Opinion
Civil Action 21-cv-05372-RAL
05-08-2023
DENISE MARIE KRAMMES Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Comm. of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
RICHARD A. LLORET U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Commissioner of Social Security, through the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), denied Ms. Krammes' application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Because I find no error, I will affirm the ALJ's decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security income benefits (SSI), alleging disability beginning March 13, 2019, due to impairments adenocarcinoma of the large intestine, colon status post-hemicolectomy with removal of the right colon and proximal half of transverse colon, solid nodule of the lung, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis of the right wrist, and ulnar neuropathy at elbow of right upper extremity. R. 14. The state agency denied the application at the initial review level on August 1, 2019, and on reconsideration on April 30, 2020. R. 12. Ms. Krammes requested and received an administrative hearing, held February 12, 2021, via telephone due to the extraordinary circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. The ALJ heard testimony from Ms. Krammes (represented by counsel), and a vocational expert. Id. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on February 25, 2021. R. 12-21. Ms. Krammes appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied her appeal on October 7, 2021. R. 1-5.
The ALJ's decision of February 25, 2021, found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, but with the additional exertional limitations. R. 17. With the Appeals Council's denial of review, the ALJ's decision is the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. R. 1. Ms. Krammes timely filed a request for review in this court on December 10, 2021. Doc. No. 1.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Claimant's Background
Ms. Krammes was 49 years old on the date of her application for benefits, making her a younger individual aged 18-49, on the date the application was filed. R. 20. Ms. Krammes subsequently changed age categories to closely approaching advanced age, pursuant to 20 CFR 416.963. Id. Plaintiff graduated from high school and can communicate in English. R. 34. Ms. Krammes has no past relevant work. R. 35.
B. The ALJ's Decision
The ALJ found that Ms. Krammes was not eligible for SSI because she has not been under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act. R. 12. In reaching this decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Social Security's five-step sequential evaluation process.
An ALJ evaluates each case using a sequential process until a finding of “disabled” or “not disabled” is reached. The sequence requires an ALJ to assess whether a claimant: (1) is engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe “medically determinable” physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal the criteria listed in the social security regulations and mandate a finding of disability; (4) has the residual functional capacity to perform the requirements of her past relevant work, if any; and (5) is able to perform any other work in the national economy, taking into consideration her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).
At step one, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Krammes had not engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since March 13, 2019, the alleged onset date. R. 14. At step two, the ALJ determined that Ms. Krammes had the following severe impairments: “adenocarcinoma of large intestine/malignant neoplasm of colon, unspecified, adenocarcinoma, colon status post hemicolectomy with removal of right colon and proximal half of transverse colon [] adenomatous polyposis coli, solid nodule of lung 6mm in diameter, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis of right wrist, and ulnar neuropathy at elbow of right upper extremity (20 CFR 416.920(c)). Id. The ALJ found that Ms. Krammes has the following non-severe impairments: abdominal mass in left lower quadrant; acute gastric ulcer without hemorrhage; chronic Hepatitis C; ovarian cyst; left side familial multiple polyposis syndrome; benign neoplasm of colon, unspecified; lung mass/solitary pulmonary nodule; thyroid nodule; essential hypertension; lumbar degenerative disc disease; dysphagia; status post-hysterectomy bilateral salpingectomy; mixed anxiety and depressive disorder. R. 14-15. The ALJ found that “[t]he record does not demonstrate that these conditions cause any significant functional limitations or that they have lasted or are expected to last 12 months or more. Therefore, the [ALJ found] that these impairments have no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities and are considered ‘non-severe.'” R. 15. Ms. Krammes does not contest the ALJ's analysis at steps one and two. At step three, the ALJ compared Ms. Krammes' impediments to those contained in the Social Security Listing of Impairments (“listing”). Specifically, the ALJ compared Ms. Krammes' severe impairments to the listings 1.04 (disorders of the spine) and 13.18 (cancer, large intestine). The ALJ found that Ms. Krammes did not meet any listing criteria, R. 16-17. Ms. Krammes does not dispute this finding.
The regulations contain a series of “listings” that describe symptomology related to various impairments. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1. If a claimant's documented symptoms meet or equal one of the impairments, “the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). If not, the sequential evaluation continues to step four, where the ALJ
Prior to undertaking his step four analysis, the ALJ assessed Ms. Krammes' residual functional capacity (“RFC”), or “the most [Ms. Krammes] can still do despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ found that Ms. Krammes had the RFC to perform work at the light exertional level, as defined in 20 C.F.R. 416.967(b), but with the following exertional limitations: occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently finger and feel with the right upper extremity; tolerate frequent exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, extreme cold, and extreme heat. R. 17. At step four, the ALJ found that Ms. Krammes does not have relevant past work. R. 20. At step five, based on the RFC and testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Ms. Krammes would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as marker, garment sorter, and bakery line worker. Id. Because these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Krammes was not disabled. R. 21.
Ms. Krammes contends the ALJ erred by determining that substantial evidence in the record supported his finding that the Plaintiff is not disabled. Plaintiff's Brief (Pl. Br.) 2. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the Vocational Expert (VE) should have contained sit/stand limitations consistent with Ms. Krammes' testimony that she had trouble sitting or standing for more than a few minutes without determines whether the impairments assessed at step two preclude the claimant from performing any relevant work the claimant may have performed in the past. Id. changing position. Pl. Br. 3-4. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have used the second hypothetical given to the VE, during Plaintiff's counsel's cross-examination, which added limitations to the original, “if you added to the restrictions someone who was required to change position either from a stand or a sit every five or ten minutes, would any of those three jobs that you identified in the national economy be capable of being performed by such an individual?” R. 59. The VE replied, “[n]o I don't believe so. I believe that would be changing positions too frequently at that time and I believe that would take him off task to a significant degree.” Id.
The Commissioner responds that the record contains sufficient evidence to uphold the ALJ's decision. Commissioner's Response (Com. Res.) 6-10. Plaintiff did not file a reply.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
My review of the ALJ's decision is deferential. I am bound by his findings of fact to the extent those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, my review of the ALJ's findings of fact is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). If the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, his disability determination must be upheld. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence “is more than a mere scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988). I must rely on the record developed during the administrative proceedings along with the pleadings in making my determination. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I may not weigh the evidence or substitute my own conclusions for those of the ALJ. Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).
The ALJ's legal conclusions and application of legal principles are subject to plenary review. See Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995). I must determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards in reaching the decision. See Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245, 247 (3d Cir. 1984). Accordingly, I can overturn an ALJ's decision based on an incorrect application of a legal standard even where I find that the decision otherwise is supported by substantial evidence. Payton v. Barnhart, 416 F.Supp.2d 385, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983)).
DISCUSSION
The ALJ did not err by deciding that Ms. Krammes did not prove she was disabled during the relevant period.
Ms. Krammes claims the ALJ should have found her disabled based on her testimony that she must change position frequently between sitting and standing, precluding employment under the VE's testimony. Pl. Br. 5. The specific evidence Plaintiff cites is Plaintiff's testimony that she has problems sitting, standing, or walking for more than a few minutes. Pl. Br. 3-4, quoting R. 39-41. The extent of Plaintiff's argument is the following:
Clearly, given the VE's response to the two hypothetical questions, the issue of whether there is any evidence to rebut the Claimant's testimony regarding the length of time she can sit or stand is crucial to a determination of whether Claimant is disabled.
As noted, the ALJ found Claimant's impairments “could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.”
However, the ALJ made no determination that specific medical findings contradict Claimant's testimony on the sit/stand issue. This is particularly striking given that the ALJ does make specific determinations based on the medical evidence with regard to Claimant's other impairments.
For example, the ALJ found Claimant's range of motion in her right arm and hand had improved after her carpal tunnel surgery (ALJ decision p. 8) - but the ALJ's decision makes no attempt to refute Claimant's inability to stand for more the (sic) 5 minutes or sit for more than 15 minutes without changing position.
Given the above, it would appear clear that the ALJ's conclusion that Claimant has no limitations on extent of time Claimant [can] sit or stand is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
Pl. Br. 5. Plaintiff concludes that because the VE testified that a hypothetical individual who with such sit/stand limitations as Plaintiff testified to, would be unable to perform the representative jobs, the ALJ's decision should be overturned or remanded. Id. 5-6. Plaintiff cites no case that supports her proposition, nor does she cite to anywhere in the over 2,000 pages of medical records where there is any objective medical evidence supporting her sit/stand limitation.
It is not enough to simply allege that the ALJ should have accepted Plaintiff's testimony. A plaintiff must demonstrate that there is some “medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in any ‘substantial gainful activity' for a statutory twelve-month period.” Stunkard v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Mere presence of a disease or impairment is not enough. A claimant must show that his disease or impairment caused functional limitations that precluded him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.” Walker v. Barnhart, 172 Fed.Appx. 423, 426 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Showell v. Colvin, No. CV 14-7081, 2016 WL 3599569, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2016).
Plaintiff's argument here does not meet this requirement. My review of some 2,400 pages of medical records establish that she was successfully treated for colon cancer and was “able to carry on all predisease performance without restriction” after treatment. R. 971. I find no indication in the medical records that Ms. Krammes has done more than occasionally complain of knee or back pain, and she received just one steroid injection in her knee. R. 1999-2000. The Plaintiff's brief fails to point me to even that evidence. Rather than providing evidence that Ms. Krammes would be unable to sit or stand for more than a few minutes, the medical records indicate that Ms. Krammes experiences pain in her back and legs but has been treated only with pain patches, topical gel (Voltaren) and oral medication. R. 1763, 1805, 1906, 2039. On at least one occasion, Ms. Krammes was prescribed Vicoden for back pain, but for the most part her pain medication consisted of over-the-counter medications such as Tylenol. R. 2035.
Rather than cite even this small amount of evidence as support for her position, Plaintiff turns the ALJ's role around, arguing that the ALJ was required to demonstrate how medical evidence in the record contradicted Ms. Krammes' testimony. Pl. Br. 5. I know of no such requirement, and Plaintiff points me to no case law or statutory support for this novel theory.
My review of the medical records turned up a few reports of some limited testing of Ms. Krammes' back and knees, but with predominantly unremarkable results. Below are the sum total of those tests, showing mostly unremarkable findings relating to Ms. Krammes' possible lower extremity physical limitations (as opposed to her treatment for cancer and her carpal tunnel syndrome).
Ms. Krammes' back was X-rayed on April 29, 2019:
Impression: Mild spondylosis. History: Pain. Exam: Spine - lumbar Technique: 5 views. Lumbar spine Findings: Vertebral bodies are in anatomic alignment. There are mild degenerative changes in endplates. There are hypertrophic changes in lower facet joints. No lytic lesion. No acute fracture. RADIOLOGY Procedure Note Interface, Rad Results In - 04/29/2019 4:16 PM EDT.
R. 1441.
A CT scan in September 2019 revealed only “mild” or “minimal” negative findings.
CT scan of the lumbar spine was obtained. Sagittal coronal reformats were performed. Findings: There is mild straightening of the lordotic curve of the lumbar spine. There is loss of disc space height at ¶ 2-3 and less so at ¶ 3-4. There is vascular calcification. At ¶ 2-3 there is a broad-based disc bulge degenerative facets. There is some bilateral neural foraminal stenosis and mild central canal stenosis. At ¶ 3-4 there is a broad-based disc bulge with mild degenerative changes of the facets. There is mild to moderate bilateral neural foraminal stenosis mild central canal stenosis. At ¶ 4-5 is minimal disc bulging. There is minimal bilateral neural foraminal narrowing. At ¶ 5-S1 there is minimal degenerative changes of the facets.
R. 1385.
A visit with a nurse practitioner on November 11, 2019, documented the following with regard to her knee pain:
Left knee pain - patient reports swelling and 10/10 pain on the medial aspect of her left knee that began 2 weeks ago. Patient states the knee occasionally “pops” with walking but denies any falls. She does not know what caused the pain. Denies any trauma to the area. Reports taking Tylenol to no relief. Patient states the swelling and pain is slowly improving on its own-now a 7/10. Patient denies weakness, numbness, tingling in her leg or feet but states the pain limits the patient's daily activity and forces her to walk with a limp.
R. 2115-16 (Progress Notes - Martin, Brenda B, CRNP - 11/11/2019 1:12 PM EST).
Ms. Krammes received a steroid injection in her left knee on September 8, 2020:
X-rays reviewed left knee does reveal some narrowing of medial joint space with sharpening of the articular surfaces and some small periarticular osteophyte formation.
Plan we discussed the pros and cons of steroid injection to the left knee she wants to do this, after which she was significantly better. As for carpal tunnels we gave her a prescription for wrist cock-up splint she will use these at least at night. We also gave her a prescription to get bilateral EMGs of her upper extremities. We will see her back in 4 weeks to reassess her. Procedure note arthrocentesis left knee after obtaining verbal informed consent using a triple alcohol prep an anterolateral approach 5 cc of 0.5% Marcaine, 6 mg of Celestone, and 40 mg Depo-Medrol were instilled into the left knee with a problems (sic) after which the patient noted improvement. A Band-Aid was applied.
R. 1999-2000 (9/08/2020 note from Dr. Helmold).
These largely normal findings, and a lack of any treatment for her lower extremities save the single steroid injection, are consistent with Ms. Krammes' two Adult Function Reports. Those reports document that she does light cleaning and laundry (although she says she “can't stand to (sic) long or I have pain”), R. 275, goes outside daily, R. 276, goes to the grocery store with her friend, R. 278, and does not use a cane, crutches, walker, or other assistive device to ambulate. R. 279. (Function report dated May 12, 2019). Although Ms. Krammes documents other health issues in the Function Report, none relate to the inability to stand, sit, or walk for more than a few minutes.
There is one error repeatedly made by the ALJ in his decision, he frequently recites that Ms. Krammes “drives.” R. 15, 16, 19. She does not. R. 33-34.
Ms. Krammes filled out a second Function Report on December 28, 2019, documenting her hysterectomy performed laparoscopically on December 3, 2019. R. 314-21. In this second report she stated that she could not lift over ten pounds or vacuum due to the surgery. She said she had ceased performing any household chores but did prepare food two times a week. R. 316. Although Ms. Krammes reported significant problems in Section D of both reports, checking numerous categories to include lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, kneeling, and stair climbing, she gave as reasons for these issues only, “due to muscle spasms, arthritis, hysterectomy.” R. 319. In the second report, like the first, she again recorded that she used no assistive device to ambulate, nor a brace or splint of any kind. R. 320.
While there is no question that Ms. Krammes suffered uncomfortable symptoms while undergoing treatment for colon cancer and carpal tunnel syndrome, the overall impression gleaned from her medical records is of a person who is essentially functional, even with some level of discomfort. For example, the two notes below were recorded in the records of the practice where she received the majority of her treatment, Lehigh Valley Health Network.
Returned call to patient. She is very upset. She was in ER last night. She has infection/abscess in her teeth, was given antibiotic and Vicoprofen. She has follow up with Dental clinic. She is in pain and states now her whole nose is swollen. She states she thinks this is all from the chemotherapy. She has only taken Xeloda for one week. Advised that it unlikely this is from the chemotherapy since she has been on it for only a short period of time. Recommended she return to the ER since the abscess is in her upper jaw and seems to be spreading quickly. She states she doesn't have a ride, she doesn't have anyone to bring her, she understands that she should go to ER. At this time, she will wait until her visit with Dr. Gupta tomorrow.
R. 1328 (7/8/2019, Mary Catherine Altmiller, RN - Telephone encounter).
Patient is extremely anxious. She had a slight lump on her lower abdomen for which she had surgical resection done. Final pathology shows folliculitis and inflammation. She is recovering very well from that. I feel like every time I see her, patient had a lot of new symptoms, and her symptoms are very suggestive. This time she is complaining of progressive dysphagia and also has been complaining of some blood-tinged sputum. Patient is not able to provide me a good history if it is with cough and sputum or coming from the GI tract. She does
have a history of GI bleeding in the past. She has no fever, no other cough and the CAT scan portion of the PET scan which was done in June as initial staging did not show any lesions in the lung. No significant diarrhea is present.
R. 1289. (8/21/19 Health Center at Bangor, Dr. Gupta).
Ms. Krammes argues in vague terms that the ALJ failed to make a “determination that specific medical findings contradict Claimant's testimony on the sit/stand issue.” Pl. Br. 5. But the ALJ need not prove a negative any time a claimant testifies to certain physical limitations.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have accepted the VE's testimony that no jobs existed based on the more restrictive hypothetical posed to the VE by Plaintiff's counsel, based on Plaintiff's testimony alone. Pl. Br. 5-6. The Third Circuit discussed in Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2005), how ALJ's should handle hypothetical questions to vocational experts:
Limitations that are medically supported but are also contradicted by other evidence in the record may or may not be found credible-the ALJ can choose to credit portions of the existing evidence but “cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason” (a principle repeated in Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir.1993); Reg. § 929(c)(4)). Finally, limitations that are asserted by the claimant but that lack objective medical support may possibly be considered nonetheless credible. In that respect the ALJ can reject such a limitation if there is conflicting evidence in the record, but should not reject a claimed symptom that is related to an impairment and is consistent with the medical record simply because there is no objective medical evidence to support it (Reg. § 929(c)(3)).Id. at 554.
Applying this guidance to claims, ALJs and claimants' attorneys routinely pose multiple hypotheticals to testifying vocational experts, with attorneys adding restrictions they believe are supported by the evidence, until the vocational expert advises that the impairments are work preclusive. It is the ALJ, however, who makes the final decision on which impairments they believe are established by the evidence in the record. Once the ALJ make this decision, he may then use the vocational expert's testimony that appropriately accounts for the impairments found by the ALJ to have been established.
Reg. § 929(c)(4) [] instructs the ALJ to evaluate claimed limitations in part based on “the extent to which there are any conflicts between [a claimant's] statements and the rest of the evidence,” and with the consideration of a symptom as contemplated in the regulations, which require a reasonable relation between the symptom and a medically determinable impairment.Id. at 555.
The ALJ took Ms. Krammes' established impairments into account when he included in the RFC limitations of
light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She could frequently finger and feel with the right upper extremity. She could tolerate frequent exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, extreme cold, and extreme heat.
The regulation states:
(b) Light work. Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).
R. 17. A job at the “light work” level may involve sitting, standing, or walking, but provides no parameters about shifting between the three. In 2,400 pages of medical record, there is no doctor's report, medical opinion, or treatment note that documents a serious problem with Ms. Krammes' ability to stand, to walk, or to sit. She uses no assistive devices. R. 279, 320. The state agency medical consultants, Thomas Lauderman, DO, and Chankun Chung, MD, both opined that Ms. Krammes could stand and/or walk with normal breaks for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday and could sit with normal breaks for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. R. 84, 98.
The ALJ did a thorough job of discussing all of Ms. Krammes' assertions, in both her function reports and her testimony. R. 17-18. The ALJ took into account Ms. Krammes' colon cancer and her carpal tunnel syndrome. There were significant medical records pertaining to both of these issues, and the ALJ discussed them. R. 18-19. The fact that the ALJ failed to mention the X-rays and CT scan discussed supra at 9-10, that related to her back and knee pain, is not fatal, as those results did not demonstrate any disease, impairment, or even limitation, that would support Ms. Krammes' assertions regarding her perceived limitations on this front.
Ms. Krammes argues that the ALJ should have used the hypothetical that resulted in a finding by the VE of work preclusion as the correct one. Nowhere, however, does she provide evidence to suggest that the ALJ is wrong in his analysis of any medical evidence, and indeed, that evidence does not support her testimony concerning her sit/stand limitations. It is necessary to demonstrate, not just assert, that the ALJ erred. Demonstration calls for careful citation to the evidence, not just a conclusory assertion that leaves the judge to search through hundreds of pages of records to see if the assertion is so. See United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91, 113 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.”) (quoting Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). I have reviewed the record and find no error.
I am satisfied that the ALJ properly considered the evidence when determining Ms. Krammes' claim. He reviewed the medical record and the opinions, considered the evidence from various health care providers, considered the state agency consultants' reports, considered the testimony of the Plaintiff, and explained his reasons for his findings. R. 17-19. He explained why he found Ms. Krammes' testimony not fully supported by the record.
While she was diagnosed with colon cancer, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis of the right wrist, and ulnar neuropathy at the elbow of right upper extremity, [] her physical exam findings show full range of motion, normal strength and coordination throughout . . .. She complained of numbness in her hands that she stated resolved after her carpal tunnel release surgery. She manages her own personal care, cleans, cooks, shops, does dishes, does laundry, drives (sic, see n. 3), watches television, reads and uses the computer.
R. 19.
I agree with the Commissioner's position that, “[t]he presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ's] decision so long as the record provides substantial support for that decision,” quoting Malloy v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. App'x. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). While Ms. Krammes' assertions during her testimony provided some evidence of a sit/stand and walk limitation that the ALJ did not accept, there were no objective medical records that supported her testimony. The record did contain substantial support for the decision the ALJ ultimately made, and I cannot reweigh the evidence contained in the record. Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359; see e.g., Monsour Med. Ctr. V. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 119091 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The Court's role in conducting such review ‘is not to impose its own interpretation of the. . . regulation, but instead to defer to [an agency's] position so long as it is reasonable.'” (Citation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Because I find no error, I will affirm the decision of the ALJ and dismiss the appeal. I will enter an Order and Judgment accordingly.