Kraft v. United States

28 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Brown

    548 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1977)   Cited 48 times
    In United States v. Brown, 548 F.2d 1194, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), we described plain errors as "[errors] involving serious deficiencies which affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or which constitute obvious error."

    One of the Eighth Circuit cases cited with approval in Broadway, however, sheds some light on the type of other-offense evidence which, under its superseded test, should be excluded as too vague and uncertain. In Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1956), defendant was charged with a scheme to defraud by inducing persons to send him money in anticipation of receiving "rare geraniums" as advertised in several newspapers. Kraft defended against the charge by denying that he had possessed the requisite criminal intent to defraud.

  2. United States v. Foote

    635 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1980)   Cited 3 times
    In Foote the director of the Little Hoop Community College was charged with misapplication of funds of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe. The community college was found to be a "tribal organization created by Devils Lake Sioux Indian Tribe."

    Id. at 1365. Had the government only attempted to show that Mr. Foote had previously been "called on the carpet" for his check writing, we might be faced with "mere accusations of some other offense" as in Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794, 802 (8th Cir. 1956). Here, however, three witnesses testified that appellant admitted prior misuse of college funds and "[s]uch an admission, if made directly, is clear and convincing proof of his participation."

  3. United States v. Cox

    536 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1976)   Cited 31 times
    In United States v. Cox, 536 F.2d 65, 71 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit cited Rule 609 in holding that evidence of a fifteen year old conviction was inadmissible for purposes of impeachment.

    As a general rule, extrinsic evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove a defendant's bad character or criminal propensities. United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 71 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ostrowsky, 501 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1974); Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794, 801-02 (8th Cir. 1956). See generally 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 305 at 205-06 (3d ed. 1940).

  4. United States v. Leonard

    524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975)   Cited 68 times
    Recognizing the return of capital theory in a criminal tax prosecution but holding that the defendant failed to meet the burden of going forward as to the corporation's lack of earnings or profits

    In addition to the practical point stressed by the trial judge, that Leonard probably had a pretty fair general idea of how $383,000 was being transmitted to him, the jury could also consider the fact that Leonard had no account at CMB, the peculiar method chosen to deliver the CMB official checks to him, and the pains taken by Leonard to keep them out of his FNCB account. Leonard further argues that the preponderance standard is not high enough for "similar act" evidence and points to statements that such evidence must be "plain, clear and conclusive" to be admissible. Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794, 802 (8 Cir. 1956); United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991, 995 (5 Cir. 1973). This view appears to rest on a misconception.

  5. United States v. King

    505 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1974)   Cited 97 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding no reversible error because the defense counsel "injected" the prejudicial evidence into the case and the testimony was restricted to informing the jury of the government witness's prior criminal background

    The Ohio transaction was not introduced merely to show the defendant's bad character, nor was the evidence of prior fraud of a vague and uncertain character. Compare Kraft v. United States, 8 Cir., 1956, 238 F.2d 794, 801-803. The Ohio fraud was almost identical in nature, it involved the same portrait trailer which was the subject of the alleged Florida fraud, and it was recent in time.

  6. United States v. Clemons

    503 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1974)   Cited 60 times
    In Clemons, this court excluded evidence of a defendant's prior arrest for possession of narcotics because he was never charged, and the government failed to offer any evidence that he knew about the confiscated drugs.

    We have held that evidence of other crimes cannot be admitted if it is "of vague and uncertain character." United States v. Spica, 413 F.2d 129, 131 (8th Cir. 1969); Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794, 802 (8th Cir. 1956); Gart v. United States, 294 F. 66 (8th Cir. 1923). It is the rule in this circuit as well that other crime evidence must be "clear and convincing."

  7. United States v. Woods

    484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973)   Cited 112 times
    Finding that a grant of acquittal on one count of a criminal prosecution did not collaterally estop the prosecution from offering evidence on that count to prove absence of accident on other counts

    The majority agrees with this so far as homicide goes but finds exception for arson cases and cases involving confessions. Even when the trial court determines that evidence of a prior act or crime is admissible as coming within one of the exceptions to the general rule, it still must determine whether the proof of the prior act is of a sufficient quality to permit its admissibility, and the courts have held, with considerable uniformity, that in cases falling under exceptions to the rule it is essential that proof of the prior act or offense be plain, clear and conclusive. Evidence concerning prior acts of a vague or uncertain character is not admissible. Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794, 802 (8th Cir. 1956). Consequently, it should be apparent that evidence of prior merely suspicious occurrences is no substitute for clear and conclusive proof.

  8. United States v. Broadway

    477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973)   Cited 70 times
    In United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973), we stated that the trial court should conduct such an independent examination.

    But the Eighth Circuit has required, in cases where intent or guilty knowledge is sought to be proved by evidence of similar offenses that the proof of other related offenses ". . . be plain, clear, and conclusive, and evidence of a vague and uncertain character is not admissible." United States v. Spica, 8 Cir. 1969, 413 F.2d 129, 131; Kraft v. United States, 8 Cir. 1956, 238 F.2d 794; Gart v. United States, 8 Cir. 1923, 294 F. 66; Paris v. United States, 8 Cir. 1919, 260 F. 529. By the requirement that evidence of other crimes be plain, clear and conclusive, the probative value of the evidence is held to outweigh the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Spica, supra, 413 F.2d at 132.

  9. United States v. Haley

    452 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1972)   Cited 12 times

    It would serve little purpose in our overall analysis to detail that which we believe was or was not admissible. The law in this area has received full amplification. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 12 S.Ct. 292, 35 L.Ed. 1077 (1892); United States v. Lewis, 423 F.2d 457 (8 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 146, 27 L.Ed.2d 142; Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (8 Cir. 1956); Kempe v. United States, 151 F.2d 680 (8 Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 843, 67 S.Ct. 1534, 91 L.Ed. 1864 (1946); United States v. Novik, 124 F.2d 107 (2 Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813, 62 S.Ct. 795, 86 L.Ed. 1212 (1942). Assuming arguendo error in some of the comments and testimony, and weighing the overall effect of this error balanced against the testimony relating to the defendants' guilt as a whole, we conclude that at its worst, the error was harmless.

  10. Moore v. United States

    441 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1971)   Cited 1 times

    Where a case falls within the exception, the proof must be clear and convincing. It will be unnecessary to discuss the point in this case as to whether or not this line of testimony fell within the exception to the general rule governing the proof of similar offenses, for the reason that in the case at bar we have no proof of an offense, but merely proof of a suspicious circumstance. See also, Zamora v. United States, 369 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1967); Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1956); Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1941). The trial judge cautioned the jury that this evidence was received for a limited purpose and no error is asserted in connection with the instruction which was given.