Krasaeath v. Parker

25 Citing cases

  1. Gwinnett Place Associates, L.P. v. Pharr Engineering, Inc.

    215 Ga. App. 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 12 times
    In Gwinnett Place Associates, L.P. v. Pharr Engineering, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 53, 53 (1994), § 9-3-51 was applied to preclude an indemnification claim based up deficient construction.

    A statute of ultimate repose limits absolutely the time during which a party may bring an action, regardless of when the cause of action accrues. It is distinguished from a statute of limitation, which is a procedural rule delineating a time period measured from the accrual of the right of action during which a party must bring an action. Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 526-527 ( 441 S.E.2d 868) (1994); see Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 845 ( 426 S.E.2d 870) (1993). It is undisputed that the construction of Gwinnett Place Mall was "substantially completed" no later than February 1984, and that the third-party complaint was filed on September 24, 1993, more than eight years after the date of substantial completion.

  2. Facility Constr. Mgmt. Inc. v. Ahrens Concrete FL

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:08-cv-01600-JOF (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2010)   Cited 2 times
    Noting that while plaintiff's claims "may be couched in terms of indemnification and defense, ... [p]laintiff is attempting to recover for losses caused by deficient construction or injury to property caused by deficient construction," and "cannot be permitted to do indirectly what the law does not permit it to do directly"

    In Krasaeath v. Parker, Parker's son was treated at a hospital and, while there, evaluated by Dr. Martin in the emergency room and his chest x-rays were interpreted as normal by Dr. Krasaeath. 212 Ga. App. 525, 525 (1994). Parker's son passed away two days later, after being discharged, from a pulmonary embolism.

  3. The Virginia Insurance Reciprocal v. Pilzer

    278 Ga. 190 (Ga. 2004)   Cited 9 times
    Holding Georgia's medical malpractice statute of repose does not apply to contribution actions when the contributor's negligence was established in the underlying medical malpractice action

    The rationale of the Court of Appeals in reversing the grant of summary judgment to TVIR was that the contribution action is an action for negligence in which TVIR would have to prove Pilzer was a tortfeasor who was liable to the plaintiff in the underlying suit, and since recovery on the contribution claim would depend on proof of Pilzer's professional negligence, it would be logical and fair to apply the statute of repose for medical malpractice. That reasoning was based primarily on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525 ( 441 SE2d 868) (1994), and in part on its decision in Gwinnett Place Assoc. v. Pharr Engineering, 215 Ga. App. 53 ( 449 SE2d 889) (1994), and this Court's decision in Dept. of Transp. v. Montgomery Tank Lines, 276 Ga. 105 ( 575 SE2d 487) (2003). Those cases differ from the present case in that this action is based on a judgment conclusively establishing joint tort liability whereas the cited cases were based on the alleged but undetermined joint tort liability of the defendants.

  4. Dept. of Transportation v. Montgomery Tank Lines

    276 Ga. 105 (Ga. 2003)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that the phrase of enlargement in the statute providing that "any other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence" showed that a wider sense was intended, and thus, ejusdem generis did not control

    In summary, the concluding phrase of the "loss" definition is specific and unambiguous and is broad enough to include claims for contribution and indemnification. See Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 50, p. 339 (contribution plaintiff must show that contribution defendant is a tortfeasor and is liable to the original plaintiff); Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 526(1) ( 441 S.E.2d 868) (1994); OCGA § 51-12-32. See Prosser, at 339.

  5. MacFarlan v. Atlanta Gastroenterology Assocs., Inc.

    A12A1138 (Ga. Ct. App. Sep. 19, 2012)

    In any case, and to the extent that the claims of plaintiffs' amended complaint are taken as "arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth in the original complaint, they are barred by the statute of repose laid out in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b). See Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525 (441 SE2d 868) (1994) (even if action for contribution against radiologist was not barred by the 20-year statute of limitation, it was barred by the 5-year statute of repose). Even assuming that some claims asserted for the first time in the amended complaint could be construed as a distinct set of actions and omissions ending in 2001, moreover, or more than two years before that amended complaint was filed, they would be barred under the statute of limitation laid out in OCGA § 9-3-71 (a). Frankel, 213 Ga. App. at 224.

  6. Saiia Construction v. Terracon Consultants

    310 Ga. App. 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    We have held before that such claims are subject to OCGA § 9-3-22, and we see no reason in this case to revisit these holdings. See, e.g., Auto-Owners, 252 Ga. App. at 364 (1) ("The statute of limitation for a claim of [common-law] indemnity is 20 years from the settlement or final judgment."); Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 526 (1) ( 441 SE2d 868) (1994) ("The 20-year statute of limitation for contribution actions is governed by OCGA § 9-3-22."). Terracon argues on appeal that Saiia is not entitled to recover indemnification under the common law or contribution from Terracon on the facts alleged in its complaint.

  7. Wesley Chapel Foot Ankle Ctr. v. Johnson

    286 Ga. App. 881 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 10 times
    Finding that, if "the initial complaint gives a defendant fair notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence called into question," the defendant is protected from "stale claims" by the statute of limitation even if the initial complaint is subsequently amended

    own with respect to the statute of repose. See Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 846 (1) ( 426 SE2d 870) (1993) (where a plaintiff filed a timely medical malpractice action, dismissed it, and then, more than five years after the alleged malpractice, filed a second action as a renewal action, the renewal action did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint but was barred by the medical malpractice statute of repose); Burns v. Radiology Assoc., 214 Ga. App. 76 ( 446 SE2d 788) (1994) (accord); Miller v. Vitner, 249 Ga. App. 17 ( 546 SE2d 917) (2001) (accord); Ray v. Scottish Rite Children's Med. Center, 251 Ga. App. at 800 (where a plaintiff filed a timely malpractice action against a hospital, dismissed it, and then, more than five years after the alleged malpractice, filed a negligent retention action against the hospital, the negligent retention action did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint but was barred by the medical malpractice statute of repose); Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 526 ( 441 SE2d 868) (1994) (where a plaintiff filed a timely malpractice action, settled it, and then, more than five years after the alleged malpractice, filed a second action asserting a claim for contribution from a doctor alleged to be a joint tortfeasor with the doctor sued in the first action, the contribution action did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint but was barred by the medical malpractice statute of repose). See also Charles R. Adams III, Ga. Law of Torts, § 18-4 (2007 ed.); Robert E. Cleary, Jr., Eldridge's Ga. Wrongful Death Actions, § 4-18 (3d ed.).

  8. Suggs v. Hale

    629 S.E.2d 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 8 times

    Suggs contends that, since he paid $400,000 and Hale paid $32,500 to settle the wrongful death action, he is entitled to recover $183,750 from Hale. Although Hale contends that Suggs' contribution claim is barred by res judicata because he did not assert it in the wrongful death action, a contribution claim need not be brought as a cross-claim in the underlying action, but may be brought later in a separate suit. See Johnson Harber Constr. Co. v. Bing, 220 Ga. App. 179, 180 (1) ( 469 SE2d 697) (1996); Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 526 (1) ( 441 SE2d 868) (1994). Under Georgia law, one tortfeasor may seek contribution from another joint tortfeasor.

  9. Pilzer v. Virginia Ins. Reciprocal as Subrogee

    260 Ga. App. 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 3 times
    In Pilzer v. The Virginia Ins. Reciprocal, 260 Ga. App. 736 (580 SE2d 599) (2003), we concluded that the contribution plaintiff's contribution action was barred by the medical malpractice statute of repose.

    This appeal raises the issue of whether the five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions embodied at OCGA § 9-3-71(b) operates to bar a contribution action brought by one joint tortfeasor against another joint tortfeasor, or whether the action was timely filed under OCGA § 9-3-22, which provides for a 20-year statute of limitation for contribution actions. See Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 526 ( 441 S.E.2d 868) (1994). We conclude that the facts of this case implicate the purposes underlying enactment of OCGA § 9-3-71(b) and that those facts would be better served by application of the five-year statute of repose.

  10. Perkins v. Georgia Dept. of Med. Assist

    252 Ga. App. 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding that it was proper to dismiss putative class action where claims of both representative plaintiffs were subject to dismissal, including claims against one of the representative plaintiffs for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

    Executive cannot avoid the requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies by claiming that its action is a mere breach of contract action seeking the recovery of damages, because the administrative procedures covered such disputes; Executive is prohibited from doing by indirection that which it is prohibited from doing directly, i.e., bypassing the exhaustion of administrative appeals. See Department of Human Resources v. Lewis, 217 Ga. App. 399, 400 ( 457 S.E.2d 824) (1995); see also Mayor Alderman of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette Amusement Svcs., Inc., 267 Ga. 173, 174 ( 476 S.E.2d 581) (1996); Kraseath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 527 (1) ( 441 S.E.2d 868) (1994). Executive argues that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when such relief is inadequate or when administrative relief is futile.