Krupp Intern. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n

6 Citing cases

  1. Research in Motion Ltd. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n

    2012-1648 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2012)

    When the ITC renders a final determination that a product is not in violation of section 337 because the patent is invalid, the importer or seller of the product has no standing to appeal since any adverse infringement or invalidity finding in the ITC's decision would not alter the scope of the ITC's final determination. See Surface Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 780 F.2d 29, 30-31 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Krupp Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 626 F. 2d 844, 846 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ("[F]indings associated with the ultimate determination that section 337 has not been violated are not final determinations within the meaning of subsection (c) and do not give standing to appeal to a respondent dissatisfied with those findings."). In view of the ITC's finding that they did not violate section 337, RIM is without standing to appeal. Accordingly, RIM's appeal must be dismissed.

  2. Amkor Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n

    692 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 6 times

    Carsem argues that, if this court reverses the Commission's invalidity determination with respect to § 102(g)(2) as we have, this court should nevertheless affirm the Commission's determination on the alternative grounds that the '277 Patent is invalid as anticipated and obvious because: (1) the Commission erred in construing of the term “fully around a circumference of the die pad” to exclude “tie bars” but not “fused leads” from the circumference of the die pad; (2) under the proper claim construction, Japanese Patent Application No. HEI 1[1989]–106456 (“JP–456”) anticipates claims 2–4 and 21–23 of the '277 Patent; and (3) under either claim construction, JP–456 alone, or JP–456 in view of Japanese Patent Application No. SHO 63[1988]–188964 (“JP–964”), Japanese Patent Publication No. 96–4284 (“JP–284”), or both renders claims 2–4 and 21–23 of the '277 Patent invalid as obvious. Carsem's arguments in the alternative should not and need not be asserted as a cross-appeal. Krupp Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 626 F.2d 844, 846 (Fed.Cir.1980) (holding that “the risk of reversal” created by an appeal is not an “adverse effect” sufficient to sustain a cross-appeal). “All questions bearing on the issue of whether there exists a section 337 violation ... [are] before the court.”

  3. Fuji Photo v. Intern

    474 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 26 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Affirming liability of the foreign shareholder as “legally identified with [the respondent] and had the power to affect compliance with the Cease and Desist Order”

    The very cases on which Fuji relies confirm this. See Surface Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 780 F.2d 29, 30 (Fed. Cir.1985) (alleged infringer lacks standing to challenge a Commission finding that certain requirements of Section 1337 were satisfied when the non-infringement finding made the alleged infringer the prevailing party); Krupp Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 626 F.2d 844, 846 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (alleged infringer lacks standing to separately appeal a finding that the patent was valid when the Commission's finding of non-infringement made the alleged infringer the prevailing party); Am. Tel. Tel. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 67 C.C.P.A. 165, 626 F.2d 841, 842 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (same). Fuji did in fact request modification of the cease and desist and general exclusion orders in the Commission enforcement proceeding to require Jazz to obtain Commission approval before importing any LFFPs.

  4. Surface Technology, Inc. v. U.S. Intern

    780 F.2d 29 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    Accordingly, their appeals will be dismissed. ESK and Schlafhorst are entitled to participate in STI's appeal before this court in which they may raise any claim in support of the ITC's determination of no violation. Krupp International, Inc. v. U.S. InternationalTrade Commission, 626 F.2d 844 (CCPA 1980). This court, however, will not review those portions of the presiding officer's determinations on which the Commission has taken no position. Beloit v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

  5. Krupp Intern. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n

    644 F.2d 869 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 2 times

    Similarly, two additional appeals by Krupp (Nos. 80-15 and 80-23) were filed and, on Southwire's motions, dismissed. Appeal No. 80-14 was dismissed on March 26, 1980. American Telephone Telegraph v. USITC, 67 CCPA ___, 626 F.2d 841, 206 USPQ 222. Appeal No. 80-15 was dismissed on March 26, 1980. Krupp International v. USITC, 67 CCPA ___, 626 F.2d 843, 206 USPQ 223. Appeal Nos. 80-23 and 80-26 were dismissed on June 4, 1980. Krupp International v. USITC, 67 CCPA ___, 626 F.2d 844, 206 USPQ 310 (wherein this Court stated that Krupp and Bell could participate as appellees in Southwire's cross-appeal, No. 80-21). To complete the appellate track record, two more appeals in this matter (Nos. 79-25 and 79-31) filed by Southwire have been decided on the merits by this Court, Southwire Co. v. USITC, 67 CCPA ___, 629 F.2d 1332, 207 USPQ 189 (1980); and one Southwire appeal (No. 80-30) was dismissed on Southwire's motion.

  6. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Samsonite Corp.

    727 F. Supp. 202 (D. Md. 1989)   Cited 6 times
    Finding that, although plaintiff had at one time engaged in conduct which brought it into conflict with the defendant, it did not satisfy the second prong of the trademark test because it had stopped selling the product

    Title 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (c) allows any person "adversely affected" by a final determination of the ITC to appeal to the Federal Circuit. Baltimore Luggage, having been found not to have violated § 1337, was not a "person adversely affected" by the ITC's final determination, and thus did not have standing to appeal. See e.g., Surface Technology, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 780 F.2d 29 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Krupp Int'l v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 626 F.2d 844 (Fed. Cir. 1980); American Tel. Tel. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 626 F.2d 841 (Fed. Cir. 1980). Although Baltimore Luggage could not have appealed on its own, it was permitted to intervene in Samsonite's appeal on the grounds that its interests would be adversely affected if the ITC's determination that there was no violation of § 1337 were not affirmed on appeal. Baltimore Luggage could have raised before the Federal Circuit the ITC's determination regarding its affirmative defenses. It chose, however, not to do so.