We begin our analysis by considering the petitioners’ argument that there is an adoptive placement preference for a child’s blood relatives. This Court first rejected that argument in Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 227 W. Va. 184, 706 S.E.2d 381 (2011). In that case, a child had been removed from, her foster parents with whom she had resided for twenty-two consecutive months and placed with her paternal aunt.

We begin our analysis by considering the petitioners' argument that there is an adoptive placement preference for a child's blood relatives. This Court first rejected that argument in Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 227 W.Va. 184, 706 S.E.2d 381 (2011). In that case, a child had been removed from her foster parents with whom she had resided for twenty-two consecutive months and placed with her paternal aunt.

Syl. Pt. 7, In re G.G., 249 W. Va. at 504, 896 S.E.2d at 670 (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Treadway v. McCoy, 189 W. Va. 210, 429 S.E.2d 492 (1993)). See also Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 227 W. Va. 184, 188, 706 S.E.2d 381, 385 (2011). In Kristopher O., this Court considered a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by the long-term foster parents, seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing an order granting legal and physical custody of the child to the paternal aunt.

This argument already has been considered by this Court and was squarely rejected. In Kristopher O. v. Mazzone , 227 W. Va. 184, 706 S.E.2d 381 (2011) (per curiam), this Court considered an argument whereby the DHHR believed it was required to prefer relatives for adoptive placements in order to comply with federal funding guidelines and had adopted a policy to that effect that categorically preferred adoptions by a child’s grandparents or other adult relative "over the non-relative home even if the non-relative home has the appearance of a better placement choice." Id. at 192, 706 S.E.2d at 389.

Specifically, we have held that "[i]t is clear from our jurisprudence that the only statutory preference within our laws regarding the adoption of a child involves grandparents and reunification of siblings . . . . It does not appear, however, that a preference is granted to blood relatives generally." Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 227 W.Va. 184, 193, 706 S.E.2d 381, 390 (2011). As such, the grandparent preference as set forth in West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a)(3) has no applicability to the circuit court's denial of placement in the petitioners' home.

On appeal, petitioners raise a narrow legal issue to support their position, arguing that "[t]his Court should reverse . . . for one key reason" being that the lower court based its decision "on a non-existent, made-up legal standard . . . called 'the foster parent preference' while also purposely ignoring [p]etitioners' fictive kinship designation." Petitioners correctly cite to our prior holdings wherein we have explained that "[i]t is clear from our jurisprudence that the only statutory preference within our laws regarding the adoption of a child involves grandparents and reunification of siblings." Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 227 W.Va. 184, 193, 706 S.E.2d 381, 390 (2011).

In doing so, petitioners argue that "[a] [g]randparent or an adult relative with a positive home study certifying the home for adoption must be given preference over the non-relative home even if the non-relative home has the appearance of a better placement choice." Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 227 W. Va. 184, 192, 706 S.E.2d 381, 389 (2011) (emphasis added). Petitioners argue that, because a positive home study was critical to their preference in placement of A.L., the circuit court denied them due process by considering the allegedly inaccurate home study.

Id . n.12. See also Kristopher O. v. Mazzone , 227 W. Va. 184, 706 S.E.2d 381 (2011) (granting writ of prohibition to non-party foster parents who were excluded from permanency hearing). What Beane properly illustrates is that the right to be heard afforded under West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(h) exists and operates independently of the rights and privileges afforded to intervening parties. Foster parents and others designated in the statute have a right to be heard without the necessity of requesting intervenor status.

By ruling on the visitation issue without affording the petitioners notice and the opportunity to be heard, the circuit court exceeded its authority, entitling the petitioners to the writ of prohibition. The holding in Kristopher O. v. Mazzone , 227 W.Va. 184, 706 S.E.2d 381 (2011), directly supports our ruling today. In Kristopher O. , this Court considered a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by foster parents who had attempted, unsuccessfully, to participate in an abuse and neglect case permanency hearing.

We have previously observed that West Virginia law does not grant a permanency preference to blood relatives, generally. See Kristopher O. v. Mazzone , 227 W. Va. 184, 193, 706 S.E.2d 381, 390 (2011). The grandparent preference is the sole exception to that rule, and, even then, the preference is tempered by consideration of the child's best interests.