In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has made clear that it is the employer's burden "to gather additional information and determine if the FMLA is actually implicated." Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 F. App'x 629, 632 (4th Cir. 2008). The undisputed factual record here discloses that plaintiff satisfied this burden by notifying her supervisors that she suffered a hand contusion and would take leave because of that contusion.

It is the employee's burden to give notice to her employer in order to trigger the protections afforded by the FMLA. Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 F. App'x 629, 632 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished per curiam decision). To satisfy this burden, the employee "need only inform her employer that she needs leave from work for a medical reason."

Thus, she has presented no binding precedent, or even Sixth Circuit persuasive authority, showing that communications and documentation remotely similar to what she provided can suffice to give adequate FMLA notice to an employer or adequate verification of a serious health condition. Moreover, the only Circuit-level decision she cites, Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 F. App'x 629 (4th Cir. 2008) (p.c.) (Shedd, Hamilton, D.S.C. D.J. Terry Wootten), has never been cited by any Sixth Circuit court and is readily distinguishable on its facts. Unlike Gutierrez, the plaintiff there provided the employer pre-termination with documentation showing that a physician examined her, diagnosed her with apparent cardiovascular and psychiatric problems, prescribed medications, and placed her on a heart monitor, and then recommended that she not return to work for several days.

Some request for leave for a medical reason is necessary to trigger Shoemaker's notification rights under the FMLA. See Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 F. App'x 629, 632 (4th Cir. 2008); Brenneman v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 421 (6th Cir. 2004). Thus, we affirm the district court's decision to dismiss Shoemaker's interference claim.

That was clearly a “serious health condition” within the meaning of the statute, and Truist does not contend otherwise. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (defining “serious health condition”); see also Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 Fed.Appx. 629, 633-34 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (outlining the statutory and regulatory context). The fact that the plaintiff also had migraines does not change that.

Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 Fed.Appx. 629, 633-34 (4th Cir. 2008).

Once the employee informs the employer that she needs leave for a medical reason, “the burden then shifts to the employer to gather additional information and determine if the FMLA is actually implicated.” Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 Fed.Appx. 629, 632 (4th Cir. 2008). Even so, Plaintiff still needs to demonstrate resulting prejudice in order to survive summary judgment.

"An employee is mandated to provide notice to her employer when she requires FMLA leave." Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 382; see Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 Fed. App'x 629, 632 (4th Cir. 2008) ("The employee has the initial burden of triggering the FMLA by providing notice to her employer....to satisfy this initial burden, the employee need only inform her employer that she needs leave from work for a medical reason."); Sherif, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 477; see 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (notice requirements for foreseeable FMLA leave); id. § 825.303 (notice requirements for unforeseeable FMLA leave). Courts have "held that a plaintiff did not engage in a protected activity because the plaintiff had provided insufficient notice of the need for FMLA-qualifying leave." Sherif, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 481-82 (citing Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819, 828 (7th Cir. 2012); Wilson v. Noble Drilling Servs., Inc., 405 Fed. Appx. 909, 913 (5th Cir. 2010)).

If the employer finds the employee's request for leave vague or insufficient, the employer should ask the employee to provide the necessary details through additional documentation and information." Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 F. App'x 629, 632 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). "The employer has the duty to elicit the details required under the FMLA.

On Monday, August 22, 2016, he met with a representative from Human Resources, and was terminated, effective Friday, August 19, 2016 (Dkt. Nos. 80-1 at 31-33, 80-13 at 3). These facts establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation. First, Cumpston engaged in protected activity when he notified Central Supply of his need for surgery and corresponding medical leave, see Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., 289 F. App'x 629, 632 (4th Cir. 2008); second, he suffered an adverse employment action, see Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 656 (4th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); and third, the temporal proximity between his request for FMLA leave and his termination suggests a causal link between the two, see Waag, 857 F.3d at 192. Although the defendants point to evidence tending to disprove Cumpston's prima facie case (Dkt. No. 81 at 10-13), rebuttal evidence does not preclude Cumpston from establishing a prima facie case at the outset.