Opinion
24A-JV-930
10-09-2024
K.S., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Lisa M. Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Judge The Honorable Pauline A. Beeson, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D15-2401-JD-177
Attorney for Appellant
Lisa M. Johnson
Brownsburg, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[¶1] K.S. appeals the trial court's finding that she committed what would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an adult. K.S. raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On December 19, 2023, Sebastian Seedorf was working in the Warren Township schools in Indianapolis as a school resource officer, which is a "school-based police officer." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 23. At some point during that school day, he received a call over the radio regarding a disturbance. Officer Seedorf went to the identified classroom and, through a window, observed K.S. "lifting what appeared to be a desk over her head." Id. at 25. Officer Seedorf believed that K.S. was attempting to "intimidate" another school resource officer who was in the room with her. Id.
[¶3] Officer Seedorf entered the room and further observed two other administrators in two different corners of the room "trying to talk to and calm down" K.S. Id. at 29. However, K.S. was "not compliant." Id. Although K.S. did drop the desk, she was "still yelling" and began to run "from one side of the room to the other." Id. Officer Seedorf then "attempted to restrain" K.S. and grabbed her by the arm. Id. at 25. K.S. responded by attempting to bite and kick Officer Seedorf. She also grabbed his taser, which he was able to knock out of her hand. Officer Seedorf eventually secured K.S., and she was then escorted off the premises.
[¶4] The State alleged K.S. to be a delinquent for acts that would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct if committed by an adult. After a fact-finding hearing, the court concluded that the State had met its burden on both allegations. The court then adjudicated K.S. to be a delinquent for an act that would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an adult.
[¶5] This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] On appeal, K.S. contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that she committed an act that would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an adult. When reviewing sufficiency claims in the special context of a juvenile adjudication, such as here, "we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility" but appraise "only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences supporting it." A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (citations omitted). We will affirm a juvenile adjudication "if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the [juvenile] was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted).
[¶7] To prove K.S.'s alleged act, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer while the officer was "lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties." Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2023). Here, K.S. argues only that the State failed to prove that Officer Seedorf was "lawfully engaged" in the execution of his duties at the time of her forcible resistance. Appellant's Br. at 8-9. In particular, she asserts that Officer Seedorf did not have probable cause to seize her person at the first moment he did so.
[¶8] As the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear, "[t]he standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (cleaned up). Further, "when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence," an arrest without a court-issued warrant "is constitutionally reasonable." Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008).
[¶9] We agree with the trial court that Officer Seedorf had probable cause to believe that K.S. was committing an offense at the time he first seized her. Officer Seedorf observed K.S. holding a desk over her head inside of a classroom while confronting another school resource officer. There were two other administrators in the room, each in his or her own corner and each attempting to calm K.S. down. Although K.S. put the desk down, she continued to be noncompliant with the administrators and officers and continued to yell and run around the room.
[¶10] The totality of the facts and circumstances before Officer Seedorf gave him probable cause to believe, at a minimum, that K.S. was engaged in Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct if committed by an adult. At the time of K.S.'s actions, Indiana Code section 35-45-1-3 (2023) provided as follows:
(a) A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally:
(1) engages in fighting or in tumultuous conduct;
(2) makes unreasonable noise and continues to do so after being asked to stop; or
(3) disrupts a lawful assembly of persons;
commits disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor.
A reasonable officer in Officer Seedorf's circumstances would have readily viewed the facts and circumstances in his presence to be within that definition.
[¶11] Accordingly, Officer Seedorf had probable cause to seize K.S. when he did so. Her ensuing forcible resistance was therefore against an officer who was lawfully engaged in the exercise of his duties. And K.S.'s arguments to the contrary on appeal simply seek to have our Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
[¶12] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's finding that K.S. committed what would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an adult.
[¶13] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.