See, Molden v. Minneapolis, St. P. S. S. M. Ry. Co. 160 Minn. 471, 200 N.W. 740; 13 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 7006. See, Krtinich v. Duluth, M. I. R. Ry. Co. 206 Minn. 106, 287 N.W. 870. See, Miller v. Union Pac. R. Co. 290 U.S. 227, 54 S.Ct. 172, 78 L. ed. 285; 13 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 7005; Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 Minn. L.Rev. 19, 37.
Dunnell's Minn. Digest §§ 8186, 8186a, 8187; Prosser on Torts (2d Ed.), Chapter 8, Sec. 46, pp. 233, 234. Krtinich v. Duluth, M. I.R.R. Co., 206 Minn. 106, 287 N.W. 870; Lundstrom v. Giacomo, 194 Minn. 624, 261 N.W. 465; Chicago, M., St. P. P.R. Co. v. Slowik, 8 Cir., 184 F.2d 920, 923, 924. Contribution is an equitable practice, where the joint or concurrent conduct of the participants leads directly to and causes the injury or death at a time when the parties are not conscious of intentional wrongdoing, but which nonetheless creates the common tort.
See also: Krtinich v. Duluth, Missabe Iron Range Ry. Co., 206 Minn. 106, 287 N.W. 870; Chicago, Rock Island Pacific Railroad Co. v. Emery, 8 Cir., 233 F.2d 848. As said in the Rase case, supra [ 107 Mich. 260, 120 N.W. 362]:
Under such circumstances, the lack of warning signals was not the proximate cause of the accident. Lundstrom v. Giacomo et al., 194 Minn. 624, 261 N.W. 465; Krtinich v. Duluth M. I.R.Ry. Co., 206 Minn. 106, 287 N.W. 870. Defendant's failure to blink the lights did not relieve plaintiff of the duty to use due care. Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. Co. v. McNulty, 8 Cir., 285 F. 97. The engineer of the lead engine had the right to assume the tractor would stop if a collision appeared imminent, and if it did, to remain stopped until the train passed over the crossing. It would be too late to stop a train of such ponderosity as the one that here collided with the tractor following a stop and a movement forward again, as plaintiff did here.
The railroads further argue that if Leighton did in fact first look and see the train when he reached the edge of the Old Style Lager building, he was negligent as a matter of law in accelerating and thus attempting to beat the train to the crossing rather than stopping short of the train. The railroads cite as controlling Krtinich v. Duluth, M. I. R. Ry. Co. 206 Minn. 106, 287 N.W. 870, where this court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant railroad on the ground that since the presence of an approaching train was actually known by the automobile driver sufficiently in advance to have stopped, any negligence of the railroad in not keeping the crossing signal in operating order was not the proximate cause of the injury and that the driver's negligence was the sole cause. The Krtinich case, however, is clearly distinguishable from the instant case by the fact that there the driver had a much greater viewing distance available to him and he had ample time and distance in which to stop after becoming aware of the approaching train.
See, Bryant v. N. P. Ry. Co. 221 Minn. 577, 585, 23 N.W.2d 174, 179, and cases there cited. Asklund v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 214, 223 N.W. 95; Krtinich v. D. M. I. R. Ry. Co. 206 Minn. 106, 287 N.W. 870; Ohrmann v. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co. 223 Minn. 580, 27 N.W.2d 806. Since there is no basis for a finding of negligence, we need not consider the other issues.