Krupp v. Stubblefield

Full title: LESTER F. KRUPP, JR., Plaintiff, v. EUGENE STUBBLEFIELD, et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

Date published: Dec 21, 2007

No. 4:07CV1862 TIA (E.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2007)

Opinion

No. 4:07CV1862 TIA.

December 21, 2007

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DONALD STOHR, District Judge

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff (registration no. 91020), an inmate at St. Louis City Justice Center, for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee [Doc. #2]. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $36.67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, based upon a review of the complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of plaintiff's account indicates an average monthly deposit of $183.33, and an average monthly balance of $143.84. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $36.67, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

The Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Named as defendants are: Eugene Stubblefield (Superintendent); Jerome Fields (Grievance Officer), Unknown Burt (Corrections Officer); Raymond Brown (Corrections Officer); Unknown Chrams (Deputy Superintendent); and Almeada Ball-Tyler (Supervisor). Plaintiff complains that defendants Stubblefield, Fields and Chrams failed and refused to answer his grievances. Plaintiff claims that defendant Burt placed him in administrative segregation. Plaintiff asserts that defendant Brown failed to provide him with "necessities" during his time in administrative segregation, including such items as soap, toothpaste, sheets for his bunk, and a toothbrush. Plaintiff claims that defendant Brown also refused to allow plaintiff to send and receive mail during his time in administrative segregation, although he does not claim that he was prejudiced by this alleged action. Additionally, plaintiff does not allege that either his health or safety was affected by the purported violations by defendant Brown. Plaintiff fails to allege a denial of any constitutional rights by defendant Ball-Tyler, noting only that when defendant Chrams did not want to respond to his grievances, he sent defendant Ball-Tyler to do so on his behalf.

Discussion

The complaint is silent as to whether defendants are being sued in their official or individual capacities. Where a "complaint is silent about the capacity in which [plaintiff] is suing defendant, [a district court must] interpret the complaint as including only official-capacity claims." Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Naming a government official in his or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the official. To state a claim against a municipality or a government official in his or her official capacity, plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of the municipality is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The instant complaint does not contain any allegations that a policy or custom of a municipality was responsible for the alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights. As a result, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Additionally, the Court notes that even if plaintiff had designated his claims as brought against defendants in their individual capacities, the claims would still be subject to dismissal. Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to the prison grievance process. See Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991); see also, Burnside v. Moser, 138 Fed.Appx. 414 (3rd Cir. 2005). Moreover, plaintiff's failure to allege deliberate indifference to his health or safety is fatal to his conditions of confinement claim. See, e.g., Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that to state a claim for unconstitutional prison conditions, a pretrial detainee must show that (1) the conditions of confinement posed a substantial risk of serious harm and (2) that the prison officials knew of but disregarded, or were deliberately indifferent to, plaintiff's health and safety). And plaintiff has not stated a claim under § 1983 for unconstitutional placement in administrative segregation, because he has not alleged "some difference between his new conditions in segregation and the conditions in the general population which amounts to an atypical and significant hardship." Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to properly name defendant Ball-Tyler [Doc. #6] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $36.67 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint because the complaint is legally frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or both.

An appropriate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.