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Krohn v. Felix Industries, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Apr 15, 1996
226 A.D.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)

Opinion

April 15, 1996

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Feinberg, J.).


Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that parties to a contract may agree to limit the period in which an action must be commenced to a shorter time than that otherwise provided by the applicable Statute of Limitations. In Wayne Drilling Blasting v. Felix Indus. ( 129 A.D.2d 633, 634), a case involving one of the defendants in this case and an identical 90-day contractual period of limitations, this Court held: "CPLR 201 recognizes the right of parties to a contract to provide, by written agreement, for a shorter time for commencement of an action than that prescribed by statute. 'Absent proof that the contract is one of adhesion or the product of overreaching, or that [the] altered period is unreasonably short, the abbreviated period of limitation will be enforced' ( Timberline Elec. Supply Corp. v Insurance Co., 72 A.D.2d 905, 906, affd 52 N.Y.2d 793; accord, Siegel, N.Y. Prac § 39). Where the party against whom an abbreviated Statute of Limitations is sought to be enforced has demonstrated no duress, fraud or misrepresentation in regard to his agreement to the shortened period, it must be assumed that the term was voluntarily agreed to ( Snyder v. Gallagher Truck Center, 89 A.D.2d 705, 706 * * *)."

In the instant case, the 90-day period of limitations freely agreed to by the parties was not shown to be involuntary or unreasonable under the facts presented ( see, Wayne Drilling Blasting v. Felix Indus., supra, at 634). Furthermore, the plaintiff did not timely commence the first and fourth causes of action in the complaint within the two-year period available to him as a result of a bankruptcy petition ( see, 11 U.S.C. § 108 [a]; Matter of Phillip, 948 F.2d 985). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the first and fourth causes of action.

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review ( see, Sher v. Allied Bayview Corp., 207 A.D.2d 536; Pellic Dev. Corp. v. Whitestone Equities Farmingdale Corp., 199 A.D.2d 483) and, in any event, without merit. O'Brien, J.P., Ritter, Hart and Goldstein, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Krohn v. Felix Industries, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Apr 15, 1996
226 A.D.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
Case details for

Krohn v. Felix Industries, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:PAUL I. KROHN, Appellant, v. FELIX INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Respondents

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Apr 15, 1996

Citations

226 A.D.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
641 N.Y.S.2d 77

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