is not a factor to be weighted in this case. Justified expectations, the next factor, are protected. Kubasko's expectation to be able to sue is upheld. Pfizer's expectations, under Connecticut law, are maintained. The basic policies of both states, the next factor, are also upheld because Connecticut would recognize Delaware's law allowing this action. As the courts in Connecticut have said, recognition of another state's law in the area of worker's compensation is sustaining basic policies in this particular area of law. Choosing Delaware law in these circumstances provides certainty, predictability and uniformity of result. Employing Delaware law is particularly easier than Connecticut's law.
The Court notes that the only choice of law issue is whether, under the two states' laws, Kubasko could or could not maintain this third-party action.
The § 6 analysis, therefore, results in the application of Delaware law to the issue of Kubasko's entitlement to this cause of action. Since Delaware law would permit it, Pfizer's motion must be denied. Reaching that result means that it is unnecessary to utilize Connecticut law to determine if he were an independent contractor or a statutory employee.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant Pfizer, Inc. for summary judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.