The vendors, however, chose instead to execute a contract for deed on September 15, 1967, to other purchasers. Plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that defendants failed to comply with provisions for cancellation of the contract for deed as set forth in Minn. St. 559.21. It is agreed that the vendors perfected notice to Eric R. Ahlstrand, but there is nothing in the record to indicate an effective notice to the other parties. Enga v. Felland, 264 Minn. 67, 117 N.W.2d 787; Krost v. Moyer, 166 Minn. 153, 207 N.W. 311; Hage v. Benner, 111 Minn. 365, 127 N.W. 3. Minn. St. 559.21 provides in part as follows: "When default is made in the conditions of any contract for the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein, whereby the vendor has a right to terminate the same, he may do so by serving upon the purchaser, his personal representatives or assigns, either within or without the state, a notice specifying the conditions in which default has been made, and stating that such contract will terminate 30 days after the service of such notice unless prior thereto the purchaser shall comply with such conditions and pay the costs of service * * *. Such notice must be given notwithstanding any provisions in the contract to the contrary, and shall be served within the state in the same manner as a summons in the district court * * *.
Charles W. German and George L. Walker for appellant. (1) The notice to terminate the lease was not signed by the necessary parties. Howard v. Manning, 79 Okla. 165, 192 P. 358; Baum v. Lincoln Highway B. L. Assn., 108 N.J.L. 534, 158 A. 467; Hurst Automatic Switch Signal Co. v. Trust Co., 216 S.W. 954; Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718; Noble v. Brooks, 224 Mass. 288, 112 N.E. 649; Jones on Mortgages, secs. 978, 979, p. 363, sec. 876; Krost v. Moyer, 207 N.W. 311, 166 Minn. 153; Hawkins v. Klein, 255 P. 570, 124 Okla. 161; 16 R.C.L., sec. 629, p. 1113; Matthews v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 645; Craig v. Ry. Co., 197 S.W. 141, 217 Mo. 516. (2) This suit must fail because of the absence of certain necessary and indispensable parties. Chattanooga Savs. Bank v. Crawford, 206 Ala. 530, 91 So. 316; Lebeck v. Fort Payne Bank, 115 Ala. 447, 22 So. 75; Huddleston v. Fuller, 155 So. 556, 229 Ala. 74; Sampson v. Mitchell, 125 Mo. 217, 28 S.W. 768; Sec. 702, R.S. 1929; United Sheet Tin Plate Co. v. Hess, 159 F. 889; Ballew Lbr. Hardware Co. v. Ry. Co., 288 Mo. 473, 232 S.W. 1015; Mann v. Bailen, 200 N.E. 383; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 U.S. 152, 69 L.Ed. 219; Gaumer v. Snedeker, 330 Ill. 511, 162 N.E. 137; Silverstein v. First Natl. Bank, 231 Ala. 565, 165 So. 827; Alabama Civil Code, 1923, sec. 5707.
But that agreement is not binding upon and in no way impairs or affects the rights of the daughter who refused to become a party to it. Krost v. Moyer, 166 Minn. 153, 207 N.W. 311; 17 Am. Eng. Enc. Law (2 ed.) 672; 38 Cyc. 101. As to her the cottage is a part of the real estate, and she has the right to have it remain as such. This is a right which could not be taken away by an agreement to which she did not consent. Consequently it was beyond the power of the other remaindermen to give defendant the right to remove the cottage after it had become the absolute property of the remaindermen. Defendant's claim to be reimbursed for her expenditures rests wholly upon the written promise, and we are confronted with the question whether there was any consideration for that promise.
The answer is: There was but one agreement, to which plaintiff and defendants were all parties. The purpose of the deed was to secure to plaintiff support from Henry only. If the other children were to benefit therefrom it was incidental to the full and complete performance by Henry of the obligation he assumed as grantee. All the parties to the deed were necessary parties to an action to have it annulled. Disbrow v. Creamery Pkg. Mfg. Co. 104 Minn. 17, 115 N.W. 751; Krost v. Moyer, 166 Minn. 153, 207 N.W. 311. The rights of plaintiff could not be fully restored without annulling the agreement in toto. The deed embodied one agreement between the parties thereto, and when avoided for failure by grantee to perform a condition subsequent it was proper to restore the parties to statu quo, unless intervening equities prevented.
It is well-settled that one co-owner of a property cannot act to bind the other co-owners or to impair or affect their rights. See Krost v. Moyer, 166 Minn. 153, 157, 207 N.W. 311, 312-13 (1926) (one cotenant cannot act to impair or affect rights of other cotenants); 3 Arden H. Rathkopf Daren A. Rathkopf, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning Planning, § 29.02[b][iv][B] (4th ed. Mar. 1996) (well-established that joint tenant has duty to protect common title); Roger A. Cunningham et al., The Law of Property § 5.4, at 208 (1984) (joint tenant who purports to lease entire joint tenancy to third party cannot bind other joint tenants to lease). If consent to a zoning amendment from one co-owner were sufficient to constitute consent from the property for purposes of Minn.Stat. § 462.