Krautsack v. Anderson

11 Citing cases

  1. Krautsack v. Anderson

    223 Ill. 2d 541 (Ill. 2006)   Cited 178 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that plaintiff did not act in bad faith because, even though the trial court concluded that the evidence at trial did not support his theory, the plaintiff based his argument on certain deposition testimony

    The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment. Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 666 (2002) ( Krautsack I). As to the consumer fraud count, the appellate court noted that "[w]hile the failure to disclose or concealment of material information by a travel agent, based on the agent's fiduciary duty to his clients, is a novel and uncommon theory, it is not, however, unheard of." Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 677.

  2. Rush Beverage Company v. South Beach Beverage Company

    Case No. 01 C 5684 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2002)   Cited 2 times
    Consulting dictionary to determine the plain and obvious meaning of contractual language

    The parol evidence rule "`precludes evidence of understandings, not reflected in a writing, reached before or at the time of its execution which would vary or modify'" the contract's terms. Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App.3d 666, 680 (2002) (quoting Eichengreen v. Rollins, 325 Ill. App.3d 517, 521-22 (2001)). Parol or extrinsic evidence may not be considered unless the writing is incomplete or ambiguous. Krautsack, 329 Ill. App.3d at 680.

  3. Davis v. G.N. Mortg. Corp.

    396 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2005)   Cited 284 times
    Holding the plaintiffs failed to set forth any specific evidence that might have been obtained from further discovery, which would create a genuine issue as to a material fact

    Sunstream, 734 F.2d at 1266 (quoting Storybook Homes, Inc. v. Carlson, 19 Ill.App.3d 579, 312 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1974)) (internal quotations omitted); see Pappas v. Waldron, 323 Ill.App.3d 330, 256 Ill.Dec. 439, 751 N.E.2d 1276, 1282 (2001) (citing Air Safety, 236 Ill.Dec. 8, 706 N.E.2d at 884). Accordingly, our task is to determine whether the loan agreement is fully integrated, clear and unambiguous, Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill.App.3d 666, 263 Ill.Dec. 373, 768 N.E.2d 133, 146 (2002). The threshold question for us to examine is whether the contract in question, here the mortgage loan note, is a fully integrated document, despite the lack of a specific integration clause.

  4. R.J. O'Brien Associates, Inc. v. Vierstra

    No. 01 C 5991 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2003)   Cited 1 times

    But if a contract is incomplete or ambiguous, i.e., is not "clearly, on its face complete," the parol evidence rule does not bar a plaintiff from offering extrinsic evidence of additional, consistent terms. Krautsack v. Anderson, 768 N.E.2d 133, 146 (Ill.App.Ct. 2002); Eichengreen, 757 N.E.2d at 956. Courts determine from the four corners of the document whether a writing is fully integrated. Krautsack, 768 N.E.2d at 146.

  5. Thomson Learning v. Olympia Properties

    365 Ill. App. 3d 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 33 times

    And the Cancellation Option stated that time was of the essence. Tenant acknowledges that there is a dispute as to whether Tenant gave written notice by September 1. Tenant also acknowledges that, for purposes of summary judgment, we must assume that Tenant failed to give written notice by September 1. See Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 666, 674 (2002) ("In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the *** court should not resolve disputed factual matters"). Nevertheless, Tenant argues that, because it paid the cancellation fee by September 1, and because Landlord actually knew by that date that Tenant intended to exercise the Cancellation Option, Tenant effectively exercised that option. •2 The problem with this argument is that it assumes that something less than strict compliance with the terms of an option to cancel or extend a commercial lease is sufficient to exercise that option. It is not. On the contrary, for more than 100 years, Illinois courts have held that a lessee seeking to exercise an option to cancel or extend a commercial lease must strictly comply with the terms of that option.

  6. In re Kmart Corporation v. Capital One Bank

    No. 03 C 8625, Bankruptcy No. 02 B02474 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2005)

    Specifically, the parol evidence rule precludes the admission of unwritten understandings, reached before the execution of the contract, that would alter or modify its terms. Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 666, 680, 768 N.E.2d 133, 146 (1st Dist. 2002); Sunstream Jet Exp., Inc. v. International Air Service Co., Ltd., 734 F.2d 1258, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984). The lone exception to this prohibition of extrinsic evidence allows the admission of such evidence to show additional consistent terms of the contract if the writing is "incomplete or ambiguous," that is, not a total integration of the parties' agreements.

  7. HA 2003, Inc. v. Federal Insurance (In re HA 2003, Inc.)

    310 B.R. 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004)   Cited 5 times

    In that letter, without any specific analysis of the policy language, counsel advised that the policy might protect directors on claims brought in a bankruptcy proceeding as long as they were not brought by the debtor-in-possession or with the assistance of the directors or officers. This letter, however, is irrelevant to our inquiry. Extrinsic evidence is inadmissable unless the contract is ambiguous, and even then, the extrinsic evidence must reflect the parties' intent before or at the time of execution of the contract.E.g., Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App.3d 666, 680, 768 N.E.2d 133, 146 (2002). The letter in question was written both after the negotiation of the contract and by someone who was not involved in drafting it. The letter thus does not shed any light on the intent of the drafters when the contract was executed.

  8. In re Nordstrom

    No. 02-82350, Adv. No. 02-8167 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2004)   Cited 1 times

    DEBTOR'S response to Interrogatory No. 12. NATIONAL TOUR alternatively suggests that a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties based on common law, citing Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App.3d 666, 768 N.E.2d 133, 145 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2002), where the court noted that a travel agent has a duty to disclose all information learned by the agent which is material to the travel arrangements. Viewing travel agents as "information specialists," courts are increasingly willing to characterize those duties of the travel agent as fiduciary in nature.

  9. Boeckenhauer v. Joe Rizza Lincoln Mercury

    866 N.E.2d 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)

    Relying on the Third District opinion in Casey, the First District also found that bad faith was required. Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 666, 684 (2002) ( Krautsack I), rev'd on other grounds, 223 Ill. 2d at 563-66. The Illinois Supreme Court has since clarified that bad faith is a prerequisite.

  10. Emerson Electric v. Aetna Casualty

    352 Ill. App. 3d 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 18 times
    Explaining that, with respect to "first-party" insurance, the insurer is to pay money due under the policy upon the happening of physical harm or property damage to the insured, whereas "third-party" insurance insures against the possibility of legal liability due to damages sustained by a third party

    We agree with plaintiffs that summary judgment on these facts is premature with respect to the Dixiana, South Carolina, site. See Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 666, 676-77, 768 N.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (reversing summary judgment where the trial court's conclusion ignored the totality of evidence and merely focused upon a single statement taken out of context, which amounted to impermissible weighing of evidence or judgment of credibility). There is a genuine question of fact as to whether plaintiffs actually began defending against potential liability with respect to the Dixiana site prior to November of 1983. Furthermore, reasonable minds could disagree as to whether plaintiffs had knowledge prior to the inception of the policy of a substantial probability that claims would be made against them in connection with the Dixiana site, given that in 1978 a state court ordered operations at the Dixiana site to cease, by 1980 water contamination was confirmed, and the ongoing pollution problems in connection with the site were covered in local newspaper articles during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Republic next argues that there are alternative grounds not reached by the trial court