Once the defendant establishes that the time between the institution of the suit and the date of actual service is indicative of a lack of diligence in the absence of any patently unusual circumstances, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate, with specificity and in conformity with the rules of evidence, that reasonable diligence was exercised and to offer an explanation to satisfactorily justify any delay in service. Sacco, 136 Ill.2d at 286, 555 N.E.2d at 720; Krevkes Electric, Inc. v. Malk and Harris, 297 In. App.3d 936, 940, 697 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1998); Tischer v. Jordan, 269 Ill. App.3d 301, 307, 645 N.E.2d 991, 995 (1995); Michael, Illinois Practice, Civil procedure, § 8.7 at 92, 95 (1989). Hence, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to explain, by way of affidavit or other competent evidentiary materials, that her delay in service was reasonable and justified under the circumstances.

Generally, a party must interpose a timely objection to his opponent's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in serving a summons and complaint before defending a suit on its merits. Kreykes Electric Inc. v. Malk Harris, 297 Ill. App. 3d 936, 944 (1998). A defendant's participation in the defense of his case may constitute a waiver of a Rule 103(b) objection.

Generally, a party must interpose a timely objection to his opponent's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in serving a summons and complaint before defending a suit on its merits. Kreykes Electric Inc . v. Malk & Harris, 297Ill. App. 3d 936, 944, 232 Ill.Dec. 143, 697 N.E.2d 885 (1998). A defendant's participation in the defense of his case may constitute a waiver of a Rule 103(b) objection.

Fifth, Exxon did not have actual knowledge of the suit, notwithstanding Tidwell's March 2020 demand letter, Doc. 14-1 at pp. 5-14, and May 2020 administrative charge, Doc. 1-1 at pp. 13-17. See Kreykes Elec., Inc. v. Malk & Harris, 697 N.E.2d 885, 889 (Ill. App. 1998) (holding that a pre-suit demand letter did not establish knowledge under the fifth Segal factor). After the IDHR dismissed the charge in February 2021, Exxon was not informed that Tidwell had decided to pursue his state law claims through litigation.

However, the rule "has an essential purpose in promoting the expeditious handling of suits by giving trial courts wide discretion to dismiss when service is not effected with reasonable diligence." Kreykes Elec., Inc. v. Malk and Harris, 697 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1998). Rule 103(b) is not rooted in a subjective test of the plaintiff's intent but rather upon an objective evaluation of reasonable diligence in obtaining service of process. Marks v. Reuben H. Donnelly, 636 N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1994).

     On appeal, Paige-Myatt offers no excuse for the 11-month delay in serving Mount Sinai. Clearly, she failed to exercise reasonable diligence, and the trial court's Rule 103(b) dismissal was correct. See Kreykes Electric, Inc. v. Malks&sHarris, 297 Ill.App.3d 936, 232 Ill.Dec. 143, 697 N.E.2d 885 (1998). The issue before us is whether that dismissal should have been with prejudice.

In determining whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in effectuating service, Illinois courts consider (1) the length of time used to obtain service of process, (2) the activities of the plaintiff during that time period, (3) the plaintiff's knowledge of the defendant's location, (4) the ease with which the defendant's whereabouts could have been ascertained, (5) actual knowledge on the part of the defendant concerning the pendency of the action, (6) any special circumstances affecting the plaintiff's efforts at service, and (7) actual service on the defendant. Kole, 759 N.E.2d at 134 (citing Segal v. Sacco, 555 N.E.2d 719, 720 (Ill. 1990); Kreykes Elec. Inc. v. Malk and Harris, 697 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ill.App.Ct. 1998)). A primary reason for the passage of Rule 103(b) was to prevent the intentional delay of service of summons upon a defendant for an indefinite amount of time in order to circumvent the applicable statute of limitations.

Therefore, the first factor supports a finding that Plaintiffs did not use reasonable diligence in effectuating service. See Smith v. Menold Const., Inc., 348 Ill. App. 3d 1051 (4th Dist. 2004) (five months); Kreykes Electric, Inc. v. Malk and Harris, 297 Ill. App. 3d 936 (1st Dist. 1998) (five months); Tischer v. Jordan, 269 Ill. App. 3d 301 (1st Dist. 1995) (six months); Long v. Elborno, 875 314 Ill. Dec. 840 (1st Dist. 2007) (seven months). 2.

The instant case is distinguished from other Rule 103(b) case law dismissals because Plaintiff's did not fail to attempt to serve defendant, there is an explanation as to why the fact of filing was kept from defendant, and finally, the record is not replete with evidence that plaintiff failed to exercise diligence, other signs of delay, or any evidence of intentional dilatory behavior on the part of plaintiff. See, e.g., Kreykes Elec., Inc. v. Malk Harris, 297 Ill. App.3d 936, 942 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1998) (appellate court affirmed trial court's Rule 103(b) dismissal in which "it was shown that plaintiff intentionally chose not to cause summons to issue, caused its case to be dismissed for want of prosecution, delayed in moving to vacate that dismissal, and again delayed nearly one entire month before causing summons to issue after its case was reinstated."); Paglis v. Black, 178 Ill. App.3d 1062, 1064 (Ill.App. 3d Dist. 1989) (affirming Rule 103(b) dismissal in which "Plaintiff's conceded that they knew where the defendants' offices were located, but offered no explanation for the delay [in service]."). The court thus finds that factors (1), (2) and (6) favor Plaintiff's.

(citing Womick, 137 Ill.2d at 377) ("Prejudice against defendant is also considered, but lack of prejudice will not necessarily defeat a defendant's Rule 103(b) motion."); Kreykes Electric, Inc. v. Malk &Harris, 297 Ill.App.3d 936, 940 (1998) ("[T]he burden rests with the plaintiff to demonstrate reasonable diligence in effectuating service, and the defendant is not required to establish that it was prejudiced by plaintiff's delay."); Billerbeck v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 292 Ill.App.3d 350, 354 (1997) (While "defendant was arguably not prejudiced by the delay[,]" [a]ccording to Womick, the presence of actual knowledge and the absence of prejudice do not require this court to find reasonable diligence."); Viking Dodge, Inc. v. Hoffman, 161 Ill.App.3d 186, 189 (1987) ("To be protected by the prescriptions of [Rule 103(b)], defendant need not show that he was prejudiced by the complained of delay in service of process.").