In addition to his physical problems, he has had a history of emotional problems which result in choking and self-induced vomiting when experiencing stress." Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D.Del. 1980). The chronicle of Paul's educational placements begins in 1973, when he entered the Barber Center Preschool Program in Pennsylvania, where the Kruelle family then resided.
Moreover, the Act explicitly requires that placements be made in the least restrictive environment. See Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687, 695 (3d Cir. 1981); Department of Education v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 525-27 (D.Haw. 1982); Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 174 (D.Del. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976).See also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3049, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)
Other courts have similarly recognized the importance of the mainstreaming requirement. See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1980); Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F.Supp. 169, 174 (D.Del. 1980); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F.Supp. 180, 183-84 (S.D.W. Va. 1976) (decided under Section 504). At the present time Joseph has virtually no contact with nonhandicapped students outside of his lunch period and even then such contacts are few. From the testimony presented, this court finds that Joseph is not placed into contact with nonhandicapped students to the maximum extent consistent with an appropriate education program.
Paul Kruelle's medical expert testified that Paul needed a consistent and structured environment in order to benefit from educational services: the expert testified that Paul might be able to physically tolerate a non-residential placement requiring a transition from home to school, but "he may not learn." Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F.Supp. 169 (D.Del. 1980) (recounting Paul's expert's testimony in greater detail); see also Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 690 (relaying the expert's testimony that Paul needed a consistent environment in order to learn). Thus, with only a change in environment and without more extensive medical interventions such as drugs or psychiatric care, Paul might be enabled to learn.
In other words, children who can be mainstreamed should be mainstreamed, if not for the entire day, then for part of the day; similarly, children should be provided with an education close to their home, and residential placements should be resorted to only if these attempts fail or are plainly untenable. See Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 174 (D.Del. 1980), aff'd, 642 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1981) ("[B]efore placing a handicapped child in twenty-four hour care program, attempts should be made to provide in-home, after school instruction which would allow the child to remain with his or her family."); Hessler v. State Board of Educ., 700 F.2d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 1983) (private educational services resorted to when "public educational services appropriate for the child are not available."). Thus, Millard properly indicated to the Evanses that less restrictive placements would have to be thoroughly considered before the out-of-state placement at Logopedics could be.
They run a broad spectrum. Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169 (D.Del. 1980) (maximization of learning potential); Rowley v. Bd. of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. S.D., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (full potential commensurate with opportunity provided to nonhandicapped children); DeWalt v. Burkholder, 3 E.H.L.R. 551:550 (E.D.Va. 1980) (most appropriate); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.Pa. 1979) (sufficient to make handicapped person independent and self-sufficient). See 45 C.F.R. sections 121a.340-49, 121a.4, 121a.5, 121a.513, 121a.550-551 (1979) for the regulations promulgated under the Act.
Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of a more apt case than Paul's for which the unique needs of a child required residential placement.Id. (quoting Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 173 (D.Del. 1980), aff'd, 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981)). The Kruelle court found support for its reasoning in the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 468 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 3371, 82 L.Ed.2d 664 (1984).
Therefore, ultimate responsibility for compliance with statutory mandates rests on the state education agency. Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 174 (D.Del 1980), affirmed Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1981). Section 1412(6) explicitly provides:
Nevertheless, under the appropriate circumstances, local school districts must provide residential placement to the handicapped child. Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 173 (D.Del. 1980), aff'd sub nom., Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., supra; North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 139-40 (D.D.C. 1979). As stated by the court in Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., supra, at 875:
34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1981).See Sen.Conf.Rep. No. 94-455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News 1480, 1494 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Conf.Rep.]; House Rep. No. 94-332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 21 (1975); Sen. Rep., supra at 32, U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News 1975, 1456; Riley v. Ambach, 508 F. Supp. 1222, 1244-47, rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 635 (2nd Cir. 1981); Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 173 (D.Del. 1980); North v. District of Columbia Board of Education, 471 F. Supp. 136, 139-41 (D.D.C. 1979). The provision of a free appropriate public education must also include provision of "related services."