Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:01-CV-085-C.
April 27, 2002
ORDER
The Court has considered the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner, Stephen Edward Krammer (Krammer) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed an Answer, together with relevant state court records, to which Krammer filed a response.
Respondent has lawful custody of Krammer pursuant to a judgment and sentence of the 51st District Court of Tom or County, Texas. Krammer was indicted for aggravated kidnaping on November 4, 1991. He pleaded guilty on June 10, 1992, pursuant to a plea agreement. Punishment was assessed at 10 years' deferred adjudication probation, with a $1,000 fine. There was also a finding that a deadly weapon was used. Thereafter, the State moved to revoke Krammer's probation, in part on grounds that he committed attempted murder and murder. After a jury trial on January 26, 1996, Krammer was found not guilty of the attempted under and the murder charges.
Krammer's probation was revoked on February 8, 1996, after Krammer entered pleas of true to at least 12 alleged probation violations. The trial court adjudicated him guilty of aggravated kidnaping, a first-degree felony) made no deadly weapon finding, and assessed punishment at 52 years' imprisonment. The judgment was upheld on appeal. Krammer did not seek discretionary review.
Krammer filed a state habeas application on October 2, 1998. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the writ on April 7, 1999, reversed the sentence of 52 years, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that Krammer's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence at the adjudication hearing that Krammer voluntarily released his victim alive in a safe place. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. There was no finding that Krammer's attorney was ineffective with regard to the original plea.
After remand, the State and Krammer entered into a written Waiver and Stipulation that provided, in part,
Following sentencing a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed, and the Defendant was granted a new punishment hearing due to ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment hearing.
The State agrees and stipulates that the evidence in this case would show that the Defendant, Stephen Edward Krammer released the victim in this case voluntarily, alive, and in a safe place. The State agrees and stipulates that this would entitle the Defendant to be punished in a range of not less than two nor more than twenty years confinement . . . .
The Defendant, Stephen Edward Krammer and his attorneys agree that in return for the above stipulation, the Defendant agrees that his Aggravated Kidnapping (sic) sentence be set at twenty years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Correction with credit for all dine previously served.
The Defendant and his attorney understand that had ibis case gone to trial on the issue of punishment the issue of whether or not the victim was released voluntarily, alive, and in a safe place, could have been contested by the State and the Court might have ruled against him. Had the Court ruled against him, the range of punishment available could have been not less than five years nor more tan ninety-nine years or life confinement . . . .
At the re-sentencing heating held on October 26, 1999, Krammer acknowledged that he had signed the Waiver and Stipulation agreement because it was true and correct, that he understood that the only evidence the Court would hear was what was contained in the Waiver and Stipulation, that he wanted the Court to consider the Waiver and Stipulation, and that he was satisfied with the representation of his attorneys. On October 26, 1999, the trial court resentenced Krammer to 18 years' imprisonment. The sentence noted that Krammer had previously been adjudged guilty on February 8, 1996.
Krammer filed a second state habeas application on September 20, 2000, which was dismissed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on January 17, 2001, as a subsequent application. Krammer then filed a third state habeas application on March 14, 2001, which was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals without written order on July 11, 2001.
Krammer alleges that his original guilty plea was involuntary as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney
(1) failed to advise him that his conduct did not constitute aggravated kidnaping; and
(2) failed to advise him that his conduct constituted at most a second degree felony because Krammer voluntarily released the complainant alive and in a safe place.
Krammer's conviction became final on March 9, 1996, 30 days after he was adjudged guilty on February 8, 1996. His claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at his original guilty plea are time-barred. See generally Jordan v. Cockrell, No. 3:01-CV-1162-G, 2001 WL 1388015 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2001); Crenshaw v. Cockrell, No. 4:01-CV-405-Y, 2002 WL 356513 At *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2002).
Krammer also alleges that the subsequent re-sentencing plea agreement was involuntary because his attorney grossly misinformed and failed to accurately advise him of the law applicable to the facts of his case.
The Court has reviewed Krammer's petition, Respondent's answer, the stare court records, and Krammer's response. The state courts originally found that Krammer received ineffective assistance of counsel at the adjudication of guilt proceeding and his case was remanded for re-sentencing. Krammer signed a Waiver and Stipulation after remand, agreeing to a 20-year sentence. The trial court refused the 20 year term and, instead, sentenced Krammer to a lesser term of 18 years.
Krammer's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and claim of involuntary pleas are without merit. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); North Carolina v. Afford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) ("An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting to crime."); James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995) (A challenged guilty plea will be upheld on federal habeas review if it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Krammer's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied and this case dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Any pending motions are denied.