Our case law reflects that “regardless of the ostensible reason for the plaintiff not submitting to the chemical test, any failure to submit to the testconstitutes a refusal pursuant to subdivision (3) [of § 14–227b (g) ].” (Emphasis added.) Fitzgerald v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 142 Conn.App. 361, 365 n. 3, 65 A.3d 533 (2013) ; see also Dalmaso v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 47 Conn.App. 839, 844, 707 A.2d 1275 (court's determination that substantial evidence of refusal existed not affected by evidence that plaintiff was not afforded reasonable opportunity to contact attorney pursuant to § 14–227b [b] ), appeal dismissed, 247 Conn. 273, 720 A.2d 885 (1998) ; Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn.App. 911, 911–12, 610 A.2d 201 (1992) (same); Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn.App. 101, 102, 598 A.2d 670 (1991) (same). In Dalmaso, this court rejected a claim that substantial evidence of a refusal did not exist because the police did not grant the plaintiff's request to telephone his attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical alcohol testing.

This court also has adhered to the interpretation of subsection (f) of § 14-227b that confines a license suspension hearing to a determination of the four issues specified therein, despite deviations from the procedures that subsection (b) commands in making arrests for driving while under the influence of intoxicants. In both Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101, 101-102, 598 A.2d 670 (1991), and Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911, 911-12, 610 A.2d 201 (1992), we disregarded indications in each case that the police had not permitted the arrested drivers to telephone attorneys before requesting them to be tested, as subsection (b) provides. In those cases, we implicitly rejected the very claim raised by the plaintiff in this appeal, that the failure of the police to allow an opportunity to telephone an attorney prior to offering the chemical tests vitiates the conclusion of the hearing officer that the arrested drivers had refused those tests.

General Statutes 14-227b (f) limits the issues in an administrative license suspension hearing to the following: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis; and (4) was such person operating the motor vehicle. Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 511-12, 529 A.2d 177 (1987); Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 6, 509 A.2d 489 (1986); see also Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101, 102, 598 A.2d 670 (1991) (per curiam) (trial may not go beyond the four limited suspension criteria of 14-227b [f]). We have fully considered the plaintiff's claims and have thoroughly reviewed the parties' briefs as well as the record of this case.

This claim is not one which is reviewable in a § 14-227b suspension hearing. Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101, 102 (1991), Piorek v. Delponte, 28 Conn. App. 911, 912 (1992). More importantly this right does not exist, see Gaskins v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district New London at New London, Docket No. 525664 (September 24, 1993, Purtill, J.) and Buckley v. Muzio, supra, 200 Conn. 8. Also, see § 14-227b which provides only "a reasonable opportunity to telephone an attorney."

Our Appellate Court has consistently rejected it, however, as the basis for an appeal of an administrative determination under § 14-227b. See Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911 (1992) and Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101 (1991). Accordingly, the plaintiff's argument may not prevail here.

"Since there is nothing in the applicable statutes, General Statutes § 14-227b, which permits an accused to impose conditions on her consent to the BAC test, the hearing officer was justified in concluding that the plaintiff has refused to consent. See Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101 (1992);Plorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911 (1992)." Clark v. Goldberg, No. CV-92-0123017, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Norwalk (February 2, 1993, Maloney, J.).

Furthermore, even if the medical exemption in subsection (j) could be read to create such an obligation by implication, the failure of the police to comply would not expand the narrow scope of the administrative proceeding, which is limited to the four issues specified in subsection (f). That is, the commissioner could find a refusal and suspend the license even if the police had not allowed the person first to call the doctor. See Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101 (1991). The more important reason why subsection (j) does not afford the plaintiff any support in this case is that there is no evidence in the record that his condition qualifies for the exemption.

Our courts have consistently held that miscues by the police in the procedures required by § 14-227b(b) do CT Page 469-Q not constitute a basis for reversing an administrative license suspension decision. Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 521 (1987) (failure to warn of consequences of refusal to be tested); Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 7 (1986) (same); Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101 (1991) (failure to allow accused to telephone attorney). The rationale of those cases is that the administrative proceedings have a limited agenda, which is set forth in subsection (f) of § 14-227b.

Indeed, the plaintiff concedes in her brief that there is no appellate authority in support of her position. The plaintiff's arguments concerning the opportunity to contact an attorney have been conclusively dismissed by our Appellate Court in Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101 (1991), and in Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911 (1992). The plaintiff's final argument concerns the circumstances under which she failed to submit to testing.

In Piorek v. Delponte, supra, the Superior Court, (Maloney, J.), held that "so long as there is sufficient evidence to support an affirmative finding by the commissioner on the four issues set forth in subsection (f), [the] decision to suspend a person's license is unaffected by the failure of the police to comply with the requirements of subsections (b) and (c)." See also Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101, 598 A.2d 670 (1991). As noted above, the hearing officer found that the four requirements of § 14-227b(f) were present. The plaintiff does not argue that those findings are incorrect. The plaintiff's arguments in support of his contention that § 14-227b(b) is unconstitutional are that case law is unclear and a reading of the statute leads a reasonable person to believe that he is entitled to a procedural safeguard to which he may not actually be entitled. "[A] party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."