Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-1887-D
October 8, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Following the court's decision in Krusos v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2003 WL 21383656 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2003) (Fitzwater, J.) ("Krusos F), the court must decide whether plaintiff is asserting claims in this action besides her dismissed claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461, for unpaid benefits. In Krusos I the court dismissed the claim of plaintiff Sandra M. Krusos ("Krusos") for unpaid benefits but provided her an opportunity to demonstrate that she is bringing viable separate claims for breach of fiduciary duty or interference with protected rights. See id. at * 10. Because the court holds that she is not, it grants summary judgment and dismisses this action with prejudice.
I
The background facts are set out in Krusos I and need not be repeated at length. See id. at *1-*2. Krusos asserted three counts in her original complaint ("complaint"). The complaint and subsequent briefing did not clearly articulate, however, the type of relief or the statutory source of the relief sought for each claim. The court held that Krusos could not recover under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) for unpaid benefits that she maintained the Atlantic Richfield Retirement Plan II (the "Plan") owed her. Id. at *2-*8. The court then turned to her claims for breach of fiduciary duty and interference with protected rights, observing as follows:
It appears from reading Krusos' complaint that the only remedy she seeks is recovery of unpaid benefits and attorney's fees and costs that would be available under § 1132(a)(1). The complaint does contain in the prayer for relief a request for unspecified "further relief, both general and special, at law or in equity, to which Mrs. Krusos may be justly entitled." Compl. at 7 (prayer ¶ H). This language does not of itself suggest that Krusos is requesting separate equitable relief apart from Plan benefits. And the balance of the complaint contains no clear indication that Krusos is suing defendants for equitable relief to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty or interference with protected rights. Her causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and interference with protected rights are therefore subject to dismissal because they are precluded as duplicate claims for benefits.Id. at *10. The court determined that,
[a]lthough it appear[ed] doubtful that Krusos is seeking relief under these claims that is broader than her cause of action for benefits under § 1132(a)(1), . . . to avoid overlooking a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or interference with protected rights that remains in this case, . . . the court [would] give Krusos the opportunity to demonstrate that she has alleged a viable breach of fiduciary duty and/or interference with protected rights claim for equitable relief.Id. It directed that she
submit a brief that substantiates her contention that she is seeking equitable relief under a breach of fiduciary duty claim or interference with protected rights claim that is broader than her claim for Plan benefits, or she must notify the court by letter that she concedes that she is not seeking such relief.Id. The issue has now been briefed by both sides.
Before the parties completed the briefing of this issue, Krusos moved for leave to amend her complaint. The court denied the motion, concluding, inter alia, that defendants would be prejudiced because "[t]he proposed claims significantly alter the grounds for these claims as they are pleaded in the original complaint." Aug. 19, 2003 Mem. Op. at 7.
II
Krusos contends for several reasons that her claims for breach of fiduciary duty and for interference with protected rights are broader than her now-dismissed action for unpaid ERISA benefits. The court need not address each argument because Krusos has failed to demonstrate that she is seeking any relief other than for unpaid benefits. For example, Krusos asks for $99,956.28 in her motion for summary judgment, see P. Dec. 4, 2002 Br. at 43, the same amount she asserts she was underpaid in benefits, see id. at 37.As more fully explained in Krusos I, the law is settled that "an ERISA plaintiff may bring a private action for breach of fiduciary duty only when no other remedy is available under 29 U.S.C. § 1132." Rhorer v. Raytheon Eng'rs Constructors, Inc., 181 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)). Thus Krusos cannot recover for breach of fiduciary duty or interference with protected rights claim where "[t]he alternative claim is essentially the same as the principal demand in that both seek the recovery of denied benefits." Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 1997 WL 539919, at *8 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 1997), aff'd, 141 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 1998).
Krusos maintains that she has consistently "sought reimbursement of the extra expense to which Plaintiff was put to enforce her rights under the plan as a result of [Atlantic Richfield Company's breach of fiduciary duty by] the shredding [of documents] and by the refusal to accept Mr. Amis's letters as a claim." P. June 27, 2003 Br. at 3-4. Upon examining the record and the briefing, however, it is clear that Krusos originally asked only generally for an award of attorney's fees. There is no indication that she was suing for attorney's fees that resulted from a separate breach of fiduciary duty. Her present contention that she is seeking attorney's fees resulting from the increased costs associated with alleged breaches of fiduciary duty is not supported by the record and is a sub silentio attempt to amend her complaint, which the court has declined in a prior decision to permit her to do. See supra note 1.
In response to the court's request for further briefing in Krusos I, Krusos argues for the first time that she incurred additional attorney's fees because Atlantic Richfield Company breached its fiduciary duty to respond to her initial letters as a claim for benefits. In her motion for summary judgment, however, Krusos only requested "reasonable attorney's fees and all costs of suit[.]" See P. Dec. 4, 2002 Br. at 43.
Because the court concludes that Krusos is not seeking relief in her complaint for breach of fiduciary duty claim or interference with protected rights claim that is broader than her dismissed claim for unpaid Plan benefits, the court dismisses this action in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.