Opinion
06-28-2017
Emmanuel KU, respondent, v. HUEY MIN LEE, appellant.
Giacchino J. Russo, Elmsford, NY, for appellant. Cheng & Associates, PLLC, Long Island City, NY (Pui Chi Cheng of counsel; Kramer Kozek, LLP [Michelle H. Lewis of counsel], former counsel on the brief), for respondent.
Giacchino J. Russo, Elmsford, NY, for appellant.
Cheng & Associates, PLLC, Long Island City, NY (Pui Chi Cheng of counsel; Kramer Kozek, LLP [Michelle H. Lewis of counsel], former counsel on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Paul I. Marx, J.), dated January 9, 2015. The order denied the defendant's motion to invalidate the parties' prenuptial agreement.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In this matrimonial action, the defendant moved to invalidate a prenuptial agreement executed by the parties 10 days before their wedding in 1998, on grounds of overreaching and duress. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion, without a hearing. We affirm.
"An agreement between spouses or prospective spouses which is fair on its face will be enforced according to its terms unless there is proof of fraud, duress, overreaching, or unconscionability" (Hof v. Hof, 131 A.D.3d 579, 579–580, 16 N.Y.S.3d 569 ; see Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 365 N.E.2d 849 ; Cioffi–Petrakis v. Petrakis, 103 A.D.3d 766, 767, 960 N.Y.S.2d 152 ). "An unconscionable bargain is one which no person in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any person of common sense" (Morad v. Morad, 27 A.D.3d 626, 627, 812 N.Y.S.2d 126 ). An agreement, however, is not unconscionable "merely because, in retrospect, some of its provisions were improvident or one-sided" (O'Lear v. O'Lear, 235 A.D.2d 466, 466, 652 N.Y.S.2d 1008 ). "The burden of proof is on the party seeking to invalidate the agreement" (Weinstein v. Weinstein, 36 A.D.3d 797, 798, 830 N.Y.S.2d 179 ; see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 123 A.D.3d 581, 582, 999 N.Y.S.2d 386 ; Matter of Fizzinoglia, 118 A.D.3d 994, 996, 988 N.Y.S.2d 648, affd. 26 N.Y.3d 1031, 22 N.Y.S.3d 151, 43 N.E.3d 361 ).
Here, in support of her motion, the defendant failed to meet her burden of presenting evidence to establish a basis upon which the prenuptial agreement may be set aside (see Cohen v. Cohen, 93 A.D.3d 506, 506, 940 N.Y.S.2d 250 ; Weinstein v. Weinstein, 36 A.D.3d at 798–799, 830 N.Y.S.2d 179 ; see also Hof v. Hof, 131 A.D.3d 579, 16 N.Y.S.3d 569 ; Mesiti v. Mongiello, 84 A.D.3d 1547, 1549–1550, 924 N.Y.S.2d 175 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, without a hearing, the defendant's motion to invalidate the prenuptial agreement.
CHAMBERS, J.P., MILLER, MALTESE and DUFFY, JJ., concur.