Id. (citing Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai‘i 475, 486, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (1995) ). Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai‘i 426, 430, 121 P.3d 406, 410 (2005).
Id. (citing Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 486, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (1995)).Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai'i 426, 430, 121 P.3d 406, 410 (2005). D. Motion in Limine
However, a default presumption against retroactive application remains alive and well both in our jurisprudence and in the foreign jurisdictions that the dissent cites. See e.g., Taniguchi v. Assoc. of Apt. Owners of King Manor, 114 Hawai'i 37, 48, 155 P.3d 1138, 1149 (2007) ("[I]t is well settled that 'all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.'") (quoting Robinson v. Bailey, 28 Haw. 462, 464 (1925)); Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai'i 426, 432, 121 P.3d 406, 412 (2005) (quoting Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai'i 325, 333, 104 P.3d 912, 920 (2004) (" 'Hawai'i statutory and case law discourage retroactive application of laws and rules in the absence of language showing that such operation was intended.'")); Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 215-16, 638 P.2d at 323 (clarifying that "we are not suggesting, as other courts have, see, e.g., . . . Estrada; . . . Oliver, that whenever an amendatory statute is enacted . . ., it must be presumed that the legislature intended for it to apply in every case where it could constitutionally apply" and reemphasizing that "[w]here the intention of the legislature with respect to retroactivity is incapable of ascertainment, the provisions of HRS § 1-3 will determine the statute's interpretation"); Evangelatos v. Super. Court, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 642, 753 P.2d 585 (1988) (rejecting the characterization that Estrada eroded the strong presumption against retroactivity and asserting that "absen[t] . . . an
When reviewing a motion for JMOL under HRCP Rule 50, “the evidence and the inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and [the] motion may be granted only where there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment.” Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai‘i 426, 430, 121 P.3d 406, 410 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nelson v. University of Hawaii, 97 Hawai‘i 376, 393, 38 P.3d 95, 112 (2001) ). The circuit court did not err in denying Inokuma's motion for JMOL because M.K. and M.R.'s testimonies indicate that there is more than one reasonable conclusion as to whether Inokuma was liable under HRS § 663–41(1) for furnishing or providing alcohol to minors who became intoxicated and caused damage to the Uys' property.
By the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rales unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms.Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai'i 426, 432, 121 P.3d 406, 412 (2005) (citations and original ellipsis omitted). This court has also stated that "Hawai'i statutory and case law discourage retroactive application of laws and rules in the absence of language showing that such operation was intended.
Id. (citing Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 486, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (1995)).Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai'i 426, 430, 121 P.3d 406, 410 (2005). As relevant to Van Dyck's Rule 50(a) motion, the record reveals the following: Jisu was pronounced dead on July 8, 2013.
K. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Directed Verdict)The grant or denial of a “motion for judgment as a matter of law” under HRCP Rule 50, also known as a “motion for JNOV” or “motion for a directed verdict,” is reviewed de novo. Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai‘i 426, 430, 121 P.3d 406, 410 (2005) (citing Nelson v. Univ. of Hawai‘i, 97 Hawai‘i 376, 393, 38 P.3d 95, 112 (2001) ).When reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, “the evidence and the inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and [the] motion may be granted only where there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment.”
When reviewing a motion for JMOL under HRCP Rule 50, "the evidence and the inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and [the] motion may be granted only where there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment." Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai'i 426, 430, 121 P.3d 406, 410 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nelson v. University of Hawaii, 97 Hawai'i 376, 393, 38 P.3d 95, 112 (2001)). The circuit court did not err in denying Inokuma's motion for JMOL because M.K. and M.R.'s testimonies indicate that there is more than one reasonable conclusion as to whether Inokuma was liable under HRS § 663-41(1) for furnishing or providing alcohol to minors who became intoxicated and caused damage to the Uys' property.
When reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, “the evidence and the inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and [the] motion may be granted only where there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment.” Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai‘i 426, 430, 121 P.3d 406, 410 (2005) (citations omitted). “The standard of review for a trial court's issuance or refusal of a jury instruction is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading.”
Id. (citing Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 486, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (1995)).Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai'i 426, 430, 121 P.3d 406, 410 (2005) (brackets in original omitted). B. Qualification of an Expert Witness