Kracoski v. Bernice White Ash Coal Co.

11 Citing cases

  1. Davidson Unempl. Compensation Case

    151 A.2d 870 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959)   Cited 19 times

    Notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issues is required, although it is not always necessary that additional testimony be taken before the board. Kracoski v. Bernice WhiteAsh Coal Co., Inc., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 163, 130 A.2d 190. See Pennsylvania State Athletic Commission v. Bratton, 177 Pa. Super. 598, 604, 112 A.2d 422, 425:

  2. Nash v. Sandnes' Sons, Inc.

    295 A.2d 615 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1972)   Cited 17 times

    In the case of Mapp v. City of Philadelphia, 215 Pa. Super. 101, 257 A.2d 306 (1969), the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied the unusual strain doctrine to a fact situation where the employee collapsed due to the strain and stress of additional duties which were new to her prior regular course of employment. There the court cited the case of Kracoski v. Bernice White Ash Coal Co., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 130 A.2d 190 (1957) where the court had stated: "Where a claimant has a pre-existing condition, the mere aggravation thereof is itself not compensable unless there is clear proof of an accident in the ordinary lay understanding of that term. . . . Overexertion which aggravates a pre-existing condition may be sufficient." 183 Pa. Super. at 161-62, 130 A.2d at 194.

  3. Mapp v. Philadelphia

    257 A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969)   Cited 6 times

    In making this finding the Board rejected appellant's medical testimony and, instead, adopted the medical testimony of the employer's witness, Dr. Samuel G. Bullock. Dr. Bullock and the Board, however, failed to address themselves to the relevant medical question of whether the strain of the appellant's work aggravated her pre-existing condition testified to by Dr. Bullock. While it may be true, as Dr. Bullock stated, that appellant's disability was not "traumatic" in that it was not exclusively caused by the strain of her employment, this does not establish that the strain of her employment did not contribute to her disability. The law in this regard was stated in Kracoski v. Bernice White Ash Coal Co., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 130 A.2d 190 (1957): "Where a claimant has a pre-existing condition, the mere aggravation thereof is itself not compensable unless there is clear proof of an accident in the ordinary lay understanding of that term. . . . Overexertion which aggravates a pre-existing condition may be sufficient." At 161-162.

  4. Houseal v. Certain-Teed Prod. Corp.

    257 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969)

    At 45. Similarly, in Kracoski v. Bernice White Ash Coal Co., Inc., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 130 A.2d 190 (1957), we held that a claimant who was accidentally injured on the job was entitled to an award of total disability when, four months later, he aggravated his initial injury. In doing so we specifically upheld the referee's finding that the second injury did not constitute a separate accident within the meaning of the compensation act. Nonetheless, the insurance carrier of the employer, at the time the initial injury took place, was held liable for the subsequent aggravation as that naturally flowed from the first injury. "[T]he total disability resulted from the [first] accidental injury . . ., which was merely increased or intensified by the [subsequent] non-accidental incident. . . ."

  5. Shiery v. Lauffer Tire Ser., Inc. et al

    177 A.2d 455 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962)   Cited 4 times

    Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that it was proper to adjudicate their respective liability in the instant proceeding. Cf. Healey v.Carey, Baxter Kennedy, 144 Pa. Super. 500, 19 A.2d 852; Eldridge v. Blue Ridge Textile Co., 160 Pa. Super. 578, 52 A.2d 339; Kracoski v. Bernice White Ash Coal Co., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 130 A.2d 190. Conceding that there was evidence to support an award for partial disability as a result of the accident of June 10, 1958, Lauffer argues that "the compensation authorities should have awarded compensation to claimant in this case for partial disability up to the time of the second accident and then suspended the award as of that date, i.e. March 12, 1959, or at the most July 6, 1959.

  6. Hurlburt v. Fidelity Window Clean. Co.

    160 A.2d 251 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)   Cited 17 times

    We have not overlooked claimant's contention that he is entitled to compensation "even if the accident of July 28, 1954 was not of the conventional type". The only case cited in support of this proposition is Kracoski v. Bernice White AshCoal Co., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 130 A.2d 190, which fully sustains our determination of the instant appeal. Judgment reversed and here entered for the appellants.

  7. Gammaitoni v. Gasparini Ex. Co.

    139 A.2d 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958)   Cited 11 times
    In Gammaitoni it was the result of age and degeneration, but was held not to have been such as might be considered exceptional as to bar a recovery for disability resulting from a subsequent accident.

    pected and unusual pathological result, that is to say, where the accident resides in the extraordinary nature of the effect rather than in the cause, it is a compensable accident: Good v. Pa. Dept. of Property and Supplies, 346 Pa. 151, 154, 30 A.2d 434. A compensable injury may occur in the course of the normal duties of an employe and without over-exertion, when a strain, sprain or twist causes a break or sudden change in the physical structure or tissues of the body — that is, a fracture of the bone or bony cartilage, or a rupture of the softer tissues: Parks v. Miller Printing Machine Co., 336 Pa. 455, 459, 9 A.2d 742; Witt v. Witt's Food Market, 122 Pa. Super. 557, 186 A. 275; Camilli v. Pa. R.R., 135 Pa. Super. 510, 513, 514, 7 A.2d 129; Gavula v. Sims Co., 155 Pa. Super. 206, 213, 38 A.2d 482; Owatt v. Rodman's Beverage, 169 Pa. Super. 339, 343, 82 A.2d 255; Landis v. General Motors Corp., 180 Pa. Super. 332, 335, 336, 119 A.2d 645, 647; Kracoski v.Bernice White Ash Coal Co., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 161, 130 A.2d 190. Appellants argue that the court below has substituted its finding of an unexpected pathological result for the board's finding that there was an accident in the ordinary lay understanding of that term. They also argue that the board based its decision upon the sole finding that there was no accident in the usual lay meaning of the term.

  8. Leftwrich v. Colonial Alum. Sm. Corp.

    136 A.2d 182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957)   Cited 7 times

    Assuming but not deciding the correctness of "American's" position, the action of the court below would be harmless error. Kracoski v. Bernice White Ash Coal Co., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 162, 163, 130 A.2d 190. Judgment is reversed and the record is remitted to the court below with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the award of the board entered as of February 20, 1957.

  9. Ede v. Ruhe Motor Corp.

    136 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957)   Cited 12 times

    We are in agreement with both of these contentions, notwithstanding the fact that we do not question the finding of the Board that appellee has a ten percent partial disability. While the Board is the ultimate arbiter of the facts and its findings are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence, the appellate court may review questions of law, including whether the law has been properly applied to the facts: Kracoski v. Bernice White Ash Coal Co., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 130 A.2d 190. Act of 1915, P.L. 736, section 306(b), as amended, 77 P.S. 512.

  10. Ertz v. Glen Nan, Inc.

    371 A.2d 533 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1977)   Cited 7 times
    Holding new carrier liable for entire claim even though on the risk for only 7 hours

    See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Cicioni, 29 Pa. Commw. 381, 370 A.2d 1256 (1977). Shiery v. Lauffer Tire Service, Inc., 197 Pa. Super. 209, 177 A.2d 455 (1962); Kracoski v. Bernice White Ash Coal Co., 183 Pa. Super. 155, 130 A.2d 190 (1957); Gronski v. Jeddo-Highland Coal Co., 168 Pa. Super. 605, 81 A.2d 590 (1951); Karoly v. Jeddo-Highland Coal Co., 166 Pa. Super. 571, 73 A.2d 214 (1950); Gaydosh v. Richmond Radiator Co., 164 Pa. Super. 154, 63 A.2d 502 (1949). Such a determination is of course, subject to review by this Court.