Although the term “commence” has received limited explication in the context of § 52–80, our Supreme Court, in construing a different statute applicable to certain civil actions, has offered some guidance as to the term's potential meaning. See Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 448, 311 A.2d 82 (1972). In Krawiec, our Supreme Court was called upon to interpret, inter alia, General Statutes (Rev. to 1971) § 52–193, which permitted an offer of judgment in actions on contract or for money damages to be filed “ ‘before trial.’ ”
Prior to 1978, both 274 of the Practice Book (now Practice Book 342) and General Statutes 52-193 provided that a defendant's offer of judgment was to be made before trial. In Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 448, 311 A.2d 82 (1972), our Supreme Court interpreted before trial, in a jury trial, to mean before the impaneling of the jury, and the court indicated that a jury was impaneled when jury selection began. See also State v. Potter, 18 Conn. 166, 175 (1846) (jury is impaneled when summoned by sheriff and names entered into court record but before being sworn).
Although the defendant contested the probative value of this evidence, we have held that a court may properly take judicial notice of relevant court files involving the same defendant. See McCarthy v. Warden, 213 Conn. 289, 293, 567 A.2d 1187 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939, 110 S.Ct. 3220, 110 L.Ed.2d 667 (1990); Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 202 Conn. 150, 153 n. 2, 520 A.2d 186 (1987); State v. Woolcock, 201 Conn. 605, 616, 518 A.2d 1377 (1986); Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 121-22, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977); Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82 (1972); Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 605, 136 A.2d 497 (1957). The court noted that it had used this file earlier that same day in ordering the rearrest of the defendant because of his failure to appear as originally scheduled.
It is in the court file, however, of which this court may take judicial notice. Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82 (1972).
We may "take judicial notice of all papers forming a part of the file in the case and use them for any proper purpose." Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82 (1972); see State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 554, 200 A.2d 476 (1964); Jackson v. United States, 262 A.2d 106, 108 (D.C.App. 1970) ("[c]lerical entries made in the regular course of court business are presumptively true" — waiver of jury trial); W. Maltbie, Connecticut Appellate Procedure 312, 313. "The notations made by the clerk upon the original papers and in the docket need no particular authentication but, appearing as made by him in the appropriate place, may be presumed to be accurate."
This motion and order are not in the printed record, but they are in the file, of which this court may take judicial notice. Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82 (1972). This court's role in reviewing a contempt order is very limited.
Our own cases have attempted to draw a line between matters susceptible of explanation or contradiction, of which notice should not be taken without giving the affected party an opportunity to be heard; see Nichols v. Nichols, 126 Conn. 614, 622, 13 A.2d 591; McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) 333, pp. 771-72; and matters of established fact, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned, such as court files, which may be judicially noticed without affording a hearing. Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82; Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 605, 136 A.2d 497. Even when a fact, such as whether a certain date fell on a Tuesday, is not open to argument, it may be the better practice to give the parties an opportunity to be heard.
For the purpose of our consideration of this offense, we take judicial notice of the file in the trial court. See Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82 (1972). Upon examination of the promise to appear included therein, we note that on October 31, 1990, the defendant, under oath, signed a promise to appear in the Meriden Superior Court.
An appeal from that decision would lie in the trial court. See Practice Book 412; Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 447-48, 311 A.2d 82 (1972); Hall v. Hall, 36 Conn. Sup. 15, 16, 409 A.2d 1250 (1979). Should the clerk refuse to tax any costs pursuant to General Statutes 52-81, "the remedy is a petition to the court to order the clerk to perform an act as required by law.
There is authority for the proposition that where a postjudgment motion and order are not in the printed record but are in the file, the court may take judicial notice of the contents of the file. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 191 Conn. 81, 84 n. 2, 463 A.2d 587 (1983); Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82 (1972). Practice Book 3062 provides: "Should the trial court, subsequent to the filing of the appeal, make a ruling which the appellant desires to have reviewed by the supreme court, the appellant shall amend his appeal, filing notice thereof with the chief clerk of the supreme court within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the ruling.