Opinion
No. 00-1159-JTM.
March 19, 2001.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
The matter is now before the court on defendant Boeing Company's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Carl Kramer, appearing pro se, has brought the present action alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and violation of Title VII, alleging violation of equal protection. Kramer explicitly disavows making any claim of discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, national origin, or age. His claims are based upon his contention that he was not paid the same as other workers in hole inspection work, and that a supervisor's comments constituted harassment.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987).
In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
Plaintiff Kramer has not filed any explicitly denominated response to the motion for summary judgment; he has filed his own motion for summary judgment against Boeing. He does not respond to any of the facts presented by Boeing, or to the defendant's legal arguments. Kramer does not attempt to demonstrate that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Similarly, the merits of Kramer's claims, the court finds, must also be rejected
Plaintiff's equal protection claim fails to establish illegal discrimination (the facts show that workers with different grades or levels of seniority were paid differently from him.) And as noted earlier, Kramer admits he has no claim of race, gender, or religious discrimination. Finally, the alleged disability-related harassment was a single incident (in which the supervisor apparently questioned how smart Kramer was), which did not affect his ability to work and for which the supervisor was disciplined. The court finds plaintiff's claims must be rejected on the merits and in light of his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this day of March, 2001, that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 30) is hereby granted; plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 32) is denied.