Charge Conf. Tr. 1437:12โ1439:15 (stipulating that Mr. and Mrs. Munns' claim is a dependent claim, akin to reimbursing an insurance provider's costs). Hotchkiss relies on Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 160 A.2d 753 (1960), for its position. In Krause, a parent brought two claims against the defendant: one for her minor child's injuries, allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence, and a second claim to cover the parent's costs related to treating the child's injuries.
(Emphasis in original.) Kalams v. Giacchetto, supra, 268 Conn. 264 n. 14; see also Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 336, 160 A.2d 753 (1960) (reversing judgment of trial court and ordering new trial, without conducting harmless error review, when trial court improperly had denied plaintiffs' peremptory challenges to which they were entitled by law); Glass v. Peter Mitchell Construction Leasing Development Corp-, 50 Conn. App. 539, 547, 718 A.2d 79 (defendant not required to show prejudice when trial court improperly had found unity of interest among several defendants and granted only one set of peremptory challenges), cert. granted, 247Conn. 938, 723 A.2d 317 (1998) (appeal withdrawn July 6, 1999).
At common law, "when a minor child is injured by a negligent act of a third party, two causes of action immediately spring into existence; first, the right of action by the child itself for the personal injuries inflicted upon it; and second, a right of action to the parent for consequential damages, such as loss of services and expenses, caused by the injury of the child. Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 77, 174 A. 323 (1934); see Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 335 160 A.2d 753 (1960)." Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 308, 512 A.2d 130 (1986).
The only relevant Connecticut cases which discuss the independent rights of parents to recover such expenses involved children who were not minors. See, e.g., Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 160 A.2d 753 (1960); Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. at 77, 174 A. 323. Thus, Ms. Cimino can claim damages for expenses resulting from her injuries โ even if paid by her parents โ but her parents have not been shown to have an independent cause of action for those expenses.
We agree with the ruling of the trial court, therefore, in permitting recovery by the plaintiff Luigina of the medical expenses for treatment of her son against the defendant husband, who was also jointly liable for them. "When a minor child is injured by the negligent act of a third party, two causes of action immediately spring into existence; first, the right of action by the child itself for the personal injuries inflicted upon it; and second, a right of action to the parent for consequential damages, such as a loss of services and expenses, caused by the injury to the child." Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 77, 174 A. 323 (1934); see Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 335, 160 A.2d 753 (1960). Although General Statutes 52-204 authorizes the recovery of medical expenses in an action solely in behalf of the injured child and makes the recovery in such action a bar to any claim by the parent for in such expenses, the statute does not mandate that procedure.
Even assuming arguendo that the specific question and answer later admitted at trial were not the specific subject of a fifth amendment claim by Biller we would reach the same result. It is obvious that, at this stage of the proceeding, there was no fifth amendment claim which Biller could have made that had any prospect of being fully honored. It was perfectly clear from the previous rulings of the court that any such claim would be futile. Under the circumstances, Biller's failure to claim the privilege cannot reasonably be interpreted as a waiver. State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 145, 120 A.2d 152 (1956); see Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 336, 160 A.2d 753 (1960). Because we find that admitting Biller's March 3 statement in his subsequent trial was error, we need not consider the admission of the March 4 statement as it was an inseparable component of the state's exhibit.
This ruling was undoubtedly correct. See Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 336, 160 A.2d 753 (1960). General Statutes 51-241 provides as follows: "On the trial of any civil action to a jury, each party may challenge peremptorily three jurors."
See Walsh v. Stonington Water Pollution Control Authority, 250 Conn. 443, 465, 736 A.2d 811 (1999); Rivera v. Saint Francis Hospital Medical Center, 55 Conn. App. 460, 463, 738 A.2d 1151 (1999). If the plaintiff is correct, a new trial would be necessary; Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 336, 160 A.2d 753 (1960); Rivera v. Saint Francis Hospital Medical Center, supra, 55 Conn. App. 464; and the issues raised in her other claims would not be reached. If a new trial is not necessary because the court's ruling as to the peremptory challenges issue was proper, but is necessary because both the directed verdict and the jury verdict are improper, the issue of peremptory challenges will likely recur, and so we discuss it.
Even before ยง 51-241 was enacted in 1949, and when that statute consisted of only one sentence (until 1993), the number of peremptory challenges given to each party was discussed in terms of whether the parties had separate and distinct causes of action or had a similarity of position. See Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 335-36, 160 A.2d 753 (1960); Reid v. New Haven, 133 Conn. 446, 448-49, 52 A.2d 140 (1947). The amendment did not affect a substantive right, and, therefore, we conclude that the present form of the statute governs this case.
"[W]here there are several plaintiffs or defendants . . . each is entitled to . . . [be treated as a `party' for the purpose of determining the number of] peremptory challenges . . . [to which he or she is entitled]." Mourison v. Hansen, supra; see also Krause v. Almor Homes, Inc., 147 Conn. 333, 160 A.2d 753 (1960); Reid v. New Haven, 133 Conn. 446, 52 A.2d 140 (1947). Under General Statutes 51-241, each plaintiff here is therefore entitled to three peremptory challenges.